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PREFACE 
 
A Note on Terminology  
When General Robert E. Lee arrived at Appomattox in April 1865 to surrender the 
remnants of the once mighty Army of Northern Virginia he noticed Ely Parker, a Seneca 
Indian on General Grant’s staff, and remarked, “Good to see one real American here.” 
Parker replied, “We are all Americans here.”1 Although Lee’s comment was perhaps aimed 
at the lack of patriotism displayed by citizens of the North and South, who had been 
engaged in a fratricidal struggle for four years, it is debateable whether Indians in general, 
despite Parker’s reply, are happy to be described as “Americans”.  
Deciding on an appropriate term to describe the indigenous peoples of North 
America is fraught with danger for a white European, even one who remains broadly 
sympathetic to their concerns and perspectives. Indeed, such use by an alien could be seen 
as appropriating their inherent right to determine their own descriptive, endorsing the 
colonialism that led to its use, or attempting to homogenise the many inter-tribal 
differences. Nevertheless, the term Indian was predominantly used instead of Native 
American, Native North American or Amerind for a variety of reasons. Firstly, I am 
reasonably certain that the term “Indian” is not regarded nowadays as a pejorative term as 
many native scholars themselves use the term. Secondly, many indigenous organizations 
use the word Indian in the title: National Congress of American Indians and the American 
Indian Movement. Thirdly, it is used to avoid confusion as both Canadian and U.S.  
legislation include the term.2 Fourthly, Indian activist Russell Means, perhaps tenuously, 
suggests that Columbus really described Indians not as Indios (people of India) but In Dios 
(“in God”).3 Fifthly, as suggested above, some Indians reject any descriptive that includes 
American in the title such as “American Indian” and “Native American.” Finally, for 
clarity, as it is used on both sides of the border. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Bedwell, R. J. (1999). Brink of Destruction : a Quotable History of the Civil War. Nashville, Tenn. ; [Great 
Britain], Cumberland House. p202 
 
2 Pevar, S. L. (2004). The Rights of Indians and Tribes : the Authoritative ACLU Guide to Indian and Tribal 
Rights. Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press.p1 
 
3 Zimmerman, L. J. and Molyneaux, B. (1996). Native North America. Boston, Little, Brown.p7 
 
 
 
Having said that, the expression “Native American” has been used for variety and 
differentiation when referring to U.S. Indians, and “First Nations” has been used when 
describing Canadian Indians. The terms indigenous peoples and aboriginals have been 
applied to describe all Indians of North America and indeed peoples further afield.4  
 
Who is an Indian? 
United States 
An “ethnological Indian,” who may differ from a “legal Indian,” is a descendant of 
the inhabitants of North America before the arrival of the European. Indeed, a legal Indian 
may differ according to the legislation or federal programme. In very general terms, a legal 
Indian, for federal purposes, is one who has some Indian ancestry and is recognised as 
Indian by a federally recognised tribe.5  
 
Canada 
Again, an ethnological Indian would be someone with some ancestry from an 
original inhabitant of North America. Aboriginal peoples, for the purposes of Section 35(1) 
of the Constitution Act (1982), include, by virtue of Section 35(2), “Indian, Inuit and Metis6 
peoples of Canada.” The federal apportionment of “Indians and land reserved for 
Indians,” courtesy of Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act 1867, does include the Eskimos 
of Northern Quebec7 and by implication includes all Inuit.8 Whether this also includes 
Metis has not been determined.9 
                                                          
4 Indigenous itself may bear some explanation. According to a UN study of 1986 “Indigenous communities, 
peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial 
societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies 
now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society 
and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and 
their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural 
patterns, social institutions and legal systems.” U.N. Subcomm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & 
Protection of Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations FN47 
FROM HLRA (2003). "International Law as an Interpretative Force in Federal Indian Law." Harv. L. Rev. 
116: 1751-1773. Professor James Anaya’s concise definition of “the term indigenous refers broadly to the 
living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others.” Dannenmaier, E. (2008). 
"Beyond Indigenous Property Rights: Exploring the Emergence of a Distinctive Connection Doctrine." 
Wash. UL Rev. 86: 53-77, 59 
5 US v Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 For further discussion of the complexities of the definition please see 
Anderson, R.T. , Goldberg, C. et al (eds)(2005).pp160-164 
 
6 Metis are descendants of mixed marriages between indigenous people and mainly French settlers. (Elliot, D 
(2000) op.cit., p19 
 
7 Re Eskimos [1939] S.C.R 104 
 
 
 
Indians within the jurisdiction of the Indian Act have “Indian status.” In general, they are 
the descendants of a group recognised by the Canadian government as Indians in 1874,10 
and Indian status is virtually synonymous with membership in one of the approximately 
600 Indian bands.11 Indian status is further subdivided into those living on or off reserves. 
Inuit and Metis do not have “Indian status” for the purposes of the Indian Act.12 
 
Religious Encumbrance 
It is important for any author, who purports to write on religion, to declare his own 
religious affiliation at the outset. This could best be described by Deloria’s memorable 
epithet as a “Seven Day Absentist.”13 It is submitted that this lack of any religious baggage 
is perhaps an advantage in providing a more dispassionate and objective viewpoint when 
discussing the treatment of one religion by another.  
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8 Elliot, D (2000) op.cit., p13 
 
9 Ibid 
 
10 Formerly patrilineal but since 1985 and Bill C-31 now Indian women who marry non-Indian men can pass 
on Indian Status. Please see Elliot, D (2000) op.cit., p16 for further complexity. 
 
11 Elliot, D (2000) op.cit., p14 
 
12 ibid pp18-19 
 
13 ibid  p1 
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Summary 
 
This thesis will be a historical and comparative treatment of the way law has been 
applied in both an assimilative and proscriptive manner to destroy Indian religions in the 
United States and Canada. By producing the first such comparison, it is hoped that the 
emphasis on different outcomes may promote the cross-border adoption of alternative 
legal strategies, and ultimately provide something that may have potential as advocacy.  
The Nineteenth Century saw attempts by the North American governments, often 
motivated by revulsion, to homogenise their native populations with illegitimate, often 
illegal and sometimes un-constitutional laws, aimed at the suppression of their religions. In 
the Twentieth Century there was less overt proscription but rather an acquisitive attitude to 
native cultural and sacred artefacts which continues to have a destructive impact on their 
religious practices. Although there have been sporadic attempts to reverse this treatment by 
repatriating some of these objects, such gestures have come at little governmental cost. It is 
the continuing restrictions on Indian prayer at sacred sites, often motivated by opposing 
commercial interests, which reveal the true extent of the forfeit the governments are 
prepared to pay. 
An essential part of this study will be an investigation into how international legal 
doctrines that were ultimately derived from Christianity were introduced into North 
America to deprive the indigenous peoples of their legal rights. International Law on 
indigenous peoples will then be re-examined in the present era for doctrines that can be re-
incorporated in order to reverse this colonisation. The seminal United Nations Declaration 
on Indigenous Peoples (2007), together with other more substantive and binding International 
Law, will be critically assessed for their potential to bolster domestic law and its ambivalent 
attitude to Indian religious freedom.     
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    INTRODUCTION  
 Aims 
This thesis will compare the historical treatment of indigenous religions in Canada 
and the United States from the Nineteenth Century until the present day. It is hoped that 
employing a comparative approach will facilitate the cross-border transplantation of 
successful legal strategies, question the inevitability of each country’s jurisprudential 
approach, and emphasise alternative outcomes.  
A broader aim is to demonstrate how law, having been used historically as a sword 
by the dominant societies against native religious practices, can be operationalised as a 
shield in the contemporary period. One such example is how the Doctrine of Discovery, 
derived from Christianity and the European Law of Nations, was incorporated into North 
American jurisprudence from first contact in order to justify the destruction of indigenous 
legal rights, and how a contemporary re-incorporation of International Law may help to 
reverse this process. This may prove optimistic, as there is merely a selective engagement 
with supra-national law in North America, driven by expediency.  
Subsidiary themes include demonstrating that North American Indian Law is 
founded on a Christian/Infidel dichotomy and that North American religious freedom 
jurisprudence is tacitly based on, and privileges, a Judaeo-Christian perspective. There will 
also be an investigation into whether the extent of any accommodation of Indian religion is 
inversely proportional to the material sacrifice demanded of the dominant society.  
More generally, it is hoped that the dissemination of knowledge about Indian 
religions and the threat posed by the North American governments will foster greater 
empathy and respect for Indian perspectives and experiences. The crystallisation of two 
centuries of religious destruction in one text may, it is tentatively suggested, also prompt a 
greater impetus within Indian societies themselves to codify tribal heritage programmes in 
order to further safeguard their rich spiritual patrimony. 
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Importance  
Although much of the more flagrant destruction of Indian religious practices 
ceased in the early Twentieth Century, there remains an ongoing but covert subordination 
of Indian spirituality, typified by the constant need to explain and secure protection for 
their unfamiliar religious practices within a society, steeped as it is, in the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition. For example, Peyote to the Indian worshipper is a sacrament, to the North 
American governments it is merely an intoxicant. Similarly, sacred Indian objects are 
regarded as museum curios and universal cultural patrimony by western society, rather than 
essential elements in the perpetuation of a religion. Furthermore, Indian sacred sites still 
remain vulnerable within a dominant society which regards the North American geography 
as inherently secular and, leaving aside sporadic pangs of environmental conscience, 
available for commercial despoliation. 
Due to the relatively recent (2007), but seminal, United Nations Declaration on 
Indigenous Peoples, a re-assessment of how International Law can be recruited to protect 
indigenous legal rights is also important at this time. Of particular relevance is the, 
admittedly limited, extent of contemporary international protection accorded indigenous 
religion, given the fact that supranational law first articulated the legal doctrines that 
provided the framework for the suppression of their legal rights and religions. 
 This thesis is based on the view that there remains a basic value in religious 
tolerance and cultural pluralism as Justice Tobriner memorably remarked in People v Woody: 
“The varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our national life give it 
depth and beauty. We preserve a greater value than an ancient tradition when we protect the rights 
of the Indians who honestly practised an old religion...”1 
 
Structure 
This thesis will be divided into three parts. Chapter One, of Part I, will investigate 
the Christian doctrines which justified the legal subjugation of the indigenous peoples of 
the North American continent. In particular, how legitimacy and legality were originally 
derived from Papal Grant, Royal Charter, Christian conquest and Lockean concepts of land 
tenure. The development of these principles both sides of the border will be explored 
together with their consolidation by Nineteenth Century case law and their continuing 
                                                          
1 People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 821-822 (1964) 
 
3 
 
relevance in the present era. The symbiotic relationship between law and religion in the 
foundational doctrines of Indian Law will thus be demonstrated.2 
Having destroyed Indian rights by these legal doctrines, which were derived from 
Christianity, the Europeans purported to isolate church and state within their own 
societies. Chapter Two will make a general comparison between the position of religion 
within the legal systems of Canada and the United States and make an initial assessment 
whether there has been such a perfect division between the temporal and spiritual. By 
contrast, Indian societies readily admit the theocratic elements of their governments and 
this blurring of church and state will be contrasted with the supposed dichotomy in the 
dominant societies. In addition to the dissonance between the liberal, capitalist and 
individualistic paradigm and tribal concepts of property ownership, there is also a 
majoritarian incomprehension of the Indian view of land as being sacred and inalienable. 
The difficulties that this presents to the Indian litigant within the North American legal 
systems will be examined.  
Part II will then explore the Nineteenth Century in more detail and build on the 
conceptual foundations of Part I. In particular, Chapter Three will critically chart the 
development of each country’s legal relationship with their Indian populations, exposing 
the conflict between the recognition of tribal sovereignty and the unilateral imposition of 
federal jurisdiction. As a precursor to a discussion of the governments’ treatment of Indian 
religions, Chapter Four will compare, in detail, the freedom of religion jurisprudence for 
the mainstream faiths of each country. Having described the Nineteenth Century legal 
landscape, Chapter Five will then analyse each country’s attempts forcibly to evangelise 
their Indians by the use of missionaries and compulsory boarding schools. In particular, 
this treatment will be investigated for violations of Treaties in both countries and also the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses in the United States.  
Following largely unsuccessful attempts to convince the Indians of the undoubted 
advantages of Christianity as a suitable replacement for their spirituality, the North 
American governments resorted to a proscription of Indian religious practices. Chapter Six 
will analyse this devastating process against the prevailing free exercise jurisprudence within 
each country and assess which jurisdiction has been the most oppressive of Indian 
spirituality.  
                                                          
2 Indian Law is law imposed from without the tribe and consists of legislation, regulations of federal agencies 
and judicial determinations. It is law about Indians in contrast to Tribal Law, which is law created by Indians, 
relating to intra-tribal affairs. 
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Part III will continue the narrative from the start of the Twentieth Century until the 
present. Chapter Seven will, like Chapter Three, chart the development of Indian Law 
within each jurisdiction. In particular, United States’ policy, which demonstrated 
considerable fluctuation in its respect for Indian sovereignty, will be contrasted with the 
situation of Canadian Indians, who were more consistently marginalised both tribally and 
individually. Indeed, the actual existence of any aboriginal rights in Canada was 
unrecognised until the 1970s and the Calder3 case. The implications of the 
constitutionalisation of aboriginal rights in Canada from 1982 will also be explored and 
contrasted with the United States, where Indian rights are better defined but less 
entrenched.  
Chapter Eight will compare freedom of religion jurisprudence between the two 
countries from the start of the Twentieth Century. There was increasing free exercise 
litigation in the United States leading to the seminal case of Smith,4 which dealt with the 
religious use of Peyote by Native Americans. The implications of this destructive case will 
be explored both for Indians and the wider religious community.  The United States also 
purported to rebuild the wall between church and state by introducing a more robust 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. By contrast, Canada only recently constitutionalised 
the freedom of religion (although without an Establishment Clause) in 19825 and the 
nascent case law will be examined for similarities and differences. 
Although there was less overt suppression of Indian religious practices during this 
period, the attitude shifted from revulsion to acquisition with the determined and 
systematic appropriation of Indian sacred objects. Chapter Nine will explain how this is 
equally destructive of Indians’ right to the free exercise of their religion and will discuss the 
attempts to recover such objects. In particular, there will be a comparison between the two 
countries of both the extent of sacred object alienation and also the effectiveness of 
subsequent repatriation legislation. The potential for creating an aboriginal right to the 
possession of all sacred objects, which would enjoy constitutional protection, will also be 
explored in Canada. 
The accommodation of Indian spirituality by the North American governments 
seems more enthusiastic when it comes at little governmental cost. Chapter Ten will 
                                                          
3 Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313  
 
4 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
 
5 Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms ss1-34 of  The Constitution Act 1982 
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investigate these tensions and the extent to which commercial considerations circumscribe 
the free exercise of U.S. Indians at their sacred sites, many of which, it must be 
remembered, pre-date the arrival of the Europeans in North America. Although much of 
the continental United States has been subjected to wholesale extinguishment of Indian 
title by treaty, Canadian public land has not been the subject of such a comprehensive 
treaty system and thus remains, at least in theory, encumbered by un-extinguished 
aboriginal title. This difference explains the strategies pursued, with U.S Indians relying 
mainly on the free exercise of religion, whereas Canadian Indians also have the option of 
asserting aboriginal title to areas on which sacred sites are situated. As an alternative to 
judicial and executive protection of sacred sites, the chapter will investigate the feasibility of 
legislative intervention in the shape of a sacred site statute.  
This thesis will conclude with the development of International Law on indigenous 
peoples, in particular how the paradigm gradually shifted from a demand for individual 
equality and integration within the dominant societies, to a more discrete and tribal 
existence. The United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples (2007) was a significant 
development and was unique in that it was the product of serious consultation with 
indigenous peoples themselves. The Declaration will be analysed in terms of its legitimacy 
and the rather ambitious claim that it represents Customary International Law.  
Thus we may see how two chapters on International Law, or its earliest 
manifestation the European Law of Nations, bookend the thesis. The earlier incorporation 
of the Doctrine of Discovery, discussed in Chapter One, served to deprive the indigenous 
peoples of their legal rights. Yet the hope that the latter re-incorporation of some 
International Law precepts will serve to redress some of the injustice may prove illusory. 
North American enthusiasm for supra-national law depends on its conformity with the 
domestic agenda. International Treaties, UN Declarations and supervisory bodies that 
empower indigenous peoples and threaten such an agenda are usually marginalised, 
deprecated or ignored within North America.  
 
Originality/Literature Review 
Comparative Treatments 
There has been no comparative treatment between Canada and the United States of 
either the historical suppression or the modern accommodation of indigenous religious 
6 
 
practice. There are studies of the general history of the Indians in each country by Nichols;6 
a collection of essays comparing each Constitution;7 a study comparing treaty-making 
policies;8 specific articles on the Establishment Clause and lack thereof;9 articles comparing 
general religious freedom;10 the application of the Doctrine of Discovery in each country;11 
the varying interpretation of the fiduciary relationship;12 general aboriginal policy;13 
aboriginal civil rights;14 and articles comparing tribal sovereignty.15 
 
The Christian Foundations of Indian Law 
Similarly, the link between the original incorporation of the Christian Doctrine of 
Discovery into law and subsequent treatment by that law of Indian religion has not been 
                                                          
6 Nichols, R. L. (1998). Indians in the United States and Canada : a Comparative History. Lincoln, University 
of Nebraska Press. 
7 McKenna, M. C. (ed) (1993). The Canadian and American Constitutions in Comparative Perspective. 
Calgary, Alta., Canada, University of Calgary Press 
 
8 St. Germain, J. (2001). Indian Treaty-making Policy in the United States and Canada, 1867-1877. Lincoln, 
University of Nebraska Press. 
 
9 Beschle, D. (2001). "Does the Establishment Clause Matter?--Non-Establishment Principles in the United 
States and Canada." University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 4: 451-492; Albert, R. (2004). 
"American Separationism and Liberal Democracy: The Establishment Clause in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective." Marquette Law Review 88: 867-925 
 
10 Eisgruber, C. and Zeisberg, M. (2006). "Religious Freedom in Canada and the United States." International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 4(2): 244-268; Beyer, P. (2003). "Constitutional Privilege and Constituting 
Pluralism: Religious Freedom in National, Global, and Legal Context." Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion 42(3): 333-339; Sedler, R. (1988). "The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Religion, 
Expression, and Association in Canada and The United States: A Comparative Analysis Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 20: 577-621; Beaman, L. G. (2003). "The Myth of Pluralism, Diversity, 
and Vigor: The Constitutional Privilege of Protestantism in the United States and Canada." Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 42(3): 311-325 
 
11 Walters, M. (2005). " The Morality of Aboriginal Law." Queen's Law Journal 31: 470-520 
 
12 Elliott, D. (1996). "Aboriginal Peoples in Canada and the United States and the Scope of the Special 
Fiduciary Relationship." Manitoba Law Journal 24: 137-186. 
 
13 Morse, B. (1997). "Common Roots but Modern Divergences: Aboriginal Policies in Canada and the United 
States." St. Thomas Law Review 10: 115-148.; Worthen, K. (1998). "The Grand Experiment: Evaluating 
Indian Law in the "New World"." Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law 5: 299-334, 305.; 
Johnson, R. (1991). "Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States Policy toward Indians." 
Washington Law Review 66: 643-718, 666.; Fleras, A. and Elliott, J. L. (1992). The "Nations Within" : 
Aboriginal-State Relations in Canada, the United States, and New Zealand. Toronto, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
14 Cross, J. and Lomond, K. (1993). "The Civil Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of the United States and 
Canada." Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 10: 253-299, 274. 
 
15 Wells, M. (1991). "Sparrow and Lone Wolf: Honoring Tribal Rights in Canada and the United States." 
Washington Law Review 66: 1119-1137. 
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extensively analysed. Robert Williams’ 1990 account of the origins of American Indian Law 
was radical at the time, based as it was on the revelation of the Christian and feudal origins 
of American Indian Law.16 Scholarship on the Doctrine of Discovery and Christian 
imperialism has been more plentiful in recent times with several important articles. In 
particular Miller17 explains how the United States Supreme Court, far from being the 
originator of the Doctrine in Johnson v. M’Intosh,18 was in fact the last branch of government 
to adopt it. Furthermore, in common with Newcomb,19 he suggests the Doctrine as the 
basis of the Trust Relationship and Plenary Power concept, in preference to a tortuous and 
dubious constitutional justification. Watson20 questions the “Universal Recognition” of the 
Doctrine amongst the colonizers, with contemporary dissent from English authors such as 
Roger Williams, as well as those from other European nations, in particular Spain, France, 
Holland and Sweden. Worthen21 charts the differing evolution of the Doctrine in the 
United States and Canada, and how the latter failed to soften the doctrine with the 
emollient of inherent tribal sovereignty that was later recognised in the United States by 
Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia. 22 In a recent article, Kades23 reveals that the foundational 
case of Johnson v. M’Intosh was based on a misapprehension: the land in question was 
actually two tracts of land 50 miles apart! In addition there have been two 2005 studies: one 
a historical account of land dispossession from first contact to the turn of the Nineteenth 
Century;24 the other an in-depth and important treatment of the Johnson case, using 
previously unseen documentation relating to the original purchaser of the land, the Illinois 
                                                          
16 Williams, R. A. (1990). The American Indian in Western Legal Thought : the Discourses of Conquest. New 
York, Oxford University Press 
17 Miller, R. (2005). "The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law." Idaho Law Review 42: 1-122. 
18 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823) 
 
19 Newcomb, S. (1992). "The Evidence of Christian Nationalism In Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of 
Discovery, Johnson v. McIntosh, and Plenary Power." New York University Review of Law & Social Change 
20: 303-337 
 
20 Watson, B. (2006). "John Marshall and Indian Land Rights: A Historical Rejoinder to the Claim of" 
Universal Recognition" of the Doctrine of Discovery." Seton Hall Law Review 36(2): 481-549 
 
21 Worthen, K. (1998). op.cit., p305. 
 
22 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515 (1832) 
 
23Kades, E. (2001). "History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M'Intosh." Law and History 
Review: 67-116 
 
24 Banner, S. (2007). How the Indians Lost their Land : Law and Power on the Frontier. Cambridge, Mass.; 
London, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
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and Wabash Land Company.25 The latter work exposes the ulterior motive of Justice 
Marshall in relegating the Indian interest in land to something less than a fee simple in 
order to obliquely favour some unconnected grants of land to his fellow revolutionary war 
veterans.26 
 
Nineteenth Century Government Policies 
There is some literature on the Nineteenth Century religious suppression and 
Christian evangelism pursued in each country but no explicit comparison between the two 
countries. In Canada, relatively recent studies include a general treatment by Pettipas of 
how prairie tribes’ religious suppression was linked to Victorian morality;27 the specific 
targeting of the Potlatch (Giveaway Ceremony) as wasteful and regressive by Cole and 
Chaikin;28 and the clash between the Christian and Indian worldviews.29 Any United States 
study of this area is indebted to the works of Francis Paul Prucha. His study of the 
philanthropic yet misguided motives of the East Coast “Friends of the Indians,”30 and his 
general history of government policy31 remain seminal texts, if a little dated. Other notable 
contributions include James Mooney’s sympathetic and contemporaneous books on the 
Ghost Dance,32 which incidentally earned him much opprobrium at the time,33 and 
Dussias’ important recent article linking the Nineteenth Century policy with modern day 
                                                          
25 Robertson, L. G. (2005). Conquest by Law : How the Discovery of America Dispossessed Indigenous 
Peoples of their Lands. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press   
26 ibid  p96 
27 Pettipas, K. (1994). Severing the Ties that Bind : Government Repression of Indigenous Religious 
Ceremonies on the Prairies. Winnipeg, University of Manitoba Press. 
 
28 Cole, D. and Chaikin, I. (1990). An Iron Hand upon the People : The Law against the Potlatch on the 
Northwest Coast. Vancouver, Seattle, p12. 
 
29 LaViolette, F. E. (1973) The Struggle for Survival; Indian Cultures and the Protestant Ethic in British 
Columbia [by] Forrest E. LaViolette. [Reprinted with additions, Toronto, Buffalo] University of Toronto 
Press 
 
30 Prucha, F. P. (1976). American Indian Policy in Crisis : Christian Reformers and the Indian, 1865-1900. 
Norman, Okla., University of Oklahoma Press. 
 
31 Prucha, F. P. (1986). The Great Father : The United States Government and the American Indians. Lincoln 
[Neb.] ; London, University of Nebraska Press. 
 
32 Mooney, J. (1896). The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890. Washington, Govt. 
Printing Office; Mooney, J. (1973).; The Ghost-Dance Religion and Wounded Knee. New York,, Dover 
Publications 
 
33 Willard, W. (1991). "The First Amendment, Anglo-Conformity and American Indian Religious Freedom." 
Wicazo Sa Review 7: 25-41. 
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jurisprudence.34 In particular, Professor Dussias explains how the Establishment Clause 
was overlooked in the Nineteenth Century, to suit the policy of Christianization by 
missionaries, yet has emerged as a barrier to the accommodation of native religious 
practices in the Twentieth Century. Fleeting treatment is afforded to religious suppression 
in the eminent historian Angie Debo’s general history 35 and other general works.36 
  
Spirituality 
This is not a theological treatise and any description of Indian religious practice is 
merely to illustrate the divergence with Judaeo-Christian traditions, situate it within the 
wider frame of culture, and explain the specific tensions with Western legality. Native views 
that have been consulted include Black Elk,37 Charles Eastman,38 Geronimo,39 Rennard 
Strickland,40 Mary Brave Bird,41 Wilma Mankiller42 and a myriad of other voices embedded 
in more generic texts. In the works of Black Elk, Geronimo, Brave Bird and Mankiller it is 
not certain how much of the material is that of the Native American viewpoint or the non-
Indian collaborator. Indeed Vecsey has remarked that the celebrated Black Elk Speaks has 
been translated into many languages but not into his mother tongue of Lakota.43  If this 
were a purely religious project this would be problematic yet, as mentioned above, native 
                                                          
34 Dussias, A. (1997). "Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization 
Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases." Stanford Law Review: 773-852 
 
35 Debo, A. (1970). A History of the Indians of the United States. Norman,, University of Oklahoma Press 
 
36 Feest, C. (2000). The Cultures of Native North Americans. Cologne, Konemann; Josephy, A. M. (19995). 
500 Nations : an Illustrated History of North American Indians. New York, Gramercy Books.; Zimmerman, 
L. J. (1996). Native North America : Belief and Ritual, Spirits of Earth and Sky. London, Duncan Baird 
Publishers  
 
37 Black Elk, Neihardt, J.G. et al. (2004). Black Elk Speaks : Being the Life Story of a Holy Man of the Oglala 
Sioux. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press; Brown, J. E. (1953). The Sacred Pipe. Black Elk's Account of 
the Seven Rites of the Oglala Sioux. Recorded & edited by Joseph Epes Brown. [With portraits.], pp. xx. 144. 
University of Oklahoma Press: Norman. 
 
38 Eastman, C. A. (1911). The Soul of the Indian. An Interpretation, pp. xiii. 170. Houghton Mifflin Co.: 
Boston & New York 
 
39 Geronimo, Barrett, S. M. et al. (1996). Geronimo : His Own Story. New York, Meridian. 
 
40 Strickland, R. (1985). "Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American 
Experience." University of Kansas Law Review 34: 713-755 
 
41 Brave Bird, M. and Erdoes R. (1990). Lakota Woman. New York, Grove Weidenfeld.; Brave Bird, M. and 
Erdoes, R. (1993). Ohitika Woman. New York, Grove Press. 
 
42 Mankiller, W. P. and Wallis,M. (1993). Mankiller : a Chief and her People. New York, St. Martin's Press. 
 
43 Vecsey, C. (1990). Religion in Native North America. Moscow, Idaho, University of Idaho Press. p148 
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spirituality will only be treated to the extent that it enables contextualisation, therefore 
these defects should not be fatal. One interesting perspective was provided by a collection 
of essays assembled by James Treat that were written by Native American Christians.44 
These essays emphasised the syncretic elements of native spirituality, which are equally 
worthy of protection, but which are often overlooked in the primitivist non-Indian 
projection of Indian religious practices, which fails to see beyond a rigid dichotomy of 
Indian/non-Indian traditions. A more nuanced view would inquire how each changed and 
informed the other and would impart greater agency to Indians, rather than merely as 
objects of acculturation.45  
 
Free Exercise and Sacred Land in the Twentieth Century 
There is no shortage of United States’ studies on the free exercise of Indian 
religions and the protection of their sacred land. However, many are dated as Indian Law 
scholarship has been moving from the doctrinal to the empirical, with particular emphasis 
on the practical vindication of tribal sovereignty, rather than the treatment of the individual 
Indian within the dominant society.46 The books range from the comprehensive47 to the 
specialised.48 Among the more significant scholars writing articles are Beaman, who 
emphasises the tacit Christian hegemony in North America;49 Carpenter, who contrasts 
tribal constitutional religious freedom with majoritarian constitutional jurisprudence;50 
Ward, who doubts the possibility of accommodation of native religion within the existing 
                                                          
44 Treat, J. (1996). Native and Christian : Indigenous Voices on Religious Identity in the United States and 
Canada. New York ; London, Routledge 
 
45 McNally, M. D. (2000). "The Practice of Native American Christianity." Church History 69(4): 834-859, 
836,837 
46 Frickey, P (2007) “The New Realism: The Next Generation of Scholarship in Federal Indian Law” 
Conference Transcript the National Congress of American Indian (2006)  American Indian Law Review 32: 
1-150  
47 Vecsey, C. (ed) (1991) op.cit.,; Wunder, J. R.(ed) (1996) Native American Cultural and Religious Freedoms. 
New York, Garland Pub. 
 
48 Long, C. N. (2000). Religious Freedom and Indian Rights : the Case of Oregon v. Smith. Lawrence, 
University Press of Kansas 
 
49 Beaman, L. (2002). "Aboriginal Spirituality and the Legal Construction of Freedom of Religion." Journal of 
Church and State 44: 135-152; Beaman, L. G. (2003) op.cit., 
 
50 Carpenter, K. (2004). "Considering Individual Religious Freedoms under Tribal Constitutional Law." 
Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy 14: 561-606 
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legal framework and proposes substantive sacred site protection legislation; 51 and Rose, 
who highlights the problem of conflating religion and culture in terms of free exercise 
protection, and instead proposes a greater reliance on the Trust Responsibility.52 
By contrast, the situation in Canada has been less exhaustively treated. Recently 
published collections of articles on indigenous cultural heritage and the law have provided 
useful background to the struggle for the repatriation of sacred objects, in particular the 
uneven nature of provincial laws.53  
 Two recent studies on aboriginal rights and sacred sites are welcome additions to 
the Canadian First Nations legal canon but remain exceptional.54 Foster and Webber’s 
collection of essays centres around the Calder case,55 that was a watershed in the common 
law recognition of aboriginal rights in Canada, which previously had been thought to 
originate solely from the Royal Proclamation 1763. This illustrates the disparity with the 
United States, where the common law recognition of aboriginal rights occurred in the 
Johnson case, fully 150 years previously. The work by Ross is a thorough legal analysis of 
nine cases with practical suggestions for First Nations to counter threats to their sacred 
sites.  
Although the relationship between costs to the dominant society and the extent of 
indigenous religious accommodation has been explored in the United States,56 this has not 
been fully investigated in Canada and there has certainly never been a comparison. In 
addition, there has been almost no analysis of how legal strategies pursued in one 
jurisdiction can cross-fertilize the other.  
 
                                                          
51 Ward, R. (1992). "Spirits Will Leave: Preventing the Desecration and Destruction of Native American 
Sacred Sites on Federal Land, The." Ecology Law Quarterly 19: 795-846  
 
52 Rose, B. (1999). "A Judicial Dilemma: Indian Religion, Indian Land, and the Religion Clauses." Virginia 
Journal of Social Policy & the Law 7: 103-140, 122. 
 
53 Bell, C. E. and Napoleon, V. (2008). First Nations Cultural Heritage and Law : Case Studies, Voices, and 
Perspectives. Vancouver, BC, UBC Press; Bell, C. E. and Paterson R. K. (2008). Protection of First Nations 
Cultural Heritage : Laws, Policy and Reform. Vancouver, UBC Press 
 
54 Foster, H., Webber, J. H. A. et al. (2007). Let Right be Done : Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the 
Future of Indigenous Rights. Vancouver, UBC Press.; Ross, M. L. (2005). First Nations Sacred Sites in 
Canada's courts. Vancouver, UBC Press. 
 
55 Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313  
 
56 See generally Brown, B. E. (1999). Religion, Law, and the Land : Native Americans and the Judicial 
Interpretation of Sacred Land. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press; Wunder, J. R. (ed) (1996) op.cit.,  ; Vecsey, 
C. (ed) (1991). Handbook of American Indian Religious Freedom. New York, Crossroad. 
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Limitations and Justification 
Apart from their geographical proximity, Canada and the United States have been 
chosen as the comparators as they are both liberal democracies, populated initially largely 
from the British Isles, with Common Law jurisprudence, written constitutions and 
federalist governmental structures.57 Furthermore, although there is great inter-tribal 
variation, both countries were inhabited by indigenous populations for millennia pre-
contact.58 A comparison between the two countries will test the consistent nature of the 
common law and hopefully engage a creative dialogue between two parallel and adjacent 
jurisprudences.  
Although tribes straddled the border, the Indians themselves recognised differences 
between the two countries. Indeed, the 49th parallel was known as “The Medicine Line” as 
it halted the United States’ Army’s pursuit of them into the supposedly more tolerant 
Canada.59 This thesis will examine the extent to which this line still provides succour to the 
Indians of North America.  
There will be no enquiry outside North America, for example into Australasian 
treatment of indigenous peoples. Such an expansion of the thesis would become limitless 
as an equally convincing case could be made for an extension to the British Colonies in 
Africa, or more pertinently a comparison between English-speaking and Spanish-speaking 
treatment of indigenes in the wider Americas. Such treatments would make fascinating 
future studies, but space constraints and immediate relevance oblige their exclusion. 
This thesis is historically limited in that it spans the treatment of indigenous religion 
from the middle of the Nineteenth Century to the present day. This period has been 
chosen as it was the era in which Canadian union and confederation occurred and thus 
there is essentially a comparison between two complete countries, rather than one country 
and a collection of disparate provinces. Nevertheless, there is some historical treatment 
from early colonial times until the War of Independence and the birth of the United States, 
in order to contextualise the different paths that were subsequently taken north and south 
of the 49th parallel.  
                                                          
57 Eisgruber, C. and Zeisberg,M. (2006) op.cit., p244 
58 Zimmerman, L. J. (1996) op.cit., p8 
59 LaDow, B. (2001). The Medicine Line : Life and Death on a North American Borderland. New York, 
Routledge. 
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As for Part II and the treatment of the Christianization and proscription of Indian 
religions, there is necessarily a geographical limitation to the western states and provinces 
for several reasons. Firstly, virtually all U.S. Indians had been removed from the eastern 
states by that time. Secondly, although many Canadian Indians remained in the eastern 
provinces of Canada, they were left largely alone as they had historically been close allies in 
the struggle for North America, their religious practices did not jar with Victorian morality, 
and moreover they had embraced European education while admittedly retaining much of 
their own culture. Thirdly, western tribes first encountered already powerful countries 
emboldened by population increase and hungry for land and resources, that were reluctant 
to compromise. Fourthly, as mentioned above, western tribes’ self-mutilation and 
profligate giveaway practices had greater dissonance with the Christian capitalist.  
Part III has been limited to Sacred Objects and Sacred Land. Although there could 
have been a chapter on the relevance of Endangered Species Legislation and impeding 
access to animals parts such as eagle feathers, that are needed to conduct religious 
ceremonies, this was omitted because there was insufficient material on Canada to make a 
comparison. Similarly, the treatment of the religious freedom of Indian prisoners was not 
dealt with as it has barely been as issue thus far in Canada. Although a dearth of material 
can of itself be a discovery, this is a comparative thesis and both adjacent mirrors have to at 
least exist if not necessarily be of the same size. In any case, space constraints mean that 
some elements must be sacrificed.  
 
Critical Indigenous Legal Theory: A New Methodology 
“Indian tribes were here for centuries before the United States came into existence and 
plan to occupy this land long after the United States is gone.”60 
 
The thesis will have a perspective I have tentatively coined as Critical Indigenous 
Legal Theory (CILT) which is an amalgam of Peri-Colonialist study, American Legal 
Realism, Critical Legal Studies and Critical Race Theory.  
CILT recognises that Post-Colonialism is an inappropriate optic, as the departure 
of the European from the North American continent is not imminent.  Peri-Colonialism is 
perhaps more fitting as the late Twentieth Century self-determination movement largely 
bypassed Indian nations. This Peri-Colonialism will stress the ongoing effects of 
colonisation and the colonial and pre-colonial legal doctrines that still operate; one example 
                                                          
60 Washburn, K. K. (2006). "Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination." North Carolina Law 
Review 84(4): 779-855, 833. 
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being the Doctrine of Discovery, which purported to carve up the infidels’ continent 
amongst the Christian nations. This was a European legal prefabricate, which arrived in 
North America having been settled amongst Europe’s potentates in advance, no indigenes 
having been consulted. This Doctrine was cited by the United States Supreme Court as 
recently as 2005.61 
The famous Indian scholar Felix Cohen was in the vanguard of American Legal 
Realism.62 A dose of Realism’s healthy scepticism and cynicism is necessary when studying 
Indian Law and a realization that judicial decisions may coincide with executive policy. For 
example, the erosion of Indian property rights by the Marshall trilogy of cases occurred 
during the forced relocation policy.63 Similarly, the accommodation of Indian religious 
practices occurs only to the extent that no material sacrifice is demanded of the dominant 
culture as witnessed in the sacred site cases on public land.64 
Critical Legal Studies occasionally extrapolates healthy scepticism into a pathological 
nihilism.65 Although its inter-disciplinary approach and exposure of covert hegemony is 
particularly relevant when confronting Judaeo-Christian privilege no remedy is offered, 
merely diagnosis. Instead a disengagement and resignation is suggested, for example, an 
avoidance of the Supreme Court by Indian litigants for fear of adverse precedent.66 This 
can result in little more than futile handwringing. CILT would adopt the forensic 
scepticism of CLS while rejecting the disengagement in favour of a more pro-active 
approach. Of course limited tribal resources preclude incontinent litigation.  
Critical Race Theory is also not, by itself, the most appropriate optic. Critical Race 
Theory is a movement that is both deconstructive, like Critical Legal Studies, but also 
reconstructive.67 However, its ultimate aim is an equality and integration of race which is to 
be achieved by rooting out any vestige of covert discrimination and tacit privileging on 
racial grounds. The Indians, in common with other indigenous peoples, seek not equality 
                                                          
61 In City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. 125 S.Ct. 1485 (2005) from Miller, R.J. (2005) op.cit., p3 
62 Cohen, F. (1935). "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach." Columbia Law Review 35: 
809-849. 
 
63 Williams, R. A. (2005). Like a Loaded Weapon : the Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal History 
of Racism in America. Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, pp47-67 
64 See generally Brown, B.E. (1999) op.cit., 
 
65 Macks, R (2009) op.cit., p338 
 
66 Williams, R.A. (2005) op.cit., pp161-165 
67 Bell, D. (1995). "Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory." University of Illinois Law Review: 893-910, 899 
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but separation, not a final reversal of “separate but equal” but a re-affirmation of the tribal 
entity and Indian identity as “separate and different.”  As Devon Mihesuah remarks, for the 
Indian “America is not [so much a melting pot] but a “salad bowl”, a country composed  of 
peoples of different ethnicities that can often mix together like the ingredients of a salad 
but still retain their uniqueness.”68 Yet race cannot be completely ignored when stereotypes 
are perpetuated by sports teams such as the Cleveland Indians, Washington Redskins, 
Kansas City Chiefs and Atlanta Braves. Such nomenclature as the Washington Blackskins, 
Atlanta Berserkers, Kansas City Rabbis and Cleveland Polacks would hardly be tolerated.69 
Furthermore, the judiciary occasionally use overtly racist language for example when 
justifying the deprivation of aboriginal title: “Every American schoolboy knows that the 
savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force...”70 CRT’S  
anti-essentialism is also relevant, particularly when views are claimed to be from the 
“Indian Voice,” as there is so much inter-tribal variation.71 The dearth of minority 
representation in legal institutions is also a perennial concern of CRT: there is a chronic 
lack of native lawyers in the United States: only 1800 out of a total number of 1m whereas 
there are 2.6m Indians out of a total population of 300m.72   
Critical Race Theory, with its rejection of an “anti-discrimination colour blind 
approach,” in favour of an anti-subordination race-conscious methodology to equal 
protection jurisprudence,73 could be extended to the Indian religious context. Whereas an 
anti-discrimination approach disavows affirmative race and religious conscious remedies, 
anti-subordination permits them. The formalism of anti-discrimination is agnostic towards 
religious discrimination whereas the functionalism of anti-subordination takes a more 
realistic view by recognising that subliminal discrimination occurs, and then attempting to 
reverse it pro-actively.74 Such an approach would recognise that not only do judges view 
                                                          
68 Mihesuah, D. A. (1996). American Indians : Stereotypes & Realities. Atlanta, GA, Clarity. p116 
 
69Shanley, K. W. (1997). "The Indians America Loves to Love and Read: American Indian Identity and 
Cultural Appropriation." American Indian Quarterly 21(4): 675-702, 675 
70 Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) 289 
71 Wacks, R. (2009). Understanding Jurisprudence : an Introduction to Legal Theory. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. p374 
72 Galanda, G. (2006). "Bar None! The Social Impact of Testing Federal Indian Law." Federal Lawyer 53: 30-
33, 33. 
73 Soni, V. (2005). "Freedom from Subordination: Race, Religion, and the Struggle for Sacrament." Temple 
Political & Civil Rights Law Review 15: 33-64, 53. 
 
74 Soni, V. (2005) op.cit., p55. 
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things from a racial perspective but also a Christian or Judaeo-Christian perspective. 
Levine highlights the methodological lacuna for religious minorities:75 whereas Critical 
Race Theory and feminist jurisprudence highlight minority and oppressed perspectives 
there is no equivalent for minority religions, Justice Brennan’s various dissents in the U.S. 
Supreme Court being the obvious exceptions. An overly formalistic compliance has 
prevented courts from appreciating the effects of laws, particularly when viewed from a 
minority sectarian perspective.76 In Smith Justice Scalia purported not to inquire into the 
centrality of Peyote use as the facially neutral criminal law absolved him of such an 
enquiry. However, such criminalisation was originally inspired by missionary disapproval 
as being discordant with mainstream society and thus his abdication indirectly privileged 
the Christian subtext.77 Yet the Supreme Court adopted a different approach in the 
Lukumi case,78 when the Court saw through the deceptively neutral regulation and adopted 
an approach that concentrated on effects rather than intent.79  
Thus CRT is relevant for the individual Indian litigant within religious freedom 
jurisprudence without losing sight of the fact that it has limited relevance in the tribal 
context, where discrete treatment, as historical sovereign, is more appropriate. It would 
acknowledge that Indian religious litigants are perhaps doubly disadvantaged by belonging 
to a minority race and a minority religion.  
In summary, CILT is a methodology that realises the relationship with the 
dominant society is ultimately peri-colonial and recruits CLS to diagnose the covert 
manifestations. It rejects the homogenisation of CLT within the tribal context yet extends 
the anti-subordination approach to minority religion in order to provide a remedy for the 
Indian religious litigant within the dominant society.   
 
 
 
                                                          
75 Levine, S. (1996). "Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law through a Religious 
Minority Perspective." William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 5: 153-184, 184 
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77 Soni, V. (2005) op.cit., p54. 
78 Discussed in Chapter 8 
79 Soni, V. (2005)  op.cit.,  p57. 
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PART I   
             WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE 
  
           CHAPTER ONE 
 
1 The Doctrine of Discovery and Christian Imperialism 
 
1.1 Introduction  
I shall give to thee the heathen for thine inheritance and the uttermost parts of the earth for 
thy possession.1 
 
When the first trickle of Europeans arrived in the New World there were, 
depending on the different sources, between five and ten million inhabitants who had been 
established for between ten and twenty-five thousand years.2 Before assessing the treatment 
of the indigenes at the hands of the North American legal systems it is important to 
enquire how they actually came to be within the immigrants’ jurisdictions. In particular, the 
means by which these recently-arrived strangers claimed land title and sovereignty and how 
the indigenes became subjects of an imported polity and objects of an imported 
jurisprudence.  
Conquest had traditionally been the most usual means of acquiring land but how 
could a few tentative and starving immigrants lay claim to such a vast continent by the 
sword? Was the answer somehow in a divine mandate and a Christian/pagan dichotomy; 
or perhaps in a hunter-gatherer/agrarian distinction, with its ethnocentric legal concept of 
land title? This section will explore the extent to which the common denominator of 
Christianity pervaded all these theories.  
The chapter will then move to an explanation of the metropolitan country’s early 
fumbling and ultimately doomed attempts to fashion a satisfactory accommodation 
between the Crown, the colonists, the French and the natives, and how this precipitated 
the American Revolution and the subsequent divergent paths of Canada and the United 
                                                          
1 Psalm 2:8 from Newcomb, S. (1992) op.cit., p 311. 
 
2 Nichols, R. L. (1998) op. cit., pXIII 
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States. Finally, there will be an examination of the seminal case of Johnson v M’Intosh3 and 
Chief Justice Marshall’s articulation of the Doctrine of Discovery. This case was 
precedential in the United States and persuasively quoted in Canada.4 Together with the 
other cases in the Marshall trilogy of the early Nineteenth Century it was foundational in 
articulating the common law definition of Indian rights. Yet the common law tradition, 
although shared by both countries, was to reach strikingly differing conclusions as to the 
extent of such rights.  
 
 
1.2 Origins of the Doctrine of Discovery 
I believe that they would easily be made Christians because it seemed to me that they had no 
religion. (Christopher Columbus)5 
 
1.2.1 Introduction 
The Doctrine of Discovery held that the first European/Christian nation that 
discovered non-Christian lands had an immediate overarching sovereignty over the infidels, 
together with a pre-emptive right, good against other Christian nations, to acquire the 
indigenous property interest, such as it was, in the soil.6 This property interest ranged from 
a mere beneficial right of occupancy, with absolute legal title vesting in the discoverer, to 
something approaching a legal title. The Europeans’ rights were held, rather remarkably, to 
have crystallised on first disembarkation at the beach.7  
The Doctrine has often been ascribed solely to the judicial creativity of Chief 
Justice John Marshall in the seminal case of Johnson v M’Intosh of 1823.8 However, scholars 
have traced the origins of the Doctrine back to the medieval era and “feudal, ethnocentric, 
religious and even racial theories.”9 This initial symbiosis between law and religion laid the 
                                                          
3 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823) 
4 Guerin v. The Queen, 2  S.C.R. 335 (1984) 
5 Inouye, D.K. “Discrimination and Native American Religious Rights” in Wunder, J. R.(ed) (1996)op.cit.,p10 
    
6  Clinton, R. N., Newton, N. J. et al. (2005) op.cit.,  p1008 
 
7 Wilkins, E. D. (2008). Federal Policy, Western Movement, and Consequences for Indigenous People, 1790-
1920. The Long Nineteenth Century (1789-1920). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p210 
8 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 U.S. (8 Wheat)  543 (1823) 
9Miller, R. (2005) op.cit.,  p2 and see generally Williams, R. A. (1990) op.cit.,  p327 
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foundation for the sovereignty and legal title to much of North America. The religious 
component, having usefully performed its function, was then carefully quarantined by 
means of those Free Exercise and Establishment provisions deemed essential to the 
success of the secular liberal state. Nevertheless, Indians “must accept that ....Indian Law 
will forever rest on the foundation of a subjugating Christian ideology.”10 
 
1.2.2 Papal Bull 
As for the pope of whom you speak, he must be mad to speak of giving away countries that 
do not belong to him. As for my faith I will not change it. Your own god, as you tell me, 
was put to death by the very men he created, But my god still looks down upon his children. 
(Atahualpa in 1533)11 
 
The Crusades of the 11th to 13th centuries were based on papal universal jurisdiction 
and the corresponding Christian’s duty to temporally realise this divine mandate by forcible 
conversion or extermination.12 In particular, Pope Innocent IV’s concept of the “just war” 
was invented to dispossess infidels of their land and dominium or sovereignty should they 
fail to accept the undisputed advantages of Christianity, or violate divine law as understood 
by the Catholic Church.13  
The discovery of the New World and the competing claims of two Christian 
countries, Spain and Portugal, presented a dilemma. Pope Alexander VI crafted a pragmatic 
compromise with his famous Inter Caetera II of 1493 which arbitrarily divided the territories 
of the American continent by a line one hundred leagues west of the Azores.14 It purported 
to convey everything west of this line to Spain and everything east to Portugal. The line 
was modified by the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) between the two countries to 370 leagues 
west of the Azores.15 Alarmed at this rather expansive papal conveyance, the French King 
Francis I was reputed to have requested “to see Adam’s will to learn how he had 
partitioned the world.”16 
                                                          
10Newcomb, S. (1992). op.cit., p337 
 
11 Rosenstiel, A. (1983). Red & White : Indian Views of the White Man, 1492-1982. New York, Universe 
Books. p21 
12 Miller, R (2005) op.cit., p8  
 
13 ibid p9 
14Miller, R (2005) op.cit., p12.      
15 ibid 
16 Watson, B. (2006) op.cit.,  p513     
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Hispanic invaders, such as De Soto in Florida in 1539, read out the Requerimento as a 
formal prelude to invasion.17 This purported to be an ultimatum from an alien king and 
pope and assuaged any guilt that these invaders should feel. If Indians rejected the Lord’s 
word itself, their lives, rights and property were patently forfeit.  
This Catholic Doctrine was not without its 16th century Spanish dissenters. De 
Vitoria argued that the Pope “ha[d] no temporal power over the Indian aborigines or over 
other unbelievers.”18 Similarly, De Soto exclaimed that “the Pope did not grant, nor could 
he grant, our King’s dominion over these peoples and their affairs because he had no right 
to it himself.”19 In contrast, Sepulveda believed that Spain “had the right to rule in the New 
World because Indians have no written law, but barbaric institutions and customs. They do 
not even have private property”20 To which Las Casas retorted that even though the 
Indians did not live in civilized society this did not negate their property rights.21 
 
1.2.3 International Reaction 
Whatever may be the grounds occupied by international jurists they never forget the policy 
and interests of their own country. Their business is to give to rapacity and injustice, the 
most decorous veil which legal ingenuity can weave.22 
 
International legal theorists were divided: Vattel supported the papal theory in his 
famous treatise The Law of Nations. He endorsed the Puritans’ later purchase of Indian land 
but regarded it as strictly unnecessary.23 In contrast, Grotius remarked that: “surely it is a 
heresy to believe that infidels are not masters of their own property; consequently to take 
from them their possessions on account of their religious belief is no less theft and robbery 
than it would be in the case of Christians.”24  
                                                          
17
Josephy, A. M. (1995) op.cit., p140 
18 Watson, B (2006) op.cit., p504 
 
19 ibid 
 
20 ibid p508 
 
21 ibid 
22 Sir James Stephen, Legal Adviser to the Colonial Office in 1839 from Harring, S. L. (1998). White Man's 
Law : Native People in Nineteenth-Century Canadian Jurisprudence. Toronto ; London, University of 
Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History. p21 
23 ibid p512 
 
24 Mare Liberum from ibid p517 
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England and France, although not wishing to risk the sanction of 
excommunication, had lingering doubts about the absolute and comprehensive nature of 
the papal conveyance. In particular, England tentatively suggested that English explorers 
should be permitted to claim lands not yet actually discovered by another Christian nation.25 
Following the split from Rome, Elizabeth I added another refinement: Discovery was 
merely an inchoate right which must be perfected by actual possession. Otherwise, the 
English claim was merely “proclamatory or cartographic.”26 Furthermore, the land must be 
terra nullius or vacant land.27 Terra nullius, as we shall see, could be land that was literally 
vacant or land that was used in a manner not approved of by European legal systems, such 
as a non-agricultural use.28  
Thus the Doctrine of Discovery, with or without any possession however tentative, 
determined which European nations had overarching sovereignty and pre-emptive rights in 
North America.29  
 
1.2.4 Royal Patent 
Although Elizabeth had rejected the papal conveyance, her successors issued Royal 
Charters that were similar in purpose and audacity in that they conferred dominion and 
overarching title from “sea to sea.”30 This was based on the medieval feudal system that the 
King as overlord “was the original proprietor and the true and only source of title.”31 Such 
a mandate derived both from the divine right of kings and the fact that, by virtue of 
discovery, no other Christian nation had a more valid claim.32 
The legal validity of these charters (or patents) was not universally recognised. 
Roger Williams criticised this in his Sinne of the Patents as a means by which Christian Kings 
“are invested with right by virtue of their Christianitie to take and give away the lands and 
                                                          
25 Miller, R (2005) op.cit., p17 
 
26 Pagden, A. (2008). Law, Colonization, Legitimation, and the European Background. Early America (1580-
1815). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge p19. 
 
27 Miller, R (2005) op.cit., p18 
 
28 ibid p19 
 
29 ibid p26 
 
30 Watson, B. (2006) op.cit., p523 
 
31 ibid p525 
 
32 ibid p528 
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Countries of other men.”33 He felt that complete ownership rested with the Indians “from 
whom alone a valid title could be derived.”34 As for judicial recognition of such sweeping 
powers The Mohegan Indians v Connecticut (1640-1773), which was an unusually protracted 
case even by Privy Council standards, held that Royal Charters did not ipso facto destroy 
Indian title without purchase.35  
Thus the difficulty remained that a Royal Patent, like the Papal Grant, could not be 
anything other than a naked assertion of power and title over a land that was anything but 
vacant. Various refinements were therefore advanced which would be consistent with 
Christian aspirations to title and dominion such as the fiction that the Indians were 
“conquered” infidels or the ethnocentric notion that they were hunter-gatherers, rather 
than farmers, and thus had a less than perfect land title.   
 
1.2.5 Conquest. 
Edward Coke in Calvin’s Case (1608)36 had articulated the legal rule that “all infidels 
are in law perpetual enemies.... and that when an infidel country is conquered, there being 
no established law among infidels which a Christian people can recognize, the rules laid 
down by the King apply.”37 Thus a distinction was drawn between a conquered Christian 
country, in which the laws would survive although admittedly alterable by the conqueror, 
and infidel countries when they would lapse without the need for action by the conqueror. 
Yet there had been nothing that could be reasonably identifiable by an impartial observer 
as a conquest. Certainly not by these fragile and tentative coastal settlements, which existed 
largely at the sufferance of the Indian tribes.  
In Omichund v Barker (1744) Coke’s views were rejected as being “contrary to 
scripture, common sense and humanity.”38 Similarly in Campbell v Hall (1774) Lord 
Mansfield described Calvin’s Case as a ““strange extrajudicial opinion” and a “wholly 
                                                          
33 ibid p498 
 
34 ibid p497 
35 Zion, J. and Yazzie, R. (1997). "Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of Conquest." Boston 
College International and Comparative Law Review 20: 55-84, 65 
36 Calvin v. Smith, 7 Eng. Rep. 1,2 S.T. 559 (1608) 
 
37 Watson, B. (2006) op.cit., p530 
 
38 Omichund v Barker 125 Eng. Rep. 1310, 1312 (Ch. 1744)  
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groundless challenge” to the principle of the continuity of indigenous laws upon the 
Crown’s assumption of territorial sovereignty.”39 
 Nevertheless, this characterisation of North America as “conquered” land and thus 
part of the King’s demesne led the Crown, via the Metropolitan Parliament, to also assume 
legislative powers over the colonists. This use of the Crown Prerogative was in contrast to 
a “settled” colony in which the colonists had an automatic right to English Law, (rather 
than prerogative legislation) having imported the common law with them, like an 
enveloping mantle.40 Therefore a deprivation of Indian rights by this fictitious conquest 
simultaneously deprived the colonists of self-government and local autonomy, ultimately 
characterising their status as “taxation without representation,” with the inevitable 
consequences.41  
 
1.2.6 Locke and Agriculturalism 
Offend not the poor natives, but as you partake in their land, so make them partakers of 
your precious faith, as you reap their temporals, so feed them your spirituals.(Puritan 
preacher John Cotton in 1630)42 
 
As an alternative to the fiction of “conquest” as the operative model for destroying 
indigenous legal rights, the colonists also articulated another theory based on land use.  
John Locke, in his seminal Two Treatises of Government (1679), concluded that the Indians 
were in a “pre-political state of nature”43 that was characterised by no system of 
government, property or organised commerce, but existed merely as a hunter-gatherer 
community. As such their land was vacant, or vacuum domicilium,44 and available to the first 
prepared to cultivate it. Moreover, this lack of agricultural exploitation meant a general lack 
of recognition of any sovereignty or political rights, founded as these were on a settled land 
                                                          
39 Loftt. 655 at 7444, 98 E.R. 1045 (K.B.) from McHugh, P. (1998). "Common-Law Status of Colonies and 
Aboriginal Rights: How Lawyers and Historians Treat the Past, The." Saskatchewan Law Review 61: 393-429, 
406 
 
40 ibid p407 
 
41 Pagden, A. (2008). op.cit., p14  
 
42 Michaelsen, R “Law and the Limits of Liberty” in Vecsey, C. (ed) (1991). Handbook of American Indian 
Religious Freedom. New York, Crossroad p118. 
  
43 Locke, J. and Laslett, T. P. R. (1970). Two Treatises of Government. A Critical Edition with an 
Introduction and Apparatus Criticus by Peter Laslett ... Second edition. (Reprinted with amendments.), 
Cambridge: University Press p27 
44 This meant empty space and was a localised variation of the wider concept of terra nullius from Watson, B. 
(2006) op.cit., p489 
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base.45 Therefore, in common with the “conquered infidel,” a status as a non-agricultural 
people meant there was no recognition of the continuity of any indigenous laws. 
History of course suggests otherwise: the Puritans would have died out in the early 
1620s had it not been for the Indians teaching them to place dead fish upside down in 
cornfields to act as a rudimentary form of fertilizer. Similarly, the Haudenosaunee (the Five, 
later Six nations of the Iroquois Confederacy), had a highly developed system of 
government. So much so that the United States Senate passed a resolution in 1987 
acknowledging their influence on American constitutional development.46  
There was therefore a reliance on an unholy trinity of Royal Patent, conquest, and a 
form of natural right deprivation of the soil due to an Indian failure to embrace what were 
regarded as the inevitable benefits of intensive agriculture. All three concepts rested on 
Christian Imperialism: Royal Patent rested on the feudal right of a Christian king; Conquest 
on the differing status of the Christian/infidel conquered; and the Lockean theory 
bestowed a natural right to the soil only on those who observed the “biblical injunction to 
subdue the earth.”47  
 
 
1.3 Crown Attempts to Conciliate the Indians and the French 
  
1.3.1 The Royal Proclamation (1763) 
The Royal Proclamation, issued on the 7th October 1763 after the recently-concluded 
Seven Years War, consolidated the relationship with all Indians both allies and adversaries. 
It has been described as the “Magna Carta” of aboriginal rights48 and the “Indian Bill of 
Rights.”49 The preamble states that: “the several Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom 
We are connected, and who live under Our Protection, should not be molested or 
disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having 
been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
45 Pagden, A. (2008). op.cit., p21 
46 Concurrent Resolution 76 from Dussault, R., Erasmus, G. et al (1996) op.cit., Volume I Chapter 4 pp12  
47 Dussault, R., Erasmus, G. et al (1996) op.cit., Volume I Chapter 4 pp12,57  
 
48 Hall J. in Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 at 395 
 
49 Gwynne J. in St. Catherines Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen, [1887] 13 S.C.R. 577 at 652 
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Grounds;”50 Furthermore, it forbade colonial officials from making further land grants 
beyond a line north-south from western New York state down through Georgia, and 
reserved all land west of this line to the Indians until it should be purchased by the Crown. 
In other words, it created a Crown pre-emption on Indian land purchase, which was a 
devastating blow to the colonies. This unilateral Crown abrogation of the colonies’ 
admittedly ambitious and expansive sea to sea charters caused great resentment and was a 
major contributing factor to the Revolutionary War.51  
As for the Indians’ tribal sovereignty, the language was ambiguous. It discussed 
Indian nations as being entities “with whom we are connected,” who should not be 
“molested or disturbed,” yet referred to their lands as “such parts of Our Dominions and 
Territories” and Indians as “under Our Protection.” The Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples suggested that the Proclamation seemed to envisage a “broadly 
confederal” relationship.52  
Subsequent dealing seems to support this theory. At Niagara in 1764 the Royal 
Proclamation was read out and accepted by the Indians, gifts were exchanged and the Gus 
Wen Tah or Two Row Wampum was presented to consecrate the agreement. It envisaged 
the “simultaneous interaction and separation” of the two communities, yet both were to 
remain distinct:53   
There are three beads of Wampum separating the two rows and they symbolize two paths 
or two vessels travelling down the same river together. One, a birch bark canoe, will be for 
the Indian people, their laws, their customs and their ways. The other, a ship will be for the 
white people and their laws, their customs and their ways. We shall each travel the river 
together, side by side, but in our own boat. Neither of us will try to steer the other’s vessel.54 
The Crown’s Representative Sir William Johnson’s reaction to a subsequent treaty 
of 1765, which seemed to completely cede Indian internal tribal sovereignty, is significant: 
“by the present treaty I find they make expressions of subjection which must either have 
arisen from the ignorance of the interpreter or from some mistake.”55 Indeed, as he 
                                                          
50 Dussault, R., Erasmus, G. et al (1996) op.cit., Volume I Appendix D 
51 Wilkins, D. E. and Lomawaima, K. T. (2001). Uneven Ground : American Indian Sovereignty and Federal 
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54 Williams, R. A. (1990) op.cit., p327. 
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remarked two years later, “one who would call the Six Nations our Subjects needs a good 
army at his back.”56 
 
1.3.2 The Quebec Act (1774)  
As for the defeated French, the British Crown, by enacting the Quebec Act (1774), 
granted “Free exercise of the Religion of the Church of Rome”57 and also relieved the 
Quebecois from the English Protestant oath to George III, requiring merely an inoffensive 
oath of allegiance to the monarch as temporal sovereign, omitting any mention of 
Protestantism.58 More controversially, the Act extended Quebec’s boundaries south to the 
Ohio River and west to the Mississippi, severely hampering the expansionist ambitions of 
the original Thirteen Colonies. This dual policy of land grant and religious toleration was a 
pragmatic measure designed to ensure that the French Canadians remained loyal in the 
impending conflagration between the Colonies and the Mother Country. Yet the Act was 
incendiary in itself.59 The Thirteen Colonies merely saw expansionism, and what was worse, 
state-sponsored Catholic expansionism.60 As Albert reminds us, “the bitter taste of the 
Quebec Act remained in the mouths of the drafters of the Bill of Rights when they framed 
the Establishment Clause fewer than 20 years later.”61 
So we may observe how tolerance of Catholicism, anathema to the Protestant 
Colonies, and an attempt, albeit disingenuous, to insulate the Indian lands from the 
encroaching tide of European migration, contributed to the War of Independence, which 
King George III described as “nothing more than a Presbyterian Rebellion.”62 When all 
this was combined with an ill-advised, if not unreasonable request, that the colonies 
contribute something to the cost of the recently-completed Seven Years War, by means of 
the Stamp Act (1764), it proved too much for the relationship to endure.63  
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1.4 The Great Republic 
[King George III] has excited domestic insurrections amongst us and has endeavoured to 
bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of 
warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions. (Declaration 
of Independence)64 
 
1.4.1 Early Indian Policy 
Despite Jefferson’s caustic reproach to the Mother Country and her incitement of 
the natives in the Declaration of Independence, early United States policy mirrored that of the 
Royal Proclamation, with the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 prohibiting land purchase from 
the Indians, except by federal treaty, and leaving internal control of Indian affairs as a 
matter solely for Indians.65 
After the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and the War of 1812 had eliminated the 
French and English as serious rivals to the territorial integrity of the United States, such 
deference to Indian property rights and sovereignty was regarded as a luxury.66 Avaricious 
settlers, fuelled by the generalised expansionist sentiment, viewed the further presence of 
Indians as an obstruction and irritant. The stage was set for a legal reconfiguration of 
Indian rights as a precursor to their removal. As Loesch remarks, the denigration of Indian 
title and dilution of Indian sovereignty were necessary as the “economic vitality and 
structure of the United States was at stake.”67 The fate of the American Indian became 
perilous in the extreme. As one British Commissioner commented at the signing of the 
Treaty of Ghent in 1815: “I had till I came here no idea of the fixed determinism which 
prevails in the breast of every American to extirpate the Indians and appropriate their 
territory.”68 This was the prevailing sentiment on the eve of the seminal case of Johnson v 
M’Intosh. 
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1.4.2 Johnson v M’Intosh (1823) 
They made us many promises, more than I can remember, but they never kept but one; they 
promised to take our land and they took it. (Red Cloud)69 
 
1.4.2.1 Background 
The origins of the case can be traced back 50 years beforehand. In 1773 an 
enterprising land purchaser obtained a copy of the Camden-Yorke opinion of 1757 which 
concerned land ownership in India. In particular, the opinion held that a Mogul could pass 
good title to the East India Company without prior Crown approval.70 Specifically, “the 
King’s Letters Patent” were not necessary for lands “acquired by treaty or grant from the 
Mogul or any of the Indian Princes or Governments....the property of the soil [i.e. title to 
the property] vesting in the Company.”71 By deleting any reference to “the Mogul” and 
substituting “the Grantee” for the “East India Company” the document was left with 
“Indian Princes” which, thanks to Colombus’ navigational error, sufficed in the New 
World. The date had also been altered to 1772 that is after the Royal Proclamation. In effect it 
circumvented the Crown pre-emption right of The Royal Proclamation. A certain William 
Murray obtained this doctored copy and showed it to an unwitting functionary who 
recorded the deed poll of the sale of a tract of land from the Illinois Indians to Murray’s 
Illinois and Wabash Company. This land was located at the junction of the Mississippi, 
Illinois and Ohio rivers.72  
 
1.4.2.2 The Opinion 
The case was between Johnson, successor in title to Murray’s Illinois and Wabash 
Company, and M’Intosh who had purchased the “same” land from the United States in 
1818.73 Chief Justice Marshall found the Royal Proclamation’s Crown prohibition to be 
dispositive as to the original private purchase by Johnson’s predecessor, the truth having 
been discovered about the Camden-Yorke opinion and its application solely to the sub-
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continental Indians.74 This should have been the end of the matter except that Marshall saw 
fit to indulge in effusive dicta, the reason for which had nothing to do with Indians yet it is 
they who have borne the consequences.75 He quite inappropriately discussed the unrelated 
question of the exact nature of Indian title in the absence of a live issue and thus without 
argument, and most significantly, without any representation from the group who would be 
most intimately affected by it.  
Marshall explained that “Discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects 
or by whose authority, it was made against all other European governments, which title 
might be consummated by possession.”76 This was the classic statement of the pre-emptive 
nature of the European discoverer against other European nations. As for the Indians, 
“their rights were in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a 
considerable extent, impaired...[T]heir rights to complete sovereignty, as independent 
nations, were necessarily diminished and their power to dispose of the soil at their own free 
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle that 
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.”77 Yet Marshall went further: “however 
extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into 
conquest may appear, if the principle has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards 
sustained, if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass 
of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be 
questioned.”78 Thus by judicial alchemy Calvin’s case,79 and the fiction of conquest, was now 
operative apparently to sweep away the sovereignty, legal title to land, and law of the 
“conquered” infidel. Discovery did not confer an inchoate right, to be perfected by 
conquest or purchase, it was complete ab initio.  
It is not clear why Marshall suddenly adopted conquest as the model. He rejected 
the Lockean rationale: “We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturalists, 
merchants, and manufacturers, have a right on abstract principles, to expel hunters from 
the territory they possess, or to contract their limits. Conquest gives a title which the courts 
                                                          
74 Robertson, L.G. (2005) op.cit., p116 
 
75 ibid p75 
 
76 Johnson v M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-573 (1823) 
 
77 ibid p573 
 
78 ibid p591 
 
79 See text accompanying Calvin v. Smith op.cit., 
 
30 
 
of the conqueror cannot deny.”80 Banner suggests that this reframing of the issue 
transformed it into a political question which was thus insulated from judicial scrutiny.81 At 
no stage did Marshall suggest that the Indian property right was not compensable, which 
would have been the case if a complete physical conquest had occurred, it was merely 
framed thus to circumvent judicial scrutiny.  
Chief Justice Marshall’s justification for this loss of sovereignty and destruction of 
property rights could have come from the mouth of a medieval pope or king: “the 
character and religion of [the continent’s] inhabitants afforded an apology for considering 
them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy. 
The potentates of the Old World found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they 
made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them civilization 
and Christianity.”82 
As Deloria and Wilkins remark, the culture and religion of the Indians were judged 
too inferior to justify a full retention of their legal rights, yet they were not completely 
without virtue. They were deemed capable of receiving in exchange the Good News of the 
“Conqueror’s” religion.83  
 
1.4.2.3 Marshall’s Attempts at Containment 
Marshall seemed to retreat from the more extreme elements of the Doctrine in later 
cases. In Worcester v Georgia84 he held that a Royal Charter could not be converted by the 
Doctrine of Discovery into a fee title or claim to sovereignty by a state in the absence of 
purchase, and thus Georgia could not impose any of its criminal law on Cherokee lands. 
He ridiculed the “extravagant and absurd idea that the feeble settlements made on the sea-
coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate power by [the 
royal charters] to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea.”85 On the 
contrary, the charters “were well understood to convey the title which, according to the 
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common law of European sovereigns respecting America, they might rightfully convey, and 
no more. This was the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing 
to sell.”86  
 Thus in Worcester Marshall had reformulated the right from an immediate fee 
simple subject to an Indian occupancy right into the more reasonable, but still doctrinally 
suspect, pre-emptive but contingent right to a fee simple in the future; the present fee 
simple remaining with the Indians.87 In both cases the Indian interest, whatever its extent, 
had to be extinguished by purchase subject to Indian consent. Of course the pre-emptive 
and exclusive purchase mandate of the Indian property interest, whether beneficial or a fee 
simple, eliminated competition as a practical real estate matter so the land could be bought 
for cents on the dollar.  
In the third case of the Trilogy, Cherokee Nation v Georgia,88 Marshall first 
characterised the Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations” and introduced the Trust 
Power which imposed a type of fiduciary paternalistic duty on the Federal Government in 
its dealing with tribes whose “relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian.”89 This tempered the seemingly absolute nature of the discoverer’s power and 
echoed the “papal bulls which placed guardianship duties on Spain and Portugal to convert 
indigenous peoples.”90 
After Marshall’s death the new Chief Justice Roger Taney reintroduced the more 
extreme Johnson formula of conquest in the case of United States v Rogers.91 This case 
occurred towards the end of the removal era when tribes were ethnically cleansed from 
eastern states. Realpolitik dictated that the Supreme Court meekly acquiesced in this policy. 
Taney also explicitly re-iterated the “political question” concept of Indian rights: “it is a 
question for the law-making and political department of the government and not the 
judicial.”92  
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As for tribal sovereignty, the Worcester case held that the laws of Georgia “could 
have no force” within the Cherokee nation.93 This was a superficially attractive recognition 
of inherent tribal sovereignty yet this was only good against the states as successors of the 
individual colonies. An overarching sovereignty still remained in the federal government as 
successor to the Crown as discoverer, or as feudal overlord. Worcester’s recognition of 
inherent tribal sovereignty had only two express limitations: the federal government had a 
pre-emptive right of purchase of their interest in land and they could not treat with foreign 
powers.94 Yet whatever immediate and practical limitations were recognised at the time, the 
federal government was recognised as having a de jure overarching sovereignty. It was 
merely dormant. Thus whether the doctrine is the more extreme M’Intosh-Rogers line of 
cases or the more moderate Worcester version, an ultimate overarching sovereignty rests 
with the federal government. 
 
1.4.2.4 The Consequences 
Indians regard the Doctrine of Discovery as the “separate but equal”95 and the 
“Koromatsu”96 of Indian Law jurisprudence.97  It distinguished between paramount 
Christian rights and subordinate heathen rights.98As Miller concludes, the title to most real 
estate on the North American continent can be ascribed to this doctrine.99  
In Canada, as Walters reminds us, the Doctrine was followed without the Worcester 
recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty as a mitigation to the over-arching federal 
sovereignty.100  The Crown, according to the Privy Council in the case of St. Catherine’s 
Milling and Lumber Co. v. R (1888),101 had a “substantial and paramount estate” over all 
territories and the Indian land interest was a “personal and usufructuary right” which was a 
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“mere burden” on this estate.102 These Indian property rights were held to have been 
created solely by the Royal Proclamation.103 It would take until a 1973 case to suggest that 
aboriginal property rights could have arisen at Common Law, fully 150 years after such a 
recognition in the United States in the Marshall trilogy.104 As we shall see in later chapters 
the Canadian government, from the point of confederation onwards, asserted its power to 
legislate unilaterally for all aspects of internal tribal life.  
The Doctrine of Discovery has never been explicitly disclaimed and still forms part 
of the North American indigenous jurisprudence. As Borrows opines, the illegal and 
illegitimate assertion of sovereignty violates the Rule of Law.105 It is merely exertion of 
power. The Indians were originally dispossessed of vast tracts of land and their sovereignty 
diluted by the Doctrine’s religious mandate and this outrage is perpetuated by its 
calcification as temporal legal doctrine. In particular, when federal property rights that are 
directly derived from the Doctrine are mobilised to prevent Indian use of public land for 
religious practice this would seem “cruelly surreal”106  
 
 
1.5 Conclusion  
There was general if not universal agreement within Catholic countries as to the 
Pope’s competence to apportion both land title to the globe and its concomitant 
sovereignty to Catholics. However there emerged, following the Reformation, Protestant 
dissent and murmurings from the nascent discipline of International Law which suggested 
that discovery had to be accompanied by occupation, however nominal and tentative.107 
There was a general European consensus as to the diminished rights of the Indians, 
whether their land was being conveyed by papal decree or monarchical patent, and whether 
the justification was due to a Christian/infidel distinction, or failure to embrace what was 
regarded as the Christian’s inevitable destiny as a small holding farmer. Physical conquest as 
a justification for any diminishment of rights was patently absurd, yet this seemed to be the 
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alternative paradigm adopted in the early colonial period and periodically re-iterated. 
According to Campbell v Hall,108 this should have ensured the continuity of indigenous laws 
until altered by the metropolitan parliament and simultaneously deprived the colonists of 
automatic representation in the mother parliament and immunity from metropolitan 
taxation.109 Only half the prescription was followed: the Colonists were indeed taxed and 
deprived of such representation and subsequently rebelled, whereas the Indians’ existing 
laws were held to be, if not exactly non-existent, then certainly marginal.  
The Royal Proclamation was an attempt to regularise frontier relations between the 
Indians and land acquisitive settlers. It established a Crown pre-emption of Indian land 
purchase with an ambivalent recognition of Indian internal sovereignty.110 As for the exact 
nature of the Indian land interest, this was not defined pre-Revolution.  
The Great Republic initially pursued a conciliatory policy with the Indian tribes due 
as much to pragmatic military necessity as to benevolence. Gradually, with increased 
population and the removal of other European nations as rival factors on the continent, 
the relationship became more unilateral and coercive. It was within the context of 
westward migration and the federal policy of tribal removal that Chief Justice Marshall 
articulated the United States version of the Doctrine of Discovery and its legal 
implications.    
The Marshall Trilogy attempted to define the exact nature of the Indian land tenure 
at Common Law. It varied from a mere beneficial right of occupancy to a fully-fledged fee 
title in the United States.111 Marshall flirted with the concept of conquest and furthermore 
insulated this from judicial scrutiny as a political question.112 According to him, the 
relationship ultimately derived from a patriarchal Christian condescension over an infidel 
and helpless ward. This model of incompetence was selective: the Indian was not deemed 
so incompetent as to be incapable of ceding land. 
 In Canada the case of St Catherine’s Milling113 established no such common law land 
tenure. Instead, Indian land rights were in the nature of a personal usufruct which had 
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arisen solely by virtue of the Royal Proclamation.114 In both countries the land interest was 
alienable subject to a Crown/Federal pre-emption which, by removing competition and 
effective negotiation, naturally reduced the value of the real estate.   
Other Indian rights varied: in the United States the Marshall trilogy established a 
common law right (and corresponding limitation) to internal tribal sovereignty independent 
of the Royal Proclamation, yet in Canada such common law recognition had to wait 150 years 
for recognition.115 In both countries an overarching sovereignty rested with the central 
government. The exercise of this sovereignty differed markedly between the two countries 
and will be examined in more detail in later chapters. 
The Doctrine of Discovery was articulated in an era when Law and Christianity 
were symbiotic if not inseparable. The supposed subsequent secularization of law should 
not disguise the fact that this Doctrine is not so much the product of an original secular 
law of European nations, or even International law, but merely Christian dogma speciously 
legitimised as law. The irony is that the Indian, who makes no pretence of a separation 
between law and religion, must engage with American jurisprudence to combat such 
Christian tenets disingenuously disguised as temporal law. The next chapter will discuss the 
subsequent positioning of law and spirituality within the different societies and the 
inevitable conflict that ensues. 
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  CHAPTER TWO 
      2  Christians, Indians and Secular Liberalism 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Many of the first immigrants from Europe arrived in North America fleeing from 
religious persecution. Despite accepting the religious mandate of the Doctrine of Discovery 
to deprive the indigenes of legal rights they decided that between themselves religion 
should, as far as possible, be removed as a public controversy from civil society. To this 
end, Canadian tolerance of Catholics by various legislative acknowledgements of their 
rights was aimed to keep the French loyal and quiescent. The United States went further by 
simultaneously constitutionalising the free exercise and disestablishment of religion.1 
Canada would only constitutionally grant “freedom of conscience and religion”2 200 years 
later with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982. This chapter will investigate, 
in general terms, the philosophy behind these separations and protections; later chapters 
will assess the actual contemporary jurisprudence within each era. 
The major differences between Indian spirituality and Judaeo-Christian belief 
systems will also be introduced, together with their differing places within the respective 
societies. In particular, the extent to which spirituality in Indian societies is inseparable 
from all culture and the difficulties this presents for the non-Indian optic. The relevance of 
an oral and secretive culture without scripture will also be explored, in terms of its 
credibility as religion, and moreover its evidential validity within the non-Indian legal 
culture. 
The communal nature of Indian tribal society and in particular landholding 
contrasts with the liberal, individualist and capitalist systems. To what extent has the 
relentless western acquisitive society conflicted with Indian society and what effect has this 
had on Indian religious practices? The implications of the differing emphasis on balancing 
individual and group (tribal) rights with those of the liberal mainstream society will also be 
highlighted. 
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The Indian understanding of the relationship between law and religion and the 
extent to which theocratic elements overtly prevail within tribal society will then be 
compared with non-Indian society. This also has implications between the legal cultures 
which will be discussed in the context of treaties. 
Having thus described the differences between Indian and non-Indian societies, in 
terms of both law and religion, this chapter will conclude with an enquiry into the 
theoretical difficulties the Indian religious litigant faces when obliged to engage with the 
western legal systems. In particular, how this can be all too predictable from the mutual 
incomprehension of the two cultures that has been described above.  
 
2.2 Church and State in North America 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof...” (First Amendment to the United States Constitution)3 
“The First Amendment was designed to keep Christians from killing each other.” (Vine 
Deloria Jr.)4 
 
Two diametrically opposed groups united behind the drafting of the Freedom of 
Religion clauses in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The religious 
rationalists, such as Jefferson, Madison and Paine were sceptical of dogma, priests, 
revelation and churches and wanted government free from religion.5 The evangelicals, having 
sought sanctuary from state coercion in Europe, rejected hierarchical and established 
religion in favour of their own charismatic and parochial formulas. Their main concern was 
freeing religion from government.6 Both groups agreed that a “wall of separation” between 
church and state was the best means of accomplishing this.7 They just differed “from 
which side the bricks should be added.”8 
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This conflict was due in part to a recognition of the competing commands of law 
and religion, or in McLachlin’s phrase, the “dialectic of normative commitments.”9 Both 
prescribe standards against which to gauge behaviour, with “religion’s blame and 
redemption correspond[ing] with law’s liability and responsibility.”10 This dilemma was 
recognised during the Enlightenment, and ultimately settled in favour of the secular and so 
the “primacy of faith in the public sphere [was denied]. Religious faith can be comforting, it 
can be inspiring, it can be sustaining; but the Enlightenment denied that it could govern.”11 
Whereas temporal government remains negotiable and ultimately removable, spiritual 
authority was power without accountability. The Drafters of the United States Constitution, 
being slightly more sympathetic to the spiritual dilemma, decided to hedge: they 
incorporated the Enlightenment-inspired Establishment Clause with the compensatory 
Free Exercise Clause as a sop to the Evangelical lobby.12 
By contrast, the more recent Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 grants 
“freedom of conscience and religion”13 with no mention of an Establishment Clause. 
Canada’s historical lack of an Establishment Clause was due to a pragmatic compromise at 
Confederation in 1867 which constitutionalised the continuance of territory-sponsored 
denominational schools that existed at the time.14 The later introduction of such a clause in 
the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms would have denied this history and so was 
omitted.15  
A further constitutional difference is that God is specifically mentioned in the 
preamble to the Canadian Charter: “Canada is founded upon principles that recognise the 
supremacy of God;”16  moreover the G is capitalized. Horwitz points out this technical 
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privileging of monotheism and an incongruity with the later freedom of religion.17 The 
American Constitution has no reference to God, either capitalized or not. Furthermore, 
Canada’s Head of State is the Queen whose nominal title is “Defender of the Faith”18 
which Patrick describes as merely “Ceremonial Deism.”19 The American Head of State, the 
President, has no such honorific although rarely misses an opportunity to invoke the Lord’s 
blessing on his country.  
Nominally both countries’ religious jurisprudence is based on secular liberalism, 
with a temporal rather than spiritual command regarded as more legitimate. Within this 
frame “religion [is] regarded merely as a hobby.”20 On the one hand the liberal will 
vigorously defend the religious adherent’s beliefs but ultimately regard them as a choice, 
rather than an imperative.21 Provided they produce no societal turbulence they are 
sacrosanct, but must inevitably concede to “cold reason” should there be an irreconcilable 
conflict.22 Religion must therefore remain both discrete and discreet.  
Yet this separation is only partially convincing as “jurisgenesis always takes place 
through an essentially cultural medium.”23 Any legal system is the product of its culture and 
in that culture religion is integral. The North American legal systems have Christian 
morality as their foundation. The “moral tones or values of the ambient society”24 have 
always been ultimately Christian whether the judiciary were openly asserting that the 
“condemnation of sodomy is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical 
standards;”25 or “Christianity is a part of the common law of the state in that its divine 
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origin and truth are admitted;”26 or that discovery by “Christian nations gave them 
sovereignty over and title to the lands discovered;”27 or citing “Judeo-Christian teachings” 
in order to justify the prohibition on public nudity.28 One only has to observe the 
interrogation of prospective U.S. Supreme Court justices in respect of their religious beliefs 
to realise that the public “have not fallen for the illusion of an autonomous legal system.”29 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court opens its session with a monotheistic plea of 
“God save the United States and this Honourable Court.”30  
Yet the counter-majoritarian United States Bill of Rights and Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms were designed to insulate minority faiths from political interference.31 It 
is because both the United States and Canada are predominantly Christian that they would 
be highly unlikely, either deliberately or incidentally, to unduly burden Christianity with 
adverse legislation.32 Just as federalism dictates the allocation of power between the state 
and central government, acting as a diluent and restraint, so are the judiciary entrusted with 
policing the legislature and executive. 33 In our context, their function is to “protect the 
rights of members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian social 
institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as unimportant, because 
unfamiliar.”34  
Madison described the ultimate purpose of the American religious freedom clauses 
as an accommodation to duties of rendering homage to God which are “precedent both in 
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order of time and degree of obligation to the claims of civil society.”35 In order of time, 
duty to the Great Spirit must therefore precede the demands of the recently arrived 
American polity by several thousand years on the North American continent. 
 
 
2.3 The Great Spirit 
“An old Crow Chief once asked of the difference between Indian... and white [religion] 
responded that ....for the Indian there were visions for the whites there were only ideas.”36  
 
This is not a theological treatise that will exhaustively compare Indian and non-
Indian religious practices. Nevertheless, it would be beneficial at this stage, in order to 
provide context, to explain at least some of the major theoretical differences in the 
traditions. Indeed, any inquiry into the suppression of Indian religion, and in particular any 
charge of discriminatory treatment, must be based upon some comparison with the non-
Indian traditions. However, it must be admitted from the outset that “every scholarly 
writing on tribal religions is woefully incomplete.”37 A particular difficulty is that there are 
sacrosanct practices or sacred sites that must forever remain hidden from the non-Indian 
for a myriad of reasons. For example, their divulgence would sacrifice their sacrality or 
encourage an alien and intrusive tourism.  
Indian religions are tribal not universal and make no attempt to proselytise, which 
in itself can be seen as suspicious by mainstream religions.38 There may be much intra-tribal 
variation of belief: monotheists may co-exist with henotheists and polytheists39 and 
identifying the essence of a tribal faith may be impossible. People cannot join tribal 
religions by acceptance of doctrine; indeed, Indians are indifferent to the beliefs of 
outsiders.40 Christianity, by contrast, claims a universal truth which is monotheistic and 
exclusive. This necessarily frames the relationship to others as not merely evangelical but 
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“adversarial and non-negotiable.”41 Indeed, as Stephen Feldman remarks: “Christian... 
imperialism.... pulses through the American social body.”42 
Judeo-Christian religions are “commemorative” in that they can often be traced to 
a foundational event or figure with a subsequent linear progression to the present. 43 In 
contrast, the Indian cyclical concept of time emphasises degeneration and regeneration44 
and many Indian Languages “do not have past and future tenses; they reflect rather a 
perennial reality of the now.”45 Native religious experience is a “continual renewal of 
relationships with holy places”46 which have less relevance in Judeo-Christian traditions, at 
least in North America. Indian religions are therefore temporally diffuse but spatially 
precise and although Indians may be uncertain, for example, when their creation stories 
occurred, they may be certain where they occurred.47  
Indian religion and culture are oral not literate. There is therefore no sacred 
literature comparable to the Bible or Koran,48 indeed memorialisation by text may be 
forbidden as a form of desacralization.49 Ethnocentric notions may presume that literacy is 
a “step further along the evolutionary scale”50and view language in purely “instrumental 
terms.” 51As will be discussed later, the orality of Indian tradition also contributes to the 
failure of litigation.  
Tensions also exist between capitalist ideologies and certain native religious 
practice. In particular, ceremonies such as the Potlatch (Giveaway Ceremony) were targeted 
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as a violation of a solemn tenet of capitalism being wasteful and retrograde.52 Although the 
acquisition of wealth was pursued in, for example, certain North West coastal tribes this 
was not for the joy of possession or generating a surplus for profit, but for giving away at 
the Potlatch. “To give away wealth was to be wealthy”,53 not materially but spiritually and 
in terms of tribal prestige.54  
There is also an Indian reverence for land and nature which recognises that “while 
the resources have an existence without us we have no existence without them.”55 Yet the 
“preservation of species diversity”56 plays no part in Indian belief systems, thus the Indian 
killing of eagles for ceremonial and religious purposes can conflict with the dominant 
society’s concept of ecology.  Western endangered species legislation is regarded as 
“anthropocentric and utilitarian”57 as it emphasises the human interest rather than the 
inherent spirituality of the animal world. Rather, a spiritual ecology informs the Indian 
relationship with the animate world, which demands that man must answer to a higher 
authority in his treatment of the biosphere. Of course the irony is that Western culture can 
be seen as nominally more protective of species diversity than cultural diversity, although 
the environmental record would belie even that assertion.   
The Christian deity is in a sense portable.58 Worship can occur in any church of the 
same denomination with a similar chance of success. In contrast, Indian worship is often 
site-specific with the spirituality inherent in the geography. Specific sites may represent the 
emergence of ancestors from the earth or the dwelling place of gods.59 This whole concept 
of sacred sites within North America bemuses the non-Indian. Although some places such as 
Gettysburg National Cemetery are hallowed, it is due to human activity,60 specifically 
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violence and the consecration by those who “gave their last measure of devotion.”61 
Indians, of course, have been on the continent much longer and their relationship with the 
land has had more time to spiritually develop. Indeed, many sacred sites predate the United 
States.62 Of course Indian sacred sites can be analogized to certain sites in the Holy Land 
yet this is only partially satisfactory. Bulldozing the Wailing Wall or converting the Mount 
of Olives into a ski slope would be extremely painful but not fatal. These religions could 
still be practised, whereas destruction of Indian sacred sites necessarily results in “actual 
spiritual destruction.”63 Furthermore, such is the universal significance of some sites and 
rituals that they believe “that the continual welfare of their people, or even the entire world, 
depends upon certain rituals and ceremonies being properly performed.”64 
Of course parallels do exist with certain Western religions: Judaism has an acute 
sense of community and a complete cultural and religious tradition;65 the Amish are also 
insular and communally tight, with a strict adherence to custom and an intimate 
relationship to tracts of land.66 It is perhaps significant that both these communities have 
often come into conflict with mainstream Christianity and fared poorly at the hands of 
North American Jurisprudence. Indeed, it may be noteworthy in terms of religious 
minority empathy that one study in the United States found that Jewish and non-
mainstream Christian judges were “significantly more likely to approve of judicial 
intervention to overturn the decisions or actions of the political branch....that refused to 
accommodate religious dissenters.”67 
Not only are there differences in religious traditions but of equal, if not greater 
significance, is the different relationship between religion and the legal system within Indian 
society. This will be the focus of the next section. 
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2.4  Church and State in Indian Society 
“There are two kinds of societies-apple societies and orange societies. In the orange society, 
everything is separated, in an individual section-law, religion, economics, politics; but in 
an apple society everything is one great big whole.”68 
 
No Indian language has a comparable word to the English religion.69 Indians also 
have no concept of the secular.70 They are the archetypal apple society as religion is 
inseparable from other social, political, legal and cultural aspects. As Justice Brennan 
memorably said in his spirited dissent in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 
“any attempt to isolate the religious aspects of Indian life is in reality an exercise which 
forces Indian concepts into non-Indian categories.”71 Indian spirituality is all-pervasive.72  
Indeed, this inextricable relationship was recognised and exploited by the 
majoritarian culture in their Nineteenth Century assimilationist policy, as it was well 
understood that an assault on the Indian spirituality was an assault on the totality of the 
Indian lifeway and culture.  Although Victorian sensibilities may have recoiled at the more 
overtly sexual and visceral nature of some of the practices, this only partially explains the 
vigour of the suppression, the integral nature of the religious, political, economic and social 
spheres was equally relevant.73 North American governments realised that a successful 
assault on Indian religion would bring down the whole edifice of Indian identity.  
As with other aspects of Indian identity, law also feels the all-pervasive impact of 
Indian spirituality. Law to the Cherokees, for example, was a part of their larger worldview, 
a “directive from his spirit world.”74 The interconnectedness between law and religion was 
even acknowledged by the U.S. when Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act (1968). 
The Act was designed to incorporate most of the Bill of Rights provisions into internal tribal 
law75 and to ensure that a tribal member could now rely on similar rights against his tribal 
                                                          
68 Professor Neill Alford, Jr quoted in Strickland, R. (1997). "Wolf Warriors and Turtle Kings: Native 
American Law before the Blue Coats." Washington Law Review 72: 1043-1062, 1045. 
  
69 Brown, J. E., Weatherly, M. B. et al. (2007)op.cit., p2 
 
70 Pommersheim, F. (1997) op.cit.,  p1182   
71 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association 485 U.S. 439 (1988) at 469.  
 
72 Beaman, L. (2002) op.cit., p137 
73 Pettipas, K. (1994)op.cit., p18 
74  ibid p1047 
 
75 The Indian Civil Rights Act 1968 25 U.S.C. ss 1301-3 
 
46 
 
government as against the federal and state governments, although independent federal 
enforcement was limited to habeas corpus applications.76 Of particular significance was the 
fact that the Act included the Free Exercise provision of the First Amendment, but no 
counterbalancing Establishment Clause.77 This was an acknowledgement that the liberal, 
secular concept of a church-state dichotomy would be inappropriate for internal tribal 
governance as the two are complementary in Indian society, often bordering on 
theocracy.78  
The conflation of law and spirituality also means that Indians have a different 
concept of the Treaty. North American Governments regarded them as a temporal 
contract, whereas Indians saw them as a sacred bond,79 breach of which invited spiritual 
censure not merely secular legal remedies. As the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
commented, Indian treaties were regarded by the North American governments as “devices 
of statecraft” rather than solemn covenants.80  
The importance of community harmony emphasises that the tribal entity is the 
fundamental concept. Individual action must be based on responsibility and duty and must 
be functional in the furthering of tribal interests. The concept of individual civil rights 
against the tribe is often alien and absurd.81 Furthermore, a focus on an individual’s rights 
ignores the fact that “religion must be passed down through the generations or the culture 
and religion cannot survive and this means that some people in each generation are 
obligated to perform certain roles.”82 If this responsibility is avoided it means that “others 
will not have the [individual] freedom to choose the tribal religion because it will no longer 
exist.”83  
In summary, the relationship between religion and law within Indian society differs 
markedly from that within non-Indian society. Indian spirituality pervades all aspects of 
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their culture and society. The nominal but disingenuous separation of law and religion 
within non-Indian society is as incomprehensible as it is inappropriate to the Indian mind. 
Although, as mentioned, many Indians have a complete indifference to the views of 
outsiders as to the validity of their religious traditions and their means of tribal governance, 
the majoritarian culture, when armed with the law, cannot be ignored. Those particular 
tensions must now be examined. 
 
2.5 Indians and Western Legality 
The Cherokees call the white man’s court the place “where the toads chatter,” to 
the Sioux it is “the place of the spiders.”84 The Navajo name for a lawyer is agha’diit’aahii 
which literally means “one who can never lose an argument” or “one who pushes out with 
words.”85 There is not therefore an unequivocal engagement with the litigation process, nor 
indeed the legal profession.  
 
2.5.1 Tribal Rights 
In a general sense Indians often encounter difficulty in vindicating group tribal rights 
within North American legal systems. Any collective rights are usually “outside the 
acceptable framework for rights claims in the United States.”86 In particular, a racial or 
ethnic grouping may be regarded as inherently exclusionary and any preference morally 
unacceptable to a liberal society.87 Indians can suffer at the hands of both a conservative 
and liberal judiciary but for different reasons. The conservative may have an innate hostility 
to minority rights whereas for the liberal any tribal preference may, when viewed through 
an individualist optic, smack of preferential treatment and a violation of equal protection.88 
Indeed, liberalism tends to perceive the individual as the “only holder of morally important 
rights.”89  
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Yet the liberal judge can sometimes be persuaded that any partial treatment of 
Indians is a corrective for past oppression or current majoritarian disfavour. Thus as 
Kymlicka would suggest, these rights are actually intended to advance equal protection 
because the majoritarian culture’s status is inherently but tacitly privileged through “social 
institutions, official language, public holidays, symbols, museums and buildings as well as 
public school curricula that reflect the mainstream culture.”90  
 Tribal rights can also sometimes resonate with the liberal judge if framed as a self-
determination of peoples question. Similarly, it could be argued that the denial of collective 
rights impacts the individual. Indeed, the definition of group right may not be obvious: is it 
an individual right that can only be exercised within a collective such as language, or is it a 
right that can only be exercised as a collective, such as self-determination?91 
Fundamentally however, it must be admitted that liberal theory prioritises the 
individual rather than the community: “plurality over unity.”92 This of course is the 
opposite of the Indian perspective, in which any struggle for individual rather than tribal 
rights, is a “quest for things that are meaningless unless shared.”93  
 
2.5.2 Indian Religion and Western Jurisprudence 
There is a generalised and mutual incomprehension, even hostility, between the 
Indian religious rights litigant and majoritarian jurisprudence on the North American 
continent. This may be due to the fact that Indian litigants suffer from having to perform a 
double translation: their spirituality must be translated into Judaeo-Christian religious 
concepts and then into judicially cognizable forms.94  
The interconnectedness of Indian religion, alluded to before, means that Indians 
can have difficulty framing an action as a free exercise claim as it is at times impossible to 
distinguish between Indian religious and cultural activities. Indeed, the return of sacred 
objects and sacred site protection could be “treaty, cultural, religious or political rights or 
more likely all four issues together.”95 This unfamiliarity and difficulty in categorisation can 
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result in hostility and “even suspicion of fraud.”96 For free exercise purposes, Indian 
religion is viewed as inseparable from culture and therefore not a discrete element, deemed 
worthy of protection.97 Paradoxically, an accommodation of Indian religious practice, 
however minor, may provoke alarm at a perceived establishment of religion. As Ward 
remarks, the two concepts of Indian religion should be mutually exclusive.98 
These difficulties are compounded because the secrecy of many tribal religions 
prevents their desacralization as evidence. Indeed, as the anthropologist Don Bahr reminds 
us, “the ephemerality of Native American mythologies helped to protect their sacredness”99 
and as Stohr remarks, Indians face a dilemma: “they must destroy their religion to save 
it.”100 Nevertheless, for the judge, “the reason why the evidentiary cupboard is bare does 
not change the fact that it is.”101  
Another fundamental difficulty is that constitutional provisions for the protection 
of religious liberty were drafted to prevent inter-Christian dispute and that non-evangelical 
Indian faiths were not part of the calculus. Beyer makes the distinction between “Freedom 
of Religion and Freedom of Religions. The latter determines whether a religion qualifies as 
one of the “legitimate religions”, the former the extent to which, once recognised, that 
freedom is protected.”102 It is crossing the initial qualitative threshold that proves a 
difficulty for minority religions and Indians in particular. 
Judges may also have great difficulty in assessing the symbolic meaning of many 
Indian communications be they stories, phrases, metaphors and narratives.103 Analogizing 
to Christian concepts is only partially satisfactory as mentioned before in relation to land. 
For example, Peyote has been compared to the sacramental wine of the Eucharist, yet this 
is incomplete, as it is an “object of worship; prayers are devoted to it much as prayers are 
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devoted to the holy ghost.”104 Other analogies include the pipe ritual to the host; drums as 
a messenger to the Great Spirit like the church organ;105 the Sun Dance as Jesus’ suffering 
on the cross; the burning of sweetgrass as incense;106 prayer sticks as crucifixes and rosaries; 
and clouds of yucca suds as holy water.107 Yet is this not merely assimilation by analogy, 
rather than a celebration and accommodation of diversity?108 
In the final analysis, there may also be differing attitudes as to what constitutes a 
legal victory. The money judgement awarded for the illegal taking of the Black Hills has 
been left unclaimed.109 The Sioux don’t want the money but the land: Paha Sapa is sacred 
and priceless.  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
The Doctrine of Discovery was patently a Christian legal fiction and thus any 
subsequent nominal isolation of religion from law and politics must be regarded as cynical 
and disingenuous in regard to the indigenous population. The pretence of a completely 
secular polity and a perfection of the enlightenment goal of the separation of church and 
state is, in any case, undermined by the civil religion: a mainstream Christian hegemon that 
treats minority faiths as alien.110 The religious freedom clauses in the United States 
Constitution were a laudable intent to entrench a counter-majoritarian judicial check on the 
Protestant ambient yet, as has been suggested, and will be proven in greater detail later, the 
Supreme Court has largely abdicated this responsibility. 
In contrast to the constitutional protection of religious freedom in the United 
States, only the protection of denominational schooling was entrenched at Canadian 
confederation. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 belatedly introduced a 
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free exercise guarantee, but with no Establishment Clause.111 Although Canadian 
jurisprudence will be explored in the relevant chapters, it would be safe to say that, absent a 
constitutional review facility for substantive rights violations, religious freedom was at the 
mercy of each parliament. 
Any attempt to isolate Indian spirituality within the compartmentalised western 
frameworks of church and state is inappropriate. Indian spirituality informs all aspects of 
law and society. Indeed, this integration was recognised by the proscription of Indian 
religions which, it was hoped, would totally destroy Indian identity and lead to a more 
complete assimilation.112   
This blurring of religion and culture in general also enables the judiciary to deny 
characterisation of Indian religion qua religion and thus worthy of constitutional 
protection.113 The lack of a written scripture is deemed suspect: without miracles being 
documented they are regarded as the product of febrile superstition. The absence of a 
fervid evangelism is regarded as a lack of conviction, yet this serves to protect the sacrality 
of Indian traditions.114 Of course, such secrecy remains an inevitable but real evidential 
disability for the Indian litigant. 
Indian spirituality suffers at the hands of western jurisprudence for several reasons. 
Firstly, there must be a double translation into western religious concepts and then into 
judicially cognizable forms.115 Such enforced analogy may indeed be assimilative in itself. 
Secondly, an oral legal tradition may suffer evidentially at the hands of a hermeneutic-
driven western analysis, as does the lack of a scripture undermine the credibility of the 
faith.116 Finally, and most fundamentally, the religious freedom concepts were designed to 
be applied to inter-faith disputes within a narrow spectrum of Judaeo-Christian religion; 
outside this ambit Indian spirituality could be classified as mere superstition or conflated 
with culture. 
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The general philosophical differences and points of conflict between Indian and 
non-Indian law and spirituality have now been outlined. The next two chapters will situate, 
within the Nineteenth Century, the legal status of Indians within North America and the 
prevailing religious freedom jurisprudence within the majoritarian society. Having 
established this framework, there will then be an enquiry into how the treatment of Indian 
spirituality within this period differed both from non-Indian religion within the two 
countries and across the 49th parallel. 
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PART II  
CULTURAL GENOCIDE IN THE LONG 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 The Indian within the Nineteenth Century North American 
Legal Systems 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The development of Indian Law has not been free from paradox. If the Indians 
enjoyed a form of internal tribal sovereignty, according to the Marshall model, how could 
the federal government impose its own jurisdiction over intra-tribal affairs? If the Indians 
were wards of the government, how could such legal incompetents be deemed capable of 
ceding vast areas of the North American continent by treaty?  
This chapter will explain these inconsistencies by charting the evolution from a 
bilateral and conciliatory legal relationship at the start of the Nineteenth Century, to a more 
unilateral and dictatorial framework by the end of the century. In particular, the differing 
common law understanding of tribal sovereignty in each country will be examined, together 
with the treaty relationships, the constitutional mandates of federal competency, the civil 
disabilities and the gradual imposition of criminal and civil jurisdiction. It will be 
demonstrated how, from the common roots of the Royal Proclamation, the Indians’ legal 
status pursued divergent paths across the 49th parallel.  
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3.2 United States 
3.2.1 Indian Treaties 
As discussed above, the Marshall Trilogy of cases established the Supreme Court’s 
view of the Doctrine of Discovery and its effect on the legal status of the Indian tribes in 
the United States.1 Internally sovereign, but described as “domestic dependent nations”2 
and subject to an overarching federal sovereignty which, although later recognised as 
plenary, had remained for the most part dormant.3 This understanding was reflected in the 
fact that the Treaty Making Clause dictated the relationship in the early years.4  
The significance of treaties is articulated in Article VI Section 2 of the Constitution: 
“[t]his Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all treaties made.....shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.” (author’s italics).5 
Indian treaties were therefore regarded as having the same status as international treaties.6 
Despite the exalted status of treaties, it has long been established that, as a matter of domestic 
law, a subsequent contrary statute can abrogate a treaty.7 This remains an international 
delinquency, but is theoretical in the case of an Indian tribe without international locus standi 
and recourse to an international tribunal. 
Perhaps to compensate for the inequities and inequalities of treaty making in a 
foreign language and an unfamiliar legal culture, the Supreme Court developed the so-
called Canons of Treaty Construction at the end of the Nineteenth Century. These state 
that, “Indian treaties should be construed as the Indians would have understood them”;8 
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liberally in favour of the Indians;9 and with ambiguities resolved in their favour.10 Later, in 
the Twentieth Century, this principle was extended to statutes.11 Of course for the Canons 
to become operative an ambiguity must first be found; any explicit and deliberate 
inconsistency prevails. 
 Congress officially discontinued treaty making in 1871 but emphasised that it was 
preserving the treaty obligations already assumed.12 This was the result of Congressional 
pique, particularly in the House of Representatives, at being reduced to a mere cipher to 
furnish money for treaties made by the Executive and confirmed by the Senate. Whereas 
Congress had already been gradually assuming a more prominent role, it now had 
something approaching an exclusive role.  
 
3.2.2 Tribal Sovereignty and the Role of Congress 
Advocates of the legality and legitimacy of congressional power point to the 
specific congressional mandate in the Commerce Clause, “to regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes.”13 The phrasing 
was in contrast to Article IX of the previous Articles of Confederation, which had given 
Congress a more wide-ranging power of "managing all affairs with the Indians.”14 This 
would imply an intended circumscription to “commerce” in the Constitution.  
By contrast, the subject matter of the Treaty Power described above was 
theoretically unlimited. The concomitant congressional power of treaty implementation, 
which was a separate power to that of the Commerce Clause, was similarly broad 
irrespective of any enumerated power of Congress. Yet such a seemingly broad 
competence was of course limited to that of consummating the results of a bilateral 
compact to which the Indians, crucially, had assented.15 
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The Commerce Clause was designed principally as a federalism provision giving a 
supposedly more disinterested Federal Congress the competency in Indian affairs, rather 
than the more acquisitive and parochial states.16 The wording of “with” not “over” itself 
implies a bilateral nature with the tribes. Early legislation under this power was initially 
correctly targeted at restricting non-Indians’ commercial dealings with the tribes by 
imposing licensing restrictions and trade regulation.17 Therefore, the Commerce Clause, if 
applied correctly, should merely have justified congressional regulation of commercial 
transactions with the tribes not the “source of a general police power to regulate and order 
all federal-tribal relationships.”18 Still less should it have been a mandate to intrude on intra-
tribal affairs.  
An early indication of the assumption of a more unilateral relationship came with 
the Trade and Intercourse Act 1817. This was the first federal statute to apply to Indians in 
Indian Country and imposed a federal criminal code for Indian crime, although with the 
exceptions that it “shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person 
or property of another Indian nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian 
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe.”19 Thus tribal sovereignty 
remained intact for all Indian-Indian crime and for Indian on non-Indian crime already 
punished by the tribe, but not for non-Indian perpetrators. It is difficult to see a sufficient 
and direct nexus to “commerce with Indian tribes” which could have justified this exercise 
of congressional power and infringement of tribal sovereignty.  
The tribal entity was further marginalised when in United States v Rogers20 the 
Supreme Court determined that a non-Indian could not bring himself within the exemption 
for Indian-Indian criminal jurisdiction by marrying a tribal member and becoming an 
adoptive Indian.21 Thus, the Supreme Court, for the first time, established a biological 
rather than political concept of the “Indian.”  Having relegated the tribe to a loose 
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aggregate defined by race, its political significance was depreciated and any governmental 
status as a barrier to the intrusion of jurisdiction was diluted.22 The Rogers case was similar 
to Johnson v M’Intosh, which articulated the Doctrine of Discovery, in that there was no 
Indian representation in a case that would be definitional in terms of their legal rights. 
Moreover, by the time of the hearing, the accused had been dead 10 months and there was 
therefore no live issue or indeed live defendant.23  
 
3.2.3 Plenary Power and the Supreme Court 
A more serious legislative intrusion occurred with the Major Crimes Act (1885)24 
which imposed United States jurisdiction on seven Indian-Indian crimes within Indian 
country.25 The constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act was tested in United States v 
Kagama.26 The Supreme Court did indeed belatedly reject the Commerce Clause as 
constitutional authority.27 Instead, and more alarmingly, legitimacy was found in the 
Marshall Trilogy’s model of ward status. Specifically, a duty of protection gleaned from 
the Trust Relationship gave rise to an overarching sovereignty and a Plenary Power 
which must rest with Congress “[n]ot so much from the clause in the Constitution in 
regard to disposing of and making rules and regulations concerning the [t]erritory and 
other property of the United States, as from the ownership of the country in which the 
[t]erritories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the National 
Government, and can be found nowhere else.”28Of course, such a spurious justification 
by virtue of “ownership” and “sovereignty” is particularly repugnant as such concepts 
rely on the Christian Doctrine of Discovery, discussed in a previous chapter.  
It must be remembered that the Plenary Power is “a judicial fiction created to 
justify clearly extra-constitutional (and hence unconstitutional) exercises of 
congressional power over Indians.”29  The justification that it “can be found nowhere 
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23 Berger, B. (2004). Op.cit., p1964 
 
24 23 Stat. 385 (1885) 
 
25 Murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny 
 
26 United States v. Kagama 118 U.S. 375 (1886) 
 
27 ibid pp378-379 
28 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886)  
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else” was an abdication of the Supreme Court’s responsibility to identify a more 
convincing mandate. In the early days of the Republic the Supreme Court, in the great 
case of Marbury v Madison, assumed the role of final arbiter on the meaning of the 
Constitution.30 This power should have remained as one of interpretation, not creation. 
The Plenary Power was quite simply a judicial fabrication. 
In Lone Wolf 31 the Supreme Court confirmed that Congress could abrogate and 
disregard Indian treaty rights whenever it wished and that such a power was political and 
unreviewable.32 This confirmed the earlier political categorisation in Johnson and Rogers.33 As 
Wunder has commented, this “foreclosed the Bill of Rights34 as an available avenue for 
legal redress. Tribes were at the mercy of the political system without the traditional checks 
of the judiciary.”35 With such power, adrift from any conceivable constitutional mooring 
and in the absence of judicial restraint, the United States was seemingly free to govern the 
tribes as it wished.  
Lone Wolf became known as the “Dred Scott decision number two.”36 Yet the 
analogy is imperfect: the original Dred Scott decision, as Berger reminds us, was 
reversed by Civil War, the death of 650,000 Americans, and constitutional amendment. 
Lone Wolf remains largely intact.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
30 5 U.S. 137 (1803) on the basis of Article III which reads “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution” 
 
31 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) 
 
32 Wilkins, D. E. and Lomawaima, K. T. (2001).op.cit., p110 
 
33 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823); United States v Rogers 45 U.S. (4 How). 567 (1846) 
 
34 In this case the Due Process and Just Compensation provisions of the Fifth Amendment 
35 Wunder, J. R. (1994). "Retained by the People" : A History of American Indians and the Bill of Rights. 
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36 Wilkins, D. E. and Lomawaima, K. T. (2001).op.cit. ,p111 
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3.2.4 Indians and Citizenship 
As for the individual Indian, he was regarded as a “person” for the purposes of a 
writ of habeas corpus,38 but not a citizen entitled to vote, even should he have met the 
property qualifications and withdrawn from tribal life.39 The Fourteenth Amendment, 
which was passed for the emancipated slave and granted “universal citizenship”, was not 
regarded as applicable to him in the tribal context. The inclusion of the “Indians not taxed” 
in Section 2 of the Amendment, which dealt with congressional representation, was 
regarded by implication as excluding the tribal Indian from automatic citizenship.40 
Citizenship was only granted piecemeal as a result of the General Allotment Act of 1887.41 
Therefore their status was unique: “neither citizens, nor aliens, nor foreign 
nations.”42 They did however have the consolation, in contrast to the Canadian Indian as 
will be discussed, that within tribal land they remained de jure immune from state and 
territorial jurisdiction43 and de facto immune from a largely unexercised federal plenary 
authority. It must be remembered however, that there was now no constitutional obstacle to 
abolishing the tribal entity and reducing Indian status to that of a religious community.44 
Moreover, as will be discussed, a religious community whose members were seemingly 
outside the protections of the Bill of Rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 Standing Bear v Crook 25 F. 695, 700-701 (1879).  
 
39 Elk v Wilkins 112 U.S. 94, 98-99 (1884) The Supreme Court ruled that John Elk, born a tribal member but  
who had severed himself from tribal relations, could not vote in Nebraska. Some Act of Congress was 
necessary to naturalize him.  
 
40 According to a report from the Committee of the Judiciary instructed by Congress to deliberate on the 
Fourteenth Amendment and which reported in December 1870 from Prucha, F. P. (1976) op.cit., p344.  
 
41 24 Stat. 388. To allottees and those who had severed their tribal relations.  
 
42 Prucha, F. P. (1976). Op.cit.,.p332 
43 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) 
44 Mansfield, J. (1986). "The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and Foreign Relations." DePaul Law 
Review 36: 1-40, 6. 
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3.3 Canada  
3.3.1 Ontario and Quebec 
In Canada, prior to confederation, the situation differed between English Upper 
Canada (Ontario) and French Lower Canada (Quebec). In the former, no common law 
rights to tribal sovereignty were recognised. As Chief Justice Macauley remarked in 1839, 
there was “no claim to separate nationality such as would except him from being amenable 
to the laws of the land.”45 In the King v. Phelps Indians were analogized with French settlers 
and “the idea that the Indians were not subject to the laws of Canada absurd.”46 Indeed, as 
Harring remarks, individual Indians were legally accorded the same rights as white people 
in the courts. Moreover, any Indian who met the individual property qualifications was 
theoretically entitled to vote.47 This is the importance difference between early Nineteenth 
Century Canadian and American Indian law.48 
 As Ontario Supreme Court Justice William Riddell remarked later in 1913, “in the 
United States there has been from time to time question as to the legal status of Indians 
and Indian land; in Ontario there has never been any doubt that all the land, Indian or 
otherwise is the King’s and that Indians are subjects in the same way as others. There are 
no troublesome subtleties in Canadian Law.”49 As a practical matter Indian tribes were left 
as de facto self-governing until the Indian Acts. However, this was not due to any legal 
principle, but mainly on account of geography.  
Whatever the anomalies and debate about access to the civil law, the criminal law 
was always applicable to the Indians, whether they were tribal members living on reserve 
land or within the mainstream society. 50 This contrasts with the United States, where some 
pretence of extending jurisdiction incrementally within the tribes was required, even though 
this was constitutionally illegitimate as mentioned.51  
                                                          
45 Harring, S. (1992). "The Liberal Treatment of Indians: Native People in Nineteenth Century Ontario Law." 
Saskatchewan Law Review 56: 297-372,315 
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47 Harring, S. L. (1998) op.cit., p101 
 
48 ibid p100 
49 Backhouse, C. and Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History (1999). Colour-Coded : a Legal History of 
Racism in Canada, 1900-1950. Toronto, Published for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History by 
University of Toronto Press. p123 
50 Harring, S. L. (1998).op.cit., p218 
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In contrast to English-dominated Upper Canada, Indian tribes in Lower Canada 
were regarded as de jure retaining at least part of their legal systems, as Judge Samuel Monk 
emphasised in Connolly v. Woodrich, “the common law could be no more carried to Rat River 
in a knapsack than the Cree law ...could be carried to Lower Canada in a canoe.”52 
However, the significance of the Connolly case should not be overestimated, as this only 
related to Cree marriage law in 1803, in an area over which European sovereignty was 
limited at the time. Significantly, Monk refused to endorse any wider powers of self-
government.  
 
3.3.2 The Union of the Two Canadas 
Following the 1840 union of the two Canadas,53 any difference between Upper and 
Lower Canada changed and the Gradual Civilization Act of 185754 was intended to “remove 
all ...distinctions... between Indians and Her Majesty’s other Canadian subjects.”55 To this 
end, it paradoxically initiated a “legal duality,”56 and was a more direct intrusion into 
internal tribal affairs. As Harring commented, this “marked the transition from law to 
equity, from equality to paternalism. There was now a legal model of Indian as child, as 
ward of the government.”57 The ultimate aim of the Act was assimilation into Canadian 
society by breaking up the tribal land mass and conveying freehold acreage to each 
member.58 It established, for the first time, an explicitly inferior legal status for the Indian 
as a precursor to assimilation. Although theoretically an Indian could have previously 
registered to vote, had he met the individual property ownership, now to become 
enfranchised he also had to give up his band status as well as his share of tribal land.59 
There was a penalty of six months imprisonment for those falsely claiming to be 
enfranchised.60 Enfranchisement, with its attendant rights and privileges would be granted 
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56 Harring, S. L. (1998) op.cit., p33 
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58 Nichols, R. L. (1998) op.cit.,p199 
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60  ibid Volume I Chapter 9 p20 
62 
 
only to those who were “literate in either English or French, free of debt and of good 
moral character,”61 conditions which would have been beyond many European Canadians 
of that time. Isolation on reserves was to be maintained and consolidated by subsequent 
land treaties during this difficult transitional period.62 Thus, the policy of civilization and 
Christianization was to be performed in quarantine, free from the risk of the moral 
contamination and degradation of these inchoate whitemen, by actual frontier whitemen.63 
The policy of voluntary enfranchisement had only limited success: only one Indian named 
Elias Hill is known to have applied.64 
The Gradual Civilization Act should actually have been declared ultra vires the colonial 
legislature as the Royal Proclamation of 1763 had reserved Indian affairs to the Crown.65 The 
Royal Proclamation had of course remained a constitutional document, in contrast to the 
situation south of the border, where it had been rejected in the thirteen colonies by 
revolution.66  
 
3.3.3 Confederation 
At the time of confederation in 1867 and the conferral of dominion status, the 
British North America Act67 confirmed that competency for all Indians was a federal 
responsibility, with section 91(24) allocating legislative authority to the national parliament 
over “Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians.”68  How much this preserved of an 
admittedly tenuous tribal sovereignty was demonstrated with the Gradual Enfranchisement Act 
of 1869,69 which explicitly replaced traditional tribal governments with non-Indian style 
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municipal level structures. Tribal governments were empowered to deal with “public 
health; order and decorum at public assemblies; repression of intemperance and profligacy; 
preventing trespass by cattle; maintaining roads, bridges, ditches and fences.....”70 The 
governor was enabled to order the elections of chiefs and councils and to dismiss leaders 
for “dishonesty, intemperance and immorality.”71 
The Canadian parliament adopted the first of a number of consolidating Indian 
Acts in 1876, which provided a more complete regime of federal governance, with very 
limited retention of tribal self-government. As Harring remarked, “it was a cradle to grave 
legal regime imposed on Indians without their consent, denying their rights and 
controlling their lives, even purporting to define who is an Indian.”72 The Indian Act 
established that the Indian “could not vote, buy or use alcohol, sell the produce from 
their own farms, enter into contracts for any purpose, mortgage their property, or sell or 
lease their lands.”73 It is important to note that the Prairies and Pacific Northwest were 
colonized after Confederation and thus Dominion Law and the Indian Act were applied as 
a complete framework from the start of contact.74 
 
3.3.4 Indian Treaties 
Paradoxically, just as the United States discontinued its treaty making policy in 
1871, Canada embarked on a series of seven numbered land cession treaties between 1871 
and 1877.75 Canadian Indian tribes were thus regarded as legally competent to cede lands 
but not to exercise more than a municipal level of self-government on any non-ceded land 
or reserve. As mentioned, treaty-making with Indian tribes in the United States had 
provoked a separation of powers conflict at the national level between the marginalized 
House of Representatives and the Executive and Senate. This was less relevant in Canada, 
because in the parliamentary system of government the Executive is more of a subset of 
the Legislature.76  
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As for the status of Indian treaties, it is significant that following dominion status 
Britain divested itself of responsibility for Canadian internal business, reserving the 
management of only foreign affairs and defence.77 Thus, by implication, Indian treaties with 
the dominion government, unlike United States’ Indian treaties, were not regarded as 
enjoying the status of international treaties as foreign relations remained legally in “the 
purview of the imperial government until the statute of Westminster of 1931.”78  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Throughout the continent, once the Indians had lost any military significance as 
power brokers between the European nations and their tribal populations were reduced, 
the need for meaningful accommodation was similarly reduced. Early use of the more 
bilateral Treaty Power gradually gave way to the more unilateral Commerce Clause in the 
United States. Indians in Canada, who had been accorded a theoretical equality within the 
legal system in the early Nineteenth Century, were reduced by the Indian Act to an explicitly 
inferior status with its corresponding civil disabilities. Canadian Indians had always 
remained subject to general criminal law, in contrast to American Indians who had to be 
brought within such jurisdiction.  
In each country responsibility for Indian affairs was national rather than local. In 
the United States the Treaty Making Clause and Commerce Clause framed the relationship 
with the federal government. North of the border, section 91 (24) of the British North 
America Act 1867 gave responsibility to the Canadian National Parliament for “Indians and 
land reserved for Indians.”  
Indian Treaties in the United States were regarded as enjoying equal status as 
foreign treaties,79 whereas in Canada, as foreign treaties were reserved to the metropolitan 
country, the implication was that they were purely a domestic convenience.80 Although 
both countries have developed sympathetic canons of construction,81 to compensate for 
the imbalance in the negotiation process, Canada’s emerged only in the Twentieth 
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Century.82 It must be emphasised that in neither country would an explicit and intentional 
abrogation be saved. 
Common law rights to tribal sovereignty were recognised in the United States by 
the Marshall trilogy of cases. This meant that any jurisdictional intrusions, such as the Major 
Crimes Act 1885, had to be justified, if disingenuously and illegitimately, by the Trust Power 
and Commerce Clause. In Canada, any internal tribal sovereignty was casually swept away 
by the Indian Acts without seemingly any need to justify the legality or legitimacy, leaving 
merely a municipal level government. Fundamentally, the difference was that internal tribal 
sovereignty in the United States was recognised as complete except where Congress acted, 
and it had acted often. By contrast, Canadian tribal sovereignty was assumed to be absent 
except when conferred by Parliament, and this had been seldom and trivial.  In the United 
States the Indians were regarded more as wards in the collective, tribal sense whereas in 
Canada, from the point of confederation, the model was that of an individual wardship with 
the tribal entity marginalised.  
Universal citizenship was absent  in both countries during the Nineteenth Century 
and as mentioned above, only granted to certain Indians in the United States as a result of 
the General Allotment Act of 1887.83 United States tribal Indians were deemed members of a 
quasi-foreign polity; Canadian Indians were regarded as simply individual domestic 
incompetents.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4 Religious Freedom Jurisprudence in Nineteenth Century 
North America 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine the differing religious freedom jurisprudence on each 
side of the border in the Nineteenth Century. In the United States, as mentioned above, a 
substantive rights-based constitutional judicial review was available, by virtue of the First 
Amendment. By contrast, in Canada, any constitutional enquiry, in the absence of a specific 
religious freedom provision, had to pursue a more federalist and procedural analysis. This 
meant that any protection of religious freedom had to be circuitous and incidental. 
The differing religious demograph will also be highlighted. In particular, Canada 
had emerged from the wars of the Eighteenth Century with a sizeable catholic community 
to assuage, whereas south of the border there was a more homogenous communion with a 
less accommodating attitude to those who were outside the protestant mainstream.  In 
neither country was there any thought of accommodating indigenous spirituality.  
 
4.2 United States 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”(First Amendment)   
 
4.2.1 The Establishment Clause 
There were two theological perspectives prevalent at the drafting of the 
Constitution: Congregational Puritans and Free Church Evangelicals; and two political 
perspectives:  Enlightenment thinkers and Civic Republicans.1 The Congregational Puritans 
saw “church and state as two covenantal associations, two seats of Godly authority in the 
community. Each institution, they believed, was vested with a distinct polity and calling.”2 
Although they were to be kept separate, with church officials banned from political office 
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and vice versa, they were both manifestations of God’s will.3 It was a sort of “divine 
federalism.”  
The Evangelical tradition sought a more perfect division of church and state, or as 
Roger Williams put it, “a wall of separation between the Garden of the Church and the 
wilderness of the world.”4 More tolerant of the dissentient view, the emphasis was on 
liberty of conscience and religious voluntarism. It was more heterodox than the puritan 
orthodox, which refused to countenance “Familists, Antinomians, and other Enthusiasts.”5 
The Evangelicals regarded both state funding and repression as obnoxious.6 They held no 
view of the political world except that it should be discrete. It was “political agnosticism.” 
The Enlightenment view was virtually the obverse of the Evangelical. It was a 
purely political creed that regarded any religion in the polity as a dangerous contaminant. In 
combination the two would be mutually destructive producing, in the words of that “filthy 
little atheist”7 Thomas Paine, “a sort of mule-animal capable only of destroying and not of 
breeding up.”8 Its Crown Prince and principle apostle was Jefferson that “arch infidel, the 
Virginia Voltaire.”9 They subscribed to the Lockean view of religion as “speculative 
opinion.”10 
The Civic Republican espoused liberty of conscience, like the Evangelical and 
Enlightenment viewpoints but, as with the Congressional Puritans, saw no particular 
danger in state support of religion (or more accurately religions in their case). Their 
scriptures included the Declaration of Independence and the Bible in equal measure and 
they saw no inherent evil in chaplains for state institutions and thanksgiving days. They felt 
that religious values should inform the public square but not dictate,11 thus the role of 
religion was perhaps to imbue but not imbrue civil society.  
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Constructing an effective compromise between these disparate voices took careful 
drafting. In particular, there was uncertainty as to whether Congress had intended a non-
preferentialist or non-entanglement understanding of the Establishment Clause. Foremost 
among the advocates of the non-entanglement concept were the Enlightenment thinkers 
such as Jefferson who, echoing Roger Williams in an early letter to the Danbury Baptist 
Association, described the First Amendment as “building a wall of separation between 
church and state.”12 In exchange for the generous and absolute free exercise provision the 
Establishment Clause was a quid pro quo, a complementary insulation of the secularity of 
government; a necessary emollient to what he regarded as a concession of his 
“enlightenment-deist-rationalist viewpoint.”13 Laycock supports the view that the founders 
sought to obviate any entanglement by reminding us that earlier drafts which were rejected 
read, “Congress shall make no law establishing any particular denomination of religion in 
preference to another” or “”establishing any Religious Sect or Society,” in favour of just 
“religion.”14 
Whatever the original intention, the actual reality reflected more the non-
preferentialist understanding, typified by the Civic Republican, which rejected one religion 
but embraced religion over irreligion. Examples abound from the early years of the 
Republic. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 declared that “religion, morality, and knowledge 
being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means 
of education shall forever be encouraged.”15 The first congress funded two official 
chaplains16 and ratified a proposal for a National Thanksgiving Day.17 Congress voted 
funds for a treaty of 1795 with the Oneida, Tuscarora and Stockbridge Indians which had 
pledged $1000 for the building of a church.18 A treaty of 1803 with the Kalaskia Indians 
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pledged funds to “help build a church and to support a catholic priest in his duties.”19In 
1796 an Act was passed “regulating the grants of land, appropriated for military services 
and for the society of the United Brethren for propagating the Gospel among the 
Heathen.”20 Thus, it can be seen that, far from a rigid non-entanglement paradigm, 
Congress was quite liberal, even incontinent, in its funding and endorsement of various 
religious projects.   
The Supreme Court determined only one Establishment Clause issue in the 
Nineteenth Century.21 The Court declared that federal aid to a hospice run by Catholics in 
Washington DC did not breach the Constitution, as it was “simply the case of a secular 
corporation being managed by people who hold to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic 
Church.”22 Justice Peckham opined that, “Congress has power to make “a law respecting a 
religious establishment”.... which is not synonymous with a “law respecting an 
establishment of religion.””23 This is a rejection of the non-entanglement position, if not a 
ringing endorsement of the non-preferentialist stance. Thus the complete wall of separation 
was, if not absent, certainly porous. It would take the Supreme Court of another era to 
reconstruct it.24 
 
4.2.2 The Free Exercise Clause 
As Buck remarks, the Free Exercise component itself could be understood to 
privilege, endorse or even establish religion, as the Constitution would be searched in vain 
for any protection for the free exercise of any other civic faith, such as “economics, 
sociology, or biology.”25 Furthermore, as Pepper remarks, the guarantee of religious 
freedom in the First Amendment is seemingly absolute.26 There are no qualifiers to the 
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right that are found elsewhere in the Bill of Rights, such as “peaceably to assemble”;27 
“unreasonable searches and seizures”;28 “due process of law”;29 “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”30  
Congress had rejected one previous draft, which read “rights of conscience,” in 
favour of “free exercise.”31 McConnell posits two reasons for this rejection. Firstly, that it 
encompassed a wider protection which included conduct not merely belief. Secondly, it was 
to exclude other wider belief systems, such as those based on “science, history, economics, 
political ideology, or secular moral philosophy.”32 But what was understood as worthy of 
protection? Justice Story, a Supreme Court Justice between 1811 and 1845, perhaps caught 
the prevailing view: “The real object of the [First] Amendment was not to countenance 
much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; 
but to exclude all rivalry between Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical 
establishment which should give rise to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national 
government.”33 The debate was intra-Christianity, other faiths being beyond the calculus.   
The Supreme Court was asked, for the first time, explicitly to determine the extent 
of the free exercise right in Reynolds v United States (1878), when faced with the legality of 
polygamy in the territories.34 On a preliminary constitutional and jurisdictional matter, the 
Court held that, “Congress cannot pass a law for the government of the territories which 
shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.”35This confirmed that the Bill of Rights extended 
to the territories which will have great significance when the treatment of Indian religion is 
considered in a later chapter.  
Justice Peckham remarked that Congress was deprived of the power to regulate 
mere opinion but was “free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or 
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subversive of good order.”36 Polygamy, he continued, had always been “an offence against 
society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less severity”37 and a 
statute properly enacted by congress does not violate the constitutional right to free 
exercise by failing to accommodate a religious exemption for conduct repugnant to societal 
mores. Indeed, were Congress limited by the requirement to excuse such practice, on the 
grounds of religious belief, then it would “permit every citizen to become a law unto 
himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.”38 
McConnell has criticised this decision as inconsistent with the standard of many 
state constitutions, which were not confined to beliefs and opinions, but encompassed the 
actions that flow from those beliefs.39 Yet there must be some circumscription to religious-
motivated conduct as such a right can never be absolute. Indeed, Justice Peckham did not 
condemn all conduct; he merely held that religious conduct was not necessarily immune from 
scrutiny. The difficulty of course is that societal mores on the relative deviance of conduct 
are those of the protestant civil religion. Polygamy again attracted the Court’s scrutiny in 
Davis v Beason (1889).40 Justice Field remarked, “bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the 
laws of all civilized and Christian countries.”41 Crime is crime, he held, even though it may 
be sanctioned “by what [a] particular sect may designate as religion.”42  
Mormonism, although nominally Christian, regarded mainstream Christianity as 
having committed a number of serious theological errors: Protestants were apostates and 
the Catholic Church was the “mother of all harlots.”43 While it would not have been 
difficult in late Nineteenth Century to have found Protestants that agreed in large measure 
with this view of Catholicism any criticism of Protestants was beyond the pale. Indeed, 
anti-Catholicism was rife at the time due to hostility to the rapid influx of European 
immigrants who did not fit the Anglo–Saxon Protestant template.44 This, together with the 
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recent and rather startling revelation that the Pope was infallible,45 led to a more complete 
identification of Protestantism and Americanism.”46Catholics were deemed suspect as they 
owed allegiance to the Pope, and he was an alien.47 
In Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, (1892)48 the matter at issue was an 1885 
statute originally designed to exclude foreign workers (mainly Chinese) who had pre-signed 
work contracts. Its subsequent unfortunate and incidental application to an Anglican priest 
prompted an eventual appeal to the Supreme Court. As the New York Times quipped, 
“[t]he Law is no respecter of Parsons.”49  On appeal, Justice Brewer for the Supreme Court 
rejected this use of the statute saying, “this is a Christian nation and the statute could not 
conceivably have been intended to apply to the Reverend without contradicting the basic 
assumptions behind all national legislation-that impinging on Christian observance was 
inimical to religious freedom”50  
Thus, as Gordon opines, towards the end of the Nineteenth Century religious 
liberty meant simply that “Protestant faiths competed on a level playing-field.”51 When 
confronted by alien beliefs, and deviant practices pursuant to such beliefs, they united in 
their condemnation and persecution. If there was not an overt privileging of Protestantism 
then certainly no such compunction was displayed with Christianity, which as Lord Bryce 
observed, “is in fact understood to be, though not the legally established religion, yet the 
national religion.”52  
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4.3 Canada 
4.3.1 Pre-Confederation 
Following the Seven Years War, the Treaty of Paris (1763) expressed a degree of 
religious tolerance to the defeated French: the King conceded that, “his new Roman 
Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion according to the rites of the 
Romish Church as far as the laws of Great Britain permit.”53 The qualifier “as far as the 
laws of Great Britain permit” was significant in that Catholics were still at that time subject 
to legal proscription in the mother country. Similarly, in the Quebec Act (1774) the Roman 
Catholic subjects could exercise their religion “subject to the Elizabethan Act of 
Supremacy.”54 Despite these seemingly qualified rights, the Catholic religion, as a practical 
matter, was left largely undisturbed.55 Indeed, a legal opinion issued by the Attorney and 
Solicitor Generals in 1765, even stated that the penal laws of England did not apply to the 
Roman Catholics of Canada.56 
The Constitutional Act of 179157 divided Quebec into Upper Canada and Lower 
Canada, comprising mainly Protestant loyalists and French Catholics respectively.58 
Although there was no formal establishment of Anglicanism, one seventh of all crown land 
grants in Upper Canada were set aside as reserves to support the Protestant clergy.59 The 
Crown also authorized the Governor or Lieutenant Governor to erect parsonages or 
rectories within every township or parish60 “according to the Establishment of the Church 
of England.”61 Following union of the two Canadas62 in 1840, the clamour grew for this 
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real estate privilege to be removed until the Clergy Reserves Act (1854) finally abolished the 
reserves and also proclaimed the intention “to remove all semblance of connexion between 
Church and State.”63 
Further afield in British Columbia the Hudson’s Bay Company, which was the 
governing authority at the time, made public grants to support Anglican churches, 
chaplains and teachers. Yet such endorsement was not unconditional, as missionaries were 
expected to refrain from over-imposing their morality or disturbing the Indian way of life. 
In short, anything that could conceivably affect trade.64 Following protests this funding was 
withdrawn in 1859.65 The Prairie Provinces were colonized after any dominion church-state 
controversy had been settled and thus had no independent establishment route.66  
 
4.3.2 Confederation 
The Canadian Constitution of the Nineteenth Century was something of a hybrid 
between the American and British constitutions: it was similar to the American system in 
that it was largely written and the apportionment of legislative powers was entrenched and 
immune from the normal legislative process. However, like the British constitutional 
system, there were few substantive issues in the Nineteenth Century which were immune 
from the normal legislative process. There were no free exercise or establishment 
provisions. Indeed, the only constitutional mention of religion was found in Section 93 of 
the British North America Act (1867)67 which entrenched government funding guarantees for 
denominational schooling. Without such guarantees, in particular for the Roman Catholic 
schools, Quebec would not have joined the confederation. It was therefore a pragmatic 
compromise and a “de facto establishment of religious privilege.”68 
Judicial authority, however, maintained that neither church was established,69 with 
perhaps the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec coming the closest, having the right to 
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tithes at law.70 The position of religious bodies was described by the Ontario High Court in 
the case of Dunnet v. Forneri (1877),71 “[a]ll religious bodies are here considered as voluntary 
associations: the law recognises their existence and protects them in their enjoyment of 
property, but unless civil rights are in question it does not interfere with their organization 
or with questions of religious faith.”72 
 
4.3.3 Federalism and Religious Freedom 
As mentioned, there was no explicit mention of religious freedom in the British 
North America Act of 1867. With no equivalent to the American Bill of Rights, this heavily 
circumscribed the ambit of judicial review.73 Furthermore, parliamentary supremacy confers 
an almost absolute sovereignty on each parliament with substantial judicial deference to 
this concept. The sole enquiry became the vires of legislation, that is whether the act was 
within the legislative competency of the federal component. Beyond that there was no 
mechanism for declaring any legislation in violation of fundamental rights.   
An early federalist challenge to a religious law occurred in Attorney-General for Ontario 
v. Hamilton Street Railway Co.74 with Ontario’s Lord’s Day Act (1897) which prohibited various 
activities on the Sabbath. The Privy Council ruled that a prohibition on Sunday opening 
was not within provincial competence because it was criminal law that was reserved to the 
national parliament under section 91(27) of the British North America Act.75 The 
legislation was regarded as prohibitory rather than regulatory.76  
Yet even the rigid dichotomy of this federalism analysis could be circumvented by a 
principle which became known as the “essential purpose” or “pith and substance.”77 It 
placed the emphasis on purpose rather than effects: should the purpose be benign and 
within the nominal federal competency, an incidental effect outside this would be 
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overlooked.78 It could save the facially neutral but operationally disparate. However, even 
should there be a judicial pronouncement of invalidity on federalism grounds, this could be 
circumvented, if desired, by the other correct federal component enacting the same 
legislation.  Thus, it must be said that these limited inquiries provided merely indirect, 
coincidental and potentially temporary protection of fundamental liberties in the presence 
of another constitutional violation.  
 A better argument, at least for Christianity, would be an indirect reliance on 
section 93 of the British North America Act (1867)79 which guaranteed denominational 
schooling. Such denominational privilege of schooling must assume the continuance of the 
relevant denomination.80 Beyond the enumerated denominations of Catholicism and 
Protestantism any fundamental freedom of other sects or religious traditions would be pure 
speculation. For native religions, as will be discussed, denominational schooling actively 
sought to destroy their religion. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Religious freedom was constitutionalised in the United States by virtue of the First 
Amendment but Supreme Court jurisprudence was sparse. Establishment concerns were 
usually satisfied if the federal governmental ambition was non-preferentialist: any non-
entanglement paradigm must wait for another era, after all the Founders were 
overwhelmingly God-fearing if not all God-bothering. As for intrastate establishment, that 
was simply no business of the United States government as the First Amendment 
Establishment and Free Exercise clauses were only applied to the states from the 
Twentieth Century.81 By contrast, the territories were regarded as within the ambit of the 
Bill of Rights82 in order to temper Congress’ plenary legislative power.83 
Within this era free exercise in the United States meant an absolute free right to a 
chosen belief, but a restricted right to the consequences and actions in pursuit of such a 
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belief. General criminal laws proscribing, for example, the assumption of multiple wives 
were upheld.84 Mormonism, and to a certain extent Catholicism, were beyond the pale for a 
predominantly Protestant country and the Supreme Court was reflective of that consensus. 
Any free exercise right seemed limited to ensuring that mainstream Protestantism was not 
disadvantaged. 
By contrast, Canada had to accommodate a sizeable Catholic community from its 
conception. Thus denominational Catholic schooling was constitutionally protected from 
1867 and Catholicism tolerated, despite being technically proscribed.85 As for any other 
religious freedom, the judiciary displayed great deference to the legislature in the absence of 
an entrenched Bill of Rights. The only judicial review available concerned whether the 
correct federal component had enacted the legislation, and only from the turn of the 
Twentieth Century was this exercised in earnest.86 If it was determined that the wrong 
federal component had legislated then it was always open to the other to fill the 
jurisdictional lacuna. The judiciary could therefore only give a protection that was sporadic, 
temporary and incidental. 87   
The next chapters will explore how Indian religious freedom was regarded as both 
falling outside the accepted range of constitutionally protected religions in the United 
States and indeed jurisdictionally beyond the protection of the Bill of Rights. As mentioned 
above, Canada could proceed without the restraint of any substantive constitutional 
protection of religious freedom. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5 Legalising Christianity as an Instrument of Assimilation 
 
5.1 Introduction: The Biology of Assimilation 
At times it was difficult to tell if the Indian Department’s view that aboriginal peoples were 
a “dying race” was an observation, a prediction, or a policy assumption.(J R Miller, 
historian, in 1996)1 
 
Two schools of thought emerged in the Nineteenth Century regarding the exact 
biological nature of the indigenous population of North America. The monogenetic theory 
stated that everyone was descended from Adam and Eve according to Mosaic teaching.2 
Any differences were explained purely by environment; nurture rather than nature. This 
theory was endorsed by abolitionists, reformers and missionaries who would have been 
redundant without this portrayal of the Indian as a noble, but essentially redeemable 
savage, who was not biologically precluded from advancement.3 As the Canadian 
missionary John Maclean remarked, “We are all savages in the estimation of somebody.”4 
The remedy was “fair treatment and acceptance by Indians of the values of Christianity and 
acquisitive capitalism;”5 the prescription was the bible and the plough. 
By contrast, polygenetic theory postulated a Linnaean taxonomy, with differences 
explained biologically rather than environmentally.6 This theory, occasionally propounded 
by ethnology and anthropology, painted a less promising future for the indigenous 
populations. In the event of their continued survival, which was by no means certain, the  
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model had to be a “paternalism [which] was no longer a trusteeship until maturity was 
reached, but a perpetual guardianship over ageless children.”7 Alternatively, the future held 
out an isolation prior to their eventual and inevitable Darwinian extinction as they were a 
“doomed race melting like the snow before the sun.”8 In terms of government policy, the 
monogeneticist theory narrowly prevailed and the Indians were deemed capable of 
“improvement.”  
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the early Nineteenth Century 
Civilization Fund in the United States which was the first formal use of the missionaries as 
instruments of government policy. Although nominally an educational programme, it will 
be scrutinised for any subtext of Christianisation and therefore any potential violation of 
the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 
In the late 1860s the Peace Policy employed churchmen as Indian agents in a more 
direct, executive role. There then followed a more extensive contract school programme 
with direct and complete government funding of mission schools, although some were 
established pursuant to agreed treaty provisions. This chapter will analyse these issues in 
terms of the freedom of religion provisions contained in the First Amendment, in 
particular the extent to which the Establishment Clause was violated by such church-state 
intimacy. Indeed, crucially whether the protection of the Bill of Rights was even applicable 
to these geographically discrete “domestic dependent nations” as a shield from such 
intrusions. 
In the absence of free exercise and anti-establishment provisions, the Canadian 
Constitution provided no obstacle to church-state entanglement and so mission funding 
and church schools could proceed without any Constitutional difficulty. Indeed, by virtue 
of section 93 of the British North America Act 1867, denominational schooling was actually 
declared an entrenched right immune from provincial abridgement. Indians also specifically 
requested education and many treaties included provisions for schooling. Yet, whereas 
these were to be provided on reserves, the Canadian government instead provided a 
comprehensive and compulsory residential school programme off-reserve. These schools will 
therefore be examined as a violation of these treaties.9 
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5.2 The United States 
How can we have confidence in the white people? When Jesus Christ came upon the earth 
you killed and nailed him on a cross. (Tecumseh)10 
 
5.2.1 Early Policy 
Although some Christian communities known as “Praying Towns” had been 
established in the 17th century, most attempts at the Christianization of the Indians had had 
limited success. The Indians’ often nomadic existence in pursuit of the fur bearing animals 
on which their economy was founded prevented the settled and captive audience amenable 
to conversion.11 Only where the Indians were settled and agrarian, such as the Five 
Civilized Tribes, was there any measure of success. It was realized that, “you cannot 
evangelize a people always on the wing.”12   
Any systematic Christianization effort would therefore have to wait until the 
Nineteenth Century when the Indians had been militarily overwhelmed, confined to 
reserves, and rendered quiescent. At that point governments could afford magnanimity. 
This they interpreted as the bible not the bullet, conversion rather than extermination.13 
 
5.2.2 The Civilization Fund 
The first congressional financial support for any “civilization programme” came 
with the establishment of the Civilization Fund Act in 1819.14 The sum appropriated initially 
was $10,000 annually which rose to $60,000 annually by 1845 and came to represent 
approximately half of the required mission funding.15 The missions were the organizations 
in situ and thus the intended recipients of this fund, which ostensibly was educational not 
evangelical. 
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The House Committee on Indian Affairs, when discussing the bill, made little 
effort to hide the Christianization subtext beneath the nominally educational and 
agricultural purposes: “Put into the hands of their children the primer and the hoe, and 
they will naturally, in time, take hold of the plow; and as their minds become enlightened 
and expand, the Bible will be their book, and they will grow up in habits of morality and 
industry, leave the chase to those of minds less cultured, and become useful members of 
society.”16  Put in another less generous way by the same committee, “the sons of the forest 
should be moralized or exterminated.”17  
 
5.2.2.1 The First Amendment and the Civilization Fund 
After a resolution of the House of Representatives this scheme was investigated for 
potential Establishment Clause concerns. The House Committee’s conclusion was that the 
education was secular, even though the instrument was sectarian.18 This was consistent with 
similar congressional funding in the early Nineteenth Century that was described in 
Chapter 4. 
 Although the Civilization Fund was certainly an entanglement it was non-
preferential, as any mission could apply for educational funds. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
later remarked in Bradfield v. Roberts (1899)19 that “a law respecting a religious 
establishment”.... is not synonymous with a “law respecting an establishment of 
religion.””20  In any case, the non-entanglement paradigm, which forbade government 
entanglement in religion irrespective of denominational preference, was yet to be 
developed; only emerging in the Twentieth Century.21  
Due to the essentially voluntary nature of the education and the lack of any overt 
deprecation or restriction of Indian religion then the free exercise clause was not 
implicated. The missionaries hoped that the example of virtue and usefulness presented by  
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the Christian farmer would turn the Indians away from their roaming life and their pagan 
superstitions.  
 
5.2.3 The Peace Policy 
The Peace Policy was actually also known as the Quaker Policy, as it was the initial 
suggestion of some enlightened Friends. As Grant had remarked, “[i]f you can make 
Quakers out of [the Indians] it will take the fight out of them. Let us have peace.”22 There 
were two main elements introduced to consolidate what was hoped would be an enduring 
cessation of hostilities and eliminate sources of grievance. Firstly, a Board of Indian 
Commissioners, comprising wealthy philanthropic volunteer laymen, who monitored and 
recommended action on the procurement of supplies. The Board actually performed 
excellent work in reducing graft and corruption and ensuring the quality of goods supplied. 
It continued in existence until 1933.23 Secondly, and most significantly, the nomination of 
agents by churches which would improve both probity and incidentally piety.24Agents had 
to be sought who “feared God and were ashamed to steal.”25 
By an Act of April 10 1869 there was a special fund of $2 million provided “to 
enable the President to maintain peace among and with the various tribes, bands and 
parties of Indian, and to promote civilization among said Indians, bring them, where 
practicable upon reservations, relieve their necessities, and encourage their self-support.”26 
Secretary of the Interior Columbus Delano summarised the main aims of the Policy: 
“relocation and confinement to reservations to learn agriculture and be Christianized; 
combine this kindness with necessary severity should it be rejected; improve the quality of 
supplies and eliminate graft; uplift the Indians spiritually by the instrumentality of Christian 
agents; finally churches and schools would demonstrate the signal advantages of a Christian 
civilization.”27 The reservations were to be the “incubators of civilization.”28  
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Advocates of the Peace Policy highlighted the issue of the cost effective application 
of federal funds in general. Military action, as well as being less humane, “cost the federal 
government one million dollars and twenty-five white lives for each single warrior killed in 
the Sioux wars of 1852 and 1854.”29 This was contrasted with the lack of expenditure on 
military matters needed to keep in order the Five Civilized Tribes.30  
The missionary societies themselves had preferred to harvest foreign rather than 
domestic souls due to the greater yield per dollar. This phenomenon was also seen in 
Canada, as one church official remarked, “[w]e spend about £1 for every 17,000 heathen in 
Asia and about £1 for every six heathen in the ecclesiastical province of Rupert’s Land.”31 
Due to this disproportionate value for money, any missionary effort for the continental, 
rather than sub-continental Indians, must seek government funding rather than rely on the 
missionary societies.   
Therefore when it came to simple economy, both church and state were prepared 
for a more symbiotic relationship. It was cheaper to save souls than shoot them. Any 
diffidence about breaching the “wall of separation” between Church and State had to be 
suppressed when the issue was one of simple cost effectiveness. The banknotes slipped 
easily through the cracks.  
Interdenominational rivalry was never far from the surface and was especially 
distasteful, bitter and unchristian between the Protestants and Catholics, with each accusing 
the other’s agents of denying Indians freedom of conscience. Indeed, Indian choice 
between denominations was sometimes refused, for example when Red Cloud’s request for 
Catholic missionaries was denied.32 As Harold Cardinal remarked: “churches prefer 
sectarianism to faith.”33 As for freedom to practice any other religious tradition one 
Catholic statement asserted, without apparent irony, “[t]he Indians have a right under the 
Constitution, as much as any other person in the Republic to the full enjoyment of liberty 
of conscience; accordingly they have the right to choose whatever Christian belief they wish 
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without interference from the government.”34 Freedom of Indian religions was regarded as 
beyond contemplation. 
There was also criticism of the administrative inexperience of the churches, in 
particular by the Board of Inquiry set up by the new Secretary of the Interior Schulz in 
1877, which regarded as impractical the “undertaking through pigmies of the solution of 
[the Indian] problem that had engaged the best efforts of statesmen and philanthropists 
ever since the days of the republic.”35 Congress became embittered, lobbying hard and 
undermining the policy. Appropriations were resented and delayed. More importantly, 
having been denied political patronage through agent appointments, Congress made up for 
this with political gifts of subordinate offices on reservations for jobless friends, the 
churches being powerless and guileless to resist.36  
Gradually the denominations started to withdraw, first the Quakers, then the 
Episcopalians, then the Methodists, until few remained. The military were recruited to fill 
vacant agent posts from 1892 as a response to the corrupt politically-appointed agents who 
had quickly moved into the agencies vacated by the denominations. In 1893 twenty-seven 
out of fifty-seven agents were army officers.37 Yet by 1898 the number had dwindled to 
three, the remainder being civilians, thus signalling the eventual triumph of Congress. 
 
5.2.3.1 The First Amendment and the Peace Policy 
Ely Parker had written in 1869 on behalf of President Grant to Benjamin Hallowell, 
secretary of the Quaker conference, “any attempt which may or can be made by your 
society, for the improvement, education and Christianization of the Indians, under such 
Agencies, will receive all the encouragement and protection which the laws of the United States 
will warrant him in giving.”38(author’s italics). The acknowledgment that there may be some 
circumscription of his actions was perhaps a reference to the First Amendment 
Establishment Clause and that such overt endorsement and sponsorship could be a 
violation. 
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The whole question as to whether the Bill of Rights contained the federal 
government’s actions on Indian reservations is not straightforward. The case of Mormon 
Church v United States, mentioned in Chapter 4, confirmed that “the power of congress over 
the territories [in contrast to the states] of the United States is general and plenary.”39 Yet 
Reynolds v United States held that “congress cannot pass a law for the government of the 
territories which shall prohibit the free exercise of religion,”40 implying that congressional 
power was exclusive but not absolute, tempered as it was by the Constitution.   
Much Indian tribal land, although geographically situated within, was not regarded 
as part of, the territories. Internal tribal sovereignty of these “domestic dependent nations”, 
according to the Marshall trilogy, was complete subject to two disabilities: they “could not 
freely alienate their land and they could not treat with foreign powers.”41 However, 
congressional power over Indians was also described as plenary (1886),42 and later even 
confirmed as political and justicially unreviewable (1903).43 But such a Plenary Power should, 
by analogy to Reynolds and its application to the territories, have been subject to the 
restraint of the Bill of Rights.  
Nevertheless, the status of “domestic dependent nation” did differ from that of a 
territory. Mansfield described it as “somewhere between the Amish and a foreign nation.”44 
Of course there had never been a murmur of an Establishment Clause violation when 
Congress had subsidized foreign missions in Africa and Asia.  
Perhaps their status more resembled that of “overseas territories” such as the 
Philippines or Puerto Rico. The application of the Bill of Rights to such territories was 
investigated in the Insular Cases.45 Views ranged from the thought that the Bill of Rights 
does not necessarily apply in its entirety but only to those rights deemed fundamental; to 
that which held that the whole set of rights should apply or else the United States should 
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not enter into any sort of political relationship.46 It is submitted that religious liberty, and 
therefore the preclusion of the favouring of one church by establishment, is a fundamental 
freedom and thus on either of these views it should have applied. If the United States 
decided to violate the inherent sovereignty of tribal nations it should have been restrained 
from violations of the Bill of Rights within the geographical confines of U.S. borders, at 
least to the same extent as outside its borders in the overseas territories. The argument that 
it did not apply to aliens outside the United States, based on a Lockean compact between 
citizens, again is unpersuasive. As Mansfield reminds us, there is no textual restriction to 
“citizens” in the Bill of Rights.47 Indeed, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion” has no geographical qualifier.  
In the 1907 case of Quick Bear v Leupp48 the Supreme Court dealt with the use of 
tribal monies to fund sectarian schooling. This will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section but suffice to say that the Court, by considering the substantive issue that there was 
no Establishment Clause violation, assumed that the First Amendment did indeed apply 
within Indian country. 
Assuming therefore that the Establishment Clause applied, then the selective 
recruitment of agents from some, but significantly not all,49 denominations should have 
been an egregious breach of even a non-preferentialist paradigm. Furthermore, their 
employment both as agents and simultaneously as missionaries would be an even greater 
violation than sectarian schooling, in which the evangelism could at least have been 
arguably incidental, although disingenuously so, to the education.  
The Free Exercise Clause should also have been implicated as the full panoply of 
Christian denominations was not represented in the selection of agents. Should the Indians, 
bizarrely, have requested a Mormon or Southern Baptist agent/missionary this would not 
have been permitted, as these denominations were excluded.50  
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As for other constitutional breaches, Article VI of the United States Constitution 
reads, “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public 
Trust under the United States.”51This provision was intended to prevent a religious test 
from acting both as a preclusion from, and as a prerequisite for, public office. Of course, 
the selective appointment of denominational Indian agents is a flagrant violation of this 
prohibition, which is without qualifier.52 
 
5.2.4 Christianization through Education 
“The pretty innocent papoose has in itself the potency of a painted savage, prowling like a 
beast of prey, or the possibilities of a sweet and gentle womanhood or a noble and useful 
manhood.”53(Indian Commissioner Morgan in 1889) 
 
5.2.4.1 Compulsory Education 
Assimilation was consolidated with the forcible education of children, which was a 
means of reducing “cultural reproduction.”54 This education was combined with a 
prohibition on native languages, except for the use of the vernacular bible, and a policy of 
renaming Indian children with anglicized names.55 As Harring remarks, the proscription of 
adult ceremonies did not always destroy cultural tradition but schooling, which prevented 
any participation in, or access to, their spiritual traditions, could “pull it up by the roots.”56 
As for coercing attendance, in 1891 Congress authorised the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs to “make and enforce such rules and regulations as will ensure the 
attendance of Indian children of suitable age and health at schools established and 
maintained for their benefit”57 This was reinforced with sanctions two years later when 
Congress stipulated that the “Secretary of the Interior may in his discretion withhold 
rations clothing and other annuities from Indian parents or guardians who refuse or neglect 
to send and keep their children of proper school age in some school a reasonable portion 
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of the year.”58In practice, coercion was widely practised with one notorious example being 
the imprisonment of Hopi parents for several years on Alcatraz Island for refusing to 
surrender their children.59  
Although admittedly some tribes had requested education in treaties this was 
generally to be situated on reservations.60 Thus the provision of boarding schools violated 
treaties. In the absence of a treaty request, the compulsory education was a flagrant breach 
of tribal sovereignty. Moreover, when the education was denominational in nature, such as 
that provided by the contract schools, religious freedom was also implicated.   
 
5.2.4.2 The Contract Schools 
The contract schools were a pragmatic response to government inertia. Although 
the principle of secular education had been accepted the necessary schools would take time 
to construct. In the meantime the mission schools were in situ and in a position to offer 
immediate value, although admittedly this was something of an abdication of government 
responsibility.61 By 1883, there were twenty-two boarding schools and sixteen day schools 
run by Christian denominations that had signed contracts with the federal government and 
had therefore directly received federal money.62 
Due to a relentless lobbying effort, the Catholics obtained two-thirds of the funds 
allocated to contract schools. This began to spark resentment and a movement to break 
this church-state relationship in Indian education. Foremost among the critics was the 
American Protective Association which was a “manifestation of rabid agrarian American 
nativism violently opposed to immigration and the Roman Catholic Church.”63 Nativism, 
of course, referred to a privileging of the earlier, largely protestant immigrants, not the 
aboriginals. Thus bigotry masked as secularism prevailed. Congress progressively reduced 
funding for denominational contract schools, 80% in 1895, 50% in 1897, 40% in 1898 to 
zero in 1899. 
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Protestants knew that government-funded schools fulfilled many of their own 
ambitions and that American Secularism was in reality a consolidation of the ambient 
Protestant norm. Furthermore, they argued that the Indians were the “wards of the 
government not of Rome” and the responsibility lay with the national government.64 
Indeed, many would have preferred to see the Indian unconverted rather than Catholicised, 
regarding Catholics as no better than “Jews, Moslems, Orientals and other heathen.”65 
Denominations sought to circumvent this lack of funding, which had been 
calculated at $150,000 per year,66 by diverting treaty rations, normally received at home, 
direct to the schools, thus obliging attendance or starvation.67 However, this could not 
retrieve all of the funding shortfall so Indian tribal funds, which could make a significant 
contribution, were targeted. These monies, it was claimed, were not the congressional 
appropriations proscribed from 1899, but Indians’ own funds either from treaty annuities 
or proceeds from the sale of land, which theoretically could be available for any purpose.68 
Missions therefore sought direct contracts with the tribes for the use of their own money. 
President Roosevelt gave his approval, subject to a demonstrable request by the Indians 
themselves, which could be evidenced by petition.69 The Executive was thus agreeing to 
facilitate financial support that the legislature had been proscribed from furnishing directly 
in 1899.70 Furthermore, it is debateable whether a majority of the Indians of each tribe 
would have consented to such a use of their monies and been literate enough to sign a 
“petition.”  
 
5.2.4.3 The First Amendment and the Contract Schools 
Questions over the differential treatment of such treaty monies arose in Quick Bear 
v. Leupp71 when the Supreme Court was asked to determine an Establishment Clause 
challenge, brought by Quick Bear, a Protestant Indian, to the validity of a contract between 
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the United States and the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions for sectarian schooling. The 
schooling was provided pursuant to a treaty provision.72 At issue were not congressional 
appropriations per se, which had been forbidden by certain provisos contained in the Indian 
Appropriation Acts of 1898 ,1896, 1897, 1898 and 1899,73 but the application of a Treaty 
Fund (annual appropriations to fund annuities stipulated in a treaty) and a Trust Fund  
(capital sum representing the value of the land cession). Both were held to be technically 
Indian money and the Supreme Court held that “it is inconceivable that congress [by an 
application of the Establishment clause] should have intended to prohibit them from 
receiving religious education at their own cost if they so desired it; such an intent would be 
one “to prohibit the free exercise of religion.””74 However the Supreme Court, by not 
denying the application of the Establishment Clause to tribal land, if the contract school 
was unsolicited and funding was not derived from Indian monies, tacitly confirmed its 
relevance. The selective conferral of school contracts to only certain denominations was 
surely an unconstitutional establishment. Furthermore, in Quick Bear, the application of the 
free exercise of religion element of the First Amendment was also acknowledged for Indians 
on tribal land. Had Indian spirituality been recognised as religion the contract schools that 
were not authorised by a treaty provision and were not funded by Indian monies would, of 
course, have violated the Free Exercise component by their relentless Christianization.  
 
 
5.3 Canada   
 
5.3.1 Early Policy  
The situation in Canada differed markedly between the western and eastern tribes. 
First contact with the eastern tribes occurred from the late Seventeenth Century, when they 
were still militarily powerful, and a degree of respect remained with the relationship 
persisting as more bilateral. The Indians were subsequently encouraged to send their 
children to school but little intrusion was attempted into their culture. Eastern tribes were 
allies and the missionaries were tolerated, provided they did not disturb the delicate 
equilibrium. By contrast, the western tribes often first confronted an all-powerful 
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Confederation in the mid Nineteenth Century with the relationship more coercive and 
unilateral.75  
The Gradual Civilization Act of 1857,76 as mentioned in Chapter Three, was the first 
dedicated assimilative legislation in the United Canadas with the stated purpose of 
“remov[ing] all ...distinctions... between Indians and Her Majesty’s other Canadian 
subjects.”77 To this end it paradoxically created a legal duality:78 Indians were consigned to 
the status of citizen aspirants, with various criteria to satisfy, before being granted full 
citizenship. Furthermore, the tribal entity and tribal land mass were to be destroyed; the 
one by legislative intrusion, the other by unequally negotiated treaties of land cession.  
The Bagot Commission Report of 1844 had recommended the centralization of 
control over all Indians and Indian lands. This was the policy adopted by the Indian Lands 
Act of 1860, which was codified constitutionally at confederation by section 91(24) of the 
British North America Act 1867.79 The first manifestation of this federal control, as 
mentioned before, was the Indian Act of 1876 which provided a “cradle to grave legal 
regime” covering all facets of Indian life.80  
 
5.3.2 Missionaries 
You tell us that God sent you. Why did he not send you sooner? Our fathers would not 
have been lost, as you say they were. The missionary Fathers are men like us. Why are they 
rather than other men privileged to speak to God?  (Chief Iacoupen in 1613)81 
 
In contrast to the situation south of the border with President Grant’s Peace Policy, 
missionaries were never officially regarded as partners in government policy.82 The 
Canadian government did use missionaries, but never considered them integral to policy or 
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worthy of consultation.83 They were not selected wholesale as Indian agents but did work 
closely with the agents on the reservations. This is the most important difference between 
the two countries: the lack of an official executive role in Canada for the church. There was 
no large scale “Peace Policy,” with its employment of legions of churchmen, as there had 
been no “War Policy” to reverse. Whether the relative lack of violence was due to the 
Canadian temperament and a deliberately more benign policy, or the lack of pressure from 
acquisitive settlers on the frontier is debateable. The missionary was not needed to assuage 
the guilt of a government that had been responsible for, or at least complicit in, large-scale 
wars of extermination. 
An early and rare example of mission funding was when the Hudson’s Bay 
Company established a successful mission at Metlakatla in 1862, similar in concept to the 
praying towns of colonial New England.84 The Hudson’s Bay Company was the major 
landowner in central and western Canada until it ceded its territory to the Crown in 1868. 
But it was above all a pragmatic and commercial venture whose purposes, according to 
Lord Palmerston, were simply “to deprive the local quadrupeds of their fur and keep the 
local bipeds off their liquor.”85 Priests could only upset the fur trade by detaining Indians 
from the hunt and were merely tolerated, provided they did not become too turbulent. As 
the Dominion of Canada tentatively spread across the continent, this passive role of the 
government, in regard to missionary involvement, was maintained, at least in respect of the 
adult Indian population. Only when the white population had reached a critical mass did 
the government dare to employ a more proactive role. This will be seen more in the next 
chapter when the suppression of Indian religion will be examined.  
 
5.3.2.1 The Constitutionality of the Missions 
Any challenge on the grounds of an illegal governmental establishment of religion 
or infringement of free exercise fails on a number of grounds. Firstly, and most 
importantly, there was no constitutional obstacle to governmental promotion of 
missionaries in general as, unlike the United States, there was no Establishment Clause or 
indeed Free Exercise Clause. Secondly, there was no large scale governmental involvement 
and funding of the missions. Thirdly, in contrast to the United States, the intimate 
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relationship between the missions and government was lacking as they were not employed 
as reserve agents and were not therefore, in effect, an arm of the executive. Lastly, 
conversions seemed largely voluntary and perhaps Christianity was regarded more as an 
addition to native spirituality not a replacement, which Dargo has described as a “process 
of non-exclusive cumulative adhesion.”86 Of course this voluntarism applied to the sentient 
adult. The manipulation, indoctrination and violent acculturation of the credulous child 
were altogether different and more sinister matters. 
 
5.3.3 Education 
As Hutchinson remarks, the theory behind education of the aborigines was to “kill 
the Indian in the child” and to sever the “artery of culture that ran between generations and 
[which] was the profound connection between the parent and child sustaining family and 
community.”87 
Canadian Indians had been mostly free of contamination by the rougher frontier 
elements and persecution by the military.88 They therefore were perhaps less suspicious of 
western education, having had less experience of the worst manifestations of the western-
educated. Education was often regarded by the Indians as a means of coping with the 
change the Europeans brought, not as an acculturation exercise. Trades and farming 
instruction were sought, not religious indoctrination. In other words, a vocational, not 
denominational education.89 Queen Victoria for her part “wished her red children to learn 
the cunning of the white man.”90  
 
5.3.3.1 The Residential School System  
Boarding schools were a Canadian device to accelerate the assimilation by removing 
any influence of the Indian home. These boarding schools were to be denominational in 
character, as to deprive the Indians of their spirituality and culture was regarded as 
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inhumane without a replacement with something Christian and virtuous. Missionaries as 
teachers were also cheaper than professionals, and the Catholics were the cheapest of all as 
their vows of celibacy and poverty ensured they would have no dependants to 
accommodate and would work for a stipend.91 
The education of Indians steadily became more coercive. Indian Act amendments of 
1894 authorised the government to require attendance at residential schools by Order in 
Council. Also the cabinet was authorised “to make regulations which shall have the force 
of law, for the committal by justices or Indians agents of children of Indian blood to 
industrial school or boarding school, there to be kept, cared for and educated for a period 
not extending beyond the time at which such children shall reach the age of eighteen 
years.”92 In theory, only a neglected child could be conveyed to school by force. The 
parents had a right of appeal, although few availed themselves of this due to the generally 
coercive atmosphere, the language barrier and the limited knowledge of such a system that 
prevailed during that era.93 
A 1906 amendment reiterated the 1894 terms as part of the Indian Act and also 
renewed the facility to direct the annuities of children in school as the agent saw fit, thus 
coercing attendance or malnutrition.94 In 1920, after representations from the Department 
of Indian Affairs for a more explicit coercion, the Indian Act itself made education at 
boarding schools compulsory for children between 7 and 15. The Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police were used as truant officers, until they started to bill the Indian department and so 
their services were discarded.95  Some children were forcibly removed from their parents; 
others were relinquished under duress by threatening fines, imprisonment or withholding 
rations.96 Coercive efforts were limited by manpower, geography and the number of 
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schools. In all, perhaps 50% of all Indian children attended these schools: 10,000 students 
in 80 schools at one time.97  
As for the targeting of culture, it was standard practice, as in the U.S. schools, for 
the speaking of native languages to be prohibited and anglicized names to be used in place 
of native ones.98 Regular church attendance was similarly obligatory. The quality of teaching 
was uneven. Indeed, one contemporary critic claimed that a teacher need only have “piety 
and the ability to play the piano.”99  
 
5.3.3.2 The Constitutionality of the Schools 
The government managed to control any diffidence at this church-state 
collaboration with the thought that it was not subsidizing the churches, but merely paying 
them for educational services that it would have had to render itself.100 Any qualms the 
missionaries may have felt were suppressed: the Indians were wards and it was the duty of 
the government to fund their spiritual and material needs.101  
The absence of any Canadian constitutional equivalent of the U.S. prohibition on 
the establishment of religion would, in any case, have rendered such funding immune from 
any substantive constitutional judicial review. Indeed the guarantee of section 93 of the 
British North America Act (1867) constitutionally entrenched denominational schooling and, 
far from being an obstacle, could have been regarded as a positive endorsement. Once the 
concept of denominational schooling had been accepted then its application to Indians 
raised little concern.  
Similarly, there was no constitutional free exercise right that could have protected 
Indian religion from destruction.  Any claims of equal protection for minorities in 
Nineteenth Century Canada would have been regarded as novel to say the least. For 
Indians that were discretely allocated to the federal government under section 91(24), it 
would have been incredible.  
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5.3.3.3 Indian Treaties and Residential Schools 
Although various purely land cession agreements had been concluded in pre-
confederation treaties,102 a comprehensive system of treaty making in Canada only started 
in earnest with the numbered treaties.  Treaties 1-7 were ratified between 1871 and 1877. In 
none of the treaties was there any explicit mention of Christianization, merely provisions 
for agricultural assistance and education. Specifically, education was phrased as “schools 
provided on each reserve when Indians desire them” (Treaties 1,2,3,5,6); “Schools 
provided on each reserve when Indians are ‘settled and prepared’” (Treaty 4); “Teachers’ 
salaries to be paid when deemed advisable and Indians are settled.” (Treaty 7)103 Although 
treaty money was diverted to missionaries for education by the federal government, thus 
abdicating its responsibility for such purposes, there was no formal contractual 
relationship. Indians, as Miller remarks, often requested that their funds be used for 
education and indeed requested the treaty clauses.104  
All the treaties, except Treaty 7, stipulated that the schools were to be on reserves; 
thus the provision of boarding schools was patently a breach of treaty. Yet Indian Treaties 
in Canada did not have the same constitutional status as international treaties that pertained 
south of the border. Any sympathetic treatment by the Canons of Construction only 
developed in the late Twentieth Century105 and in any case would not have operated in the 
event of an explicit abrogation, which was provided by the subsequent Indian Act 
amendments. This power of explicit abrogation by legislation, which can proceed free of 
any overarching restriction, is a cardinal feature of parliamentary supremacy. Although 
absolute in theory its exercise is tempered somewhat by political considerations and 
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majoritarian will. For the powerless and forlorn indigenous populations, without any 
effective lobby, it assumes its most extreme and unbridled manifestations. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
Following vigorous debate within North America, the Indians were deemed 
biologically competent to receive the undoubted blessings of Christianity. Their own 
cultures were regarded as merely the product of misinformation and superstition and thus 
their predicament was judged essentially correctable. Having been confined to reserves 
both militarily and diplomatically, they became the captive audience which was a 
prerequisite for any successful systematic acculturation and Christianisation.  
In the United States the Civilization Fund was the first church-state partnership 
directed at the Indians. As the purpose was nominally educational, and the Christianisation 
incidental, albeit intentional, this programme could survive the scrutiny of a pre-
entanglement Establishment Clause jurisprudence, particularly as missions competed for 
educational grants on equal terms. Indeed, Indians had often ingenuously requested 
education in treaties, not fully realising the sectarian package with which it would arrive. 
Any diffidence the churches may have felt at the arrangement they managed to suppress. 
 A more intimate relationship between the state and Christianity followed the Civil 
War with President Grant’s Peace Policy. This involved only selected denominations who 
were given a corresponding geographical exclusivity in proselytisation. This was a flagrant 
breach of the Establishment Clause, which together with the other Bill of Rights 
protections should have applied in Indian country, either as a United States territory or to 
the same extent as an overseas territory. Indeed, in Quick Bear the Supreme Court had 
assumed the First Amendment did apply within Indian country as it felt the need to 
determine whether there had been unconstitutional establishment.106  
The mission contract schools, introduced in the late Nineteenth Century, could 
have survived a pre-entanglement establishment challenge following Bradfield v Roberts107 if 
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they had remained purely an educational instrumentality. However, the systematic 
suppression of Indian culture and spirituality in both missions and the government public 
schools should have triggered free exercise concerns and the relentless evangelism 
undoubtedly violated the Establishment Clause. As will be seen in the next chapter, this 
should also have prevented the simultaneous proscription of native religious practices. 
Compulsory attendance at boarding schools was a breach of many treaties which had 
stipulated the provision of local schools on the reservations.  
In Canada the missionary was less often an instrument of government policy. 
Indeed, he was tolerated by both European and Indian only as long as his evangelism did 
not interfere with trade.  The Canadian government was therefore largely agnostic on the 
value of the missionary. 
Denominational education was more enthusiastically endorsed in Canada as it 
absolved the government of its responsibility. Treaty provisions were violated, as they had 
stipulated day schools on reserves instead of residential schools, which were designed as a 
more assimilative instrumentality.  Great cruelty was undoubtedly perpetrated on their 
charges with fifty per cent of students who passed through the residential schools dying. 
The genocidal implications of the schools are discussed in Appendix B. 108 
 Canada had no entrenched fundamental constitutional rights. Thus any substantive 
judicial review of establishment or free exercise was unavailable, the only constitutional 
enquiry was whether the correct federal component had acted. As “Indians and land 
reserved for Indians”109 was a federal responsibility, and the federal government had indeed 
been the governmental component that had acted, this satisfied the limited inquiry into 
legality.  
This relentless assimilation and Christianisation had only limited success. The next 
chapter will explain how frustration at such uneven results, together with alarm at some of 
the self-mortification of Indian religious rites, provoked a more specific and determined 
acculturation with the proscription of Indian religious practices.     
 
 
 
                                                          
108 A Healing Fund, set up in 1994, was designed to compensate survivors for this treatment in the Twentieth 
Century. It involved a Common Experience Payment intended to compensate primarily for physical, not 
spiritual harm. Curcio, A. (2006) op.cit., p126  The United States should adopt a similar scheme for 
compensating victims of such schools. 
 
109 section 91 (24) of the British North America Act 1867 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
6 The Proscription of Indian Religion   
 
6.1 Introduction 
The Wild West Show was a popular amusement amongst the North American 
public in the late Nineteenth Century on both sides of the border. The North American 
governments were less enthusiastic and deprecated this apparent regression because it 
“perpetuated old ways and hindered an all-out commitment to American Civilization.”1 
The irony was that the North American governments were striving to suppress Indian 
culture whereas their populations were paying to see it. Just as the “passing of tradition was 
being outlawed among Indians, its passing to the American public was pursued with a 
penchant.”2 Thus we may see, as Gooding remarks, “Indian traditions were not prohibited, 
they were merely prohibited for Indians.”3 
Indian religion had always been regarded with feelings that ranged from mild 
condescension at an unreasonable superstition, through revulsion at paganism, to terror of 
an imminent insurrection. The Missionary had enjoyed only a mixed success. Some Indians 
had completely converted to Christianity, others had merely adopted some elements while 
retaining their native religion. However, such a pragmatic compromise did not appeal to 
the North American governments which regarded Christianity as a complete replacement 
for such unreasonable superstition and barbarous practices. 
This chapter will begin with a description of some of the Indian religious practices 
and then discuss the development of the United States Courts of Indian Offenses. In 
particular, how the Indians themselves were recruited as accomplices in the suppression of 
their own culture. There will be an enquiry into the procedures of the courts and an 
                                                          
1 Prucha, F. P. (1976) op.cit.,  p319 
 
2 Gooding, S. S. (1996). "At the Boundaries of Religious Identity: Native American Religions and American 
Legal Culture." Numen 43(2): 157-183,163. 
 
3 ibid p163. 
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assessment of their legality. This section will close with the retreat from this policy during 
the 1930s, following the arrival of a more enlightened Indian Commissioner John Collier. 
There will then be a comparison with Canada and the banning of many religious 
practices in the plains and northwest coast area. In contrast to the more covert and 
administrative policy of the United States, Canada chose to pursue a more brazen route 
with specific legislation which, due to a lack of protection of substantive constitutional 
rights, was less susceptible to challenge. Again, the painfully gradual reversal of this policy 
will be followed into the Twentieth Century.  
 
6.2 United States  
6.2.1 Heathenish Dances and Medicine Men  
Secretary of the Interior Henry Teller noted in 1883 that there is “a great hindrance 
to the civilization of the Indians, viz the continuance of the old heathenish dances, such as 
the sun-dance, scalp-dance and war dance etc.”4 The religious dances, in the words of a 
later Indian Commissioner Francis Leupp, “were quite out of keeping with our accepted 
canons of propriety.”5 Indian administrators also argued that participation in ceremonies 
interrupted agriculture and education, leaving aside its evil role in the vertical transmission 
of traditional culture.6 Dances were even implicated in the horizontal transmission of 
pathogen: it was argued that the dust raised spread tuberculosis or the confined spaces bred 
pandemics.7  
The Sun Dance, also known as the Thirst Dance, was practised on both sides of the 
border, predominantly by plains tribes. It was thought to originate from the sun gazing 
ritual of the Lakota Sioux and indeed was one of their seven sacred rites.8  Sponsoring a 
Sun Dance was a major undertaking and motivations included “community well-being, 
world regeneration and thanksgiving through communal worship.”9 Practice varied but 
usually a sacred cottonwood tree was the focal point of the four day event which included 
                                                          
4 Letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs from Prucha, F. P. (2000). Documents of United States Indian 
Policy. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press.p159 
 
5 Talbot, S. (2006). "Spiritual Genocide: The Denial of American Indian Religious Freedom, from Conquest 
to 1934." Wicazo Sa Review 21: 7-39,16 
 
6 Pettipas, K. (1994) op.cit., pp102-103 
 
7 Backhouse, C. and Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History (1999) op.cit.,  p67 
 
8 Hirschfelder, A. B. and Molin, P. F. (2000) op.cit., p293 
 
9 Pettipas, K. (1994) op.cit., p56. 
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dancing, the blowing of eagle whistles, drumming, gift-giving and story-telling, until the 
culmination which proved the most objectionable to white sensitivity. This involved the 
ritual piercing of the breasts of the male participants with wooden pegs. These pegs were 
tied to the central tree with leather thongs and in the act of breaking free made sacred flesh 
offerings.10 As for the Scalp Dance and War Dance, the original eponymous elements had 
become mainly allegorical by this time.  
The Medicine Man varied between cultures but was usually a religious leader and 
healer whose calling was either due to a childhood vision or heredity.11 Teller regarded 
them with suspicion as he viewed their role as one of “resort[ing] to various artifices and 
devices to keep the people under their influence.... using their conjurers’ arts to prevent the 
people from abandoning their heathenish rites and customs.”12 
 
6.2.2 The Courts of Indian Offenses 
The Indian agent fulfilled several roles on the reservation. He was at once the 
executive, the legislative and the judicial arm of government.13 The infraction of local rules 
and regulations devised, drafted, approved and enforced by the agent resulted in detention, 
denial of rations and various other minor punishments. The Courts of Indian Offenses 
differed from such agent-conducted “courts,” which targeted mainly civil disobedience and 
misdemeanours, in that they were specifically aimed at Indian cultural practices that had so 
long been deemed an obstacle to civilization. They were to employ Indian judges and were 
an extension of the successful experiment with the Indian-staffed police, as setting Indian 
against Indian was regarded as a more effective and corrosive strategy. 
On Teller’s orders the Commissioner of Indian Affairs Hiram Price issued a 
directive on 30 April 1883 detailing the new courts. The judges were to be drawn from the 
Indian police and were to be “intelligent, honest, and upright and of undoubted integrity,”14 
with an absolute maximum of one wife each.15 They were given jurisdiction over “dances, 
                                                          
10 Hirschfelder, A. B. and Molin, P. F. (2000) op.cit., pp293-294 
 
11 ibid p177 
 
13 Prucha, F. P. (1976) op.cit.,p208 
 
14 ibid p209 
 
15Hagan, W. T. (1966). Indian Police and Judges. Experiments in Acculturation and Control. [With plates, 
including portraits, and a bibliography.], New Haven & London. pp133,135 
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polygamous marriages, interference of the medicine man with the civilization program, 
thefts and destruction of property, intoxication and liquor traffic and misdemeanours.”16 
The agent was to send cases to the court which met twice a month. The judges 
were to be the three most senior officers of the Indian police, which meant that the same 
official often investigated, arrested, tried and sentenced. This seriously undermined any 
concept of due process.17 Their decisions were subject to agent approval and ultimate 
appeal to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.18 The courts were not extended to the Five 
Civilized Tribes, the Indians of New York, or the Eastern Cherokees whose religious 
practices were not deemed so objectionable.19 In all, at the turn of the Twentieth Century, 
approximately two-thirds of tribes had Courts of Indian Offenses.20 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs continually lobbied Congress hard for a more formal 
legal status of the courts, yet the only congressional acknowledgment came in the form of 
compensation for the judges in the Indian Appropriation Act of 29 June 1888.21 The Indian 
police had previously received congressional imprimatur with the authorisation of their pay 
in the Indian Appropriation Act of 27 May 1878.22 
The agents were delighted with the experiment, reporting the courts as a major 
success. According to Commissioner Price they had suppressed “most of the barbarous 
and pernicious customs that have existed among the Indians from time immemorial.”23 
Exact statistics on incarceration were not kept, although it is clear that Indians were 
regularly locked up on many reservations.24  
The Rules for the Courts were modified in 1892.25 For the appointment of judges, 
preference was to be given to those who inter alia “read and write English readily wear 
                                                          
16Prucha, F. P. (1976) op.cit.,p209 
 
17 Hagan, W. T. (1966) op.cit., p111 
18Prucha, F. P. (1976) op.cit., p209 
 
19ibid p209 
 
20ibid p210 
 
21Harring, S. L. (1994) op.cit.,.p187 
22 Privates at $5 per month Officers at $8 per  month from Prucha, F. P. (1976) op.cit.,p204 
 
23 Prucha, F. P. (1976) op.cit., p210 
 
24 Harring, S. L. (1994) op.cit.,  FN 40 p199. 
 
25 Rules for Indian Courts August 27, 1892 from Prucha, F. P. (2000) op.cit., p185 
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Citizens’ dress, and engage in civilized pursuits.”26An additional provision provided that, “if 
an Indian refuses or neglects to adopt the habits of industry, or to engage in civilized 
pursuits or employments, but habitually spends his time in idleness and loafing, he shall be 
deemed a vagrant and guilty of misdemeanour.”27 The punishment for the first conviction 
was a fine of not more than $5 or imprisonment for up to ten days, rising to $10 and 30 
days for subsequent convictions.28 It is debatable how many frontier whites would have 
been at liberty if this provision had been extended to them. 
As for the Sun Dance and Scalp Dance, first time offenders were denied rations or 
imprisoned for 10 days, rising to court-imposed starvation for between 10 and 30 days or 
imprisonment for up to 30 days for subsequent offences.29Polygamous marriages attracted 
sanctions of a fine of $20 to $50 or hard labor for between twenty and sixty days.30 There 
was no mention of subsequent offences. The practice of Medicine Man attracted an initial 
penalty of between ten and thirty days imprisonment, rising to a maximum of six months 
on subsequent conviction.31  
The legal suppression of Indian religions continued well into the 1920s, until the 
Merriam Report of 1928 signalled the start of a different approach to Indian policy and in 
particular culture. Consistent with this approach, the procedures of the Courts of Indian 
Offenses were changed by John Collier, a more enlightened Commissioner, who was 
appointed in the 1930s. In his new guidelines for the Courts, issued on November 17 1935, 
he permitted Indian defendants to summon witnesses, raise bail, to see formal accusations 
against them and to have a jury trial.32 Another problem he had identified was the undue 
influence of the superintendents over the judges who had been removable at will. The new 
regulations required the approval of the reservation Indians for the removal of any judge.33 
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31 ibid section 4(c) 
32 Wunder, J. R. (1994) op.cit., p66 
33 ibid p65 
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Finally, a new code of misdemeanours was to be formulated in consultation with the tribes 
and crucially the cultural offenses were at last officially removed.34  
Collier had previously signalled a change in policy by his 1934 circular number 2970 
entitled Indian Religious Freedom and Culture which read, “[n]o interference with Indian 
religious life will be hereafter tolerated. The cultural history of Indians is in all respects to 
be considered equal to that of any non-Indian group.”35 This administrative gesture had 
effectively extended First Amendment protection at last to the Indians which, of course, 
had been originally removed by the purely administrative Courts of Indian Offenses.36 This 
protection of Indian religious freedom was perhaps his most enduring legacy.37 In a further 
circular of 1934 he forbad compulsory attendance at religious services in boarding schools 
without parents’ permission.38 Perhaps his most remarkable achievement was to unite 
Catholic and Protestant sentiment in branding him a “devil worshipper.”39 
 
6.2.2.1 Legal Analysis 
The legality of the Courts was challenged in the case of United States v Clapox,40 on 
the grounds that they were unconstitutional as they were not courts set up by Congress, 
pursuant to Article III Section 1, but were an administrative exercise of power by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. Although the United States, by means of Congress, had the 
power to establish the place of criminal trials for crimes not committed within a state, 
Congress had not explicitly given such official sanction for these courts.41  
Undeterred, Judge Deady of the Oregon Federal District Court ruled that they were 
“educational and disciplinary instrumentalities by which the government of the United 
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37 Bowden, H. W. (1981) op.cit.,  p206 
 
38 Wunder, J. R. (1994) op.cit., p65 
39 ibid p65 
 
40 United States v Clapox 34 Fed. Rep. 575 (1888) 
 
41 “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts 
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish” from 
http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html [accessed 15 October 2009]. Furthermore Section 2 states that 
“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the 
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial 
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.” 
 
105 
 
States endeavours to improve and elevate the condition of these dependent tribes to whom 
it sustains the relation of guardian.”42 It carried the Plenary Power doctrine of Kagama43 to 
an “obscene conclusion” as a jail was now regarded as a “school” for correcting the 
practice of an aberrant culture.44 Clapox was the last legal challenge to the Courts.45 There 
were no legal challenges based more substantively on First Amendment violations,46 yet, in 
the proscription of Indian religious practice by the Courts of Indian Offenses, it is not 
difficult to see Congress “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. 
There were also no challenges on the basis of other equally flagrant violations of 
the Bill of Rights such as the Fifth (Due Process), Sixth (Formal Accusation and 
Witnesses), Article III (Jury Trial) and Eighth Amendments (Bail) to the Constitution.47 
None of the “offenses” were categorically defined in the regulations, which should have 
been a prerequisite for any indictment. This was perhaps a recognition that such a precise 
definition would have been beyond the disciplines of anthropology, let alone jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, any incarceration, following the ruling in Standing Bear48discussed in Chapter 
Three, should have triggered a habeas corpus application, as the Indian had been found quite 
categorically to constitute a person for the purposes of such a writ. 
 As for the application of the Bill of Rights on tribal land, this was discussed in the 
previous chapter. In particular, the fact that Indians are politically sovereign and separate 
and that First Amendment protection is inapplicable is unpersuasive. There is no 
geographical qualifier to the restriction on Congress, the prohibition is absolute.49 In the 
subsequent case of Quick Bear v. Leupp50 Indians were held to be protected in their religious 
freedom on reservations. Admittedly this choice was intended to be restricted to the 
various strains of Christianity, but protected they were nevertheless. As mentioned above, 
Mansfield reminds us there is also no textual restriction on the protection of “citizens” in 
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other provisions of the Bill of Rights.51 Fundamentally, any illegal and illegitimate 
jurisdictional intrusion into tribal sovereignty should, as an emollient, have imported the 
Bill of Rights. 
 
 
6.3 Canada 
 
When Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show travelled to England in 1886 “Grandmother 
England” herself Queen Victoria, was in the audience. Black Elk, the Sioux Holy Man, 
reported her as being “little but fat” and saying to him, “if you belonged to me, I would not 
let them take you around in a show like this.”52 He liked her and speculated that “if she had 
been our Grandmother, it would have been better for our people.”53 Sadly, this generous 
assessment is not borne out by history. Grandmother’s sympathy for the persecuted and 
exploited aborigine south of the border was rather partial as her very own Dominion’s 
government was, at that time, engaged in a legal proscription of Indian culture throughout 
the Plains and Northwest Territories every bit as vigorous and oppressive as that pursued 
in the United States. 
To impose jurisdiction over Indians in these areas an Act of 1874 extended the 
existing Indian laws to Manitoba and British Columbia.54 This Act also made it an 
imprisonable offence for an Indian to be found intoxicated on or off reserve.55 In 1876 this 
was extended to prohibit Indians from even possessing alcohol on reserves.56 Although the 
general criminal law had been applicable to Indians from first contact,57 these were the first 
criminal offences applicable only to Indians.58 This selective application of criminal law was a 
portent of things to come.  
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6.3.1 The Potlatch and the Tamanawas Dance 
The word Potlatch derives from the Nootka patshatl which means gift or 
giving,59and gained popular usage through the Chinook trade jargon around the 1860s. It 
was practised on the Northwest Coast both sides of the border. Potlatches were used to 
“mourn deaths, bestow names, erase the shame of accidents or ceremonial errors, 
recognize the succession to titles and economic rights and acknowledge marriages and 
divorces.”60 The central elements were a feast, some dancing and speeches, prayers, and 
most importantly a giveaway ceremony which consecrated the honour or name bestowed, 
or solemnly commemorated the event.61 There was an essential reciprocity to the ritual with 
the degree of gifts carefully accounted for and repaid by the recipients at a later date. It had 
both a religious and socioeconomic purpose and tended to strengthen tribal solidarity. 
Furthermore, it was a form of welfare, an “assurance or benefit society” when the “elderly 
were indirectly clothed during the winter months.”62  
To the Euro-Canadian mind the Potlatch was wasteful of resources and time as it 
distracted the Indians from more useful activities, such as labour and industry and, 
moreover, kept children from school.63 It also destroyed accumulated capital and hindered 
economic and social progress, anathema to the tenets of the Protestant work ethic and 
“acquisitive capitalism.”64 So profligate was the ceremony that the Fraser River agent 
reported that one Potlatch, held by a “bad Indian” named Uslick, had resulted in him 
giving away everything that he had owned, with the exception of his “wife and a few 
potatoes, that nobody wanted.”65 
Other whites regarded them as essentially harmless and for the trader a good 
source of business as blankets and copper sales were vibrant when a Potlatch was 
imminent. Furthermore, many whites enjoyed attending these events, often purchasing 
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souvenirs; although the process of gift distribution could be protracted and tedious, and 
the full significance of the religious rite rather mystifying to the uninformed tourist.66 
Heavily intertwined with the Potlatch was the marriage tradition, which dictated 
that the groom’s family pay an amount on arrangement of the marriage. The bride’s family 
agreed to repay this at a later date with interest. Once the repayment was made the bride 
was free to leave the groom and often did. The incentive for the groom was the purchase 
of membership in the bride’s clan for the children.67 Serial marriages resulted, the bride’s 
family’s motivations often being to obtain money to buy goods for Potlatching. Euro-
Canadians recoiled at the tender age of the bride (often at first menarche) and the business-
like nature of the transaction.68 It is not difficult to see the clash with Victorian mores in 
such a transaction. 
If the Potlatch offended Nineteenth Century sensibilities the Tamanawas Dance, it 
could be argued, would have been deemed offensive in any age.  The Tamanawas or 
Tamanous was a Chinook term meaning anything associated with the spiritual.69 It also 
referred to a society in which participants wore blackened faces during an initiation 
ceremony and which involved various degrees of ritual cannibalism and the consumption 
of dogs. White commentators described it as the “the tearing apart [of] dead dogs or 
exhumed human bodies....which were orgies of the most disgusting character.”70Held in the 
wintertime, there was drumming, dancing and the sporadic gnawing of live spectators. 
 
6.3.1.1 Legislation 
Exact definitions of both these practices eluded the non-native population and 
remain difficult. Indeed, the first legislative proscription avoided the issue: section 114 of 
the Indian Act (1884) read:  
Every Indian or person who engages in or assists in celebrating the Indian festival known 
as the “Potlach” or the Indian dance known as the “Tamanawas,” is guilty of a 
misdemeanour, and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months and not less 
than two months.71 
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By placing the terms in inverted commas the government conceded that a 
satisfactory statutory definition was, if not impossible, certainly beyond the competence of 
non-Indian drafters of that era, or perhaps any era.72 Section 115 proscribed the same 
punishment for anyone “who encourages either directly or indirectly.... such a festival or 
dance.”73 
The first arrest was made on 1st August 1889.74 A Kwakwaka’wakw75 Indian named 
Ha-mer-cee-luc was subsequently given a six month prison sentence.76 However, his 
simultaneous arraignment for trial in Victoria for the same offence prompted a habeas corpus 
application by his supporters to the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Justice Begbie 
ordered his release on the grounds that “he was not held on a proper warrant of 
Committal.”77 Begbie remarked that, “if it be desired to create an offence previously 
unknown to the law there ought to be some definition of it in the statute. It seems an abuse 
of the forms of justice to have a defendant plead guilty to an offence the facts constituting 
which we should ourselves be unable to set forth.”78 The Tamanawas was similarly 
undefined, as Begbie remarked, “it may be that an Indian who had taken part in some quite 
innocent performance of dancing which the Legislature never intended to ban might plead 
guilty to a charge of having danced.”79 Begbie’s obiter dicta rendered the law a “dead 
Letter.”80 Parliament responded and section 114 was altered on 22nd July 1895, omitting the 
words Potlatch and Tamanawas, but clumsily providing a definition: 
Every Indian or other person who engages in celebrating or encourages either directly or 
indirectly another to celebrate, an Indian festival, dance or other ceremony of which the 
giving away or paying or giving back of money, goods or articles of any sort forms a part, or 
is a feature, whether such gift of money, goods or articles takes place before, at, or after the 
celebration of the same and every Indian or other person who engages or assists in any 
celebration or dance of which the wounding or mutilation of the dead or living body of any 
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human being or animal forms a part or is a feature, is guilty of an indictable offence and is 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months and not less than two months.81 
 
Thus the original section 114 mentioned Potlatch and Tamanawas without defining 
them, the revised statute defined them without mentioning them. As Bracken remarks, this 
provision was drafted so widely that it banned “every conceivable exchange and every 
possible circulation of money goods or articles.”82 It could be interpreted to ban trade 
between aboriginal people anywhere in Canada.83 As one contemporary government report 
remarked, “a potlatch encompassed everything from what a white man might call an 
invitation to dinner up to a frenzied carouse leaving the hosts absolutely penniless.”84 The 
Act had one exception: “but nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the 
holding of any agricultural show or exhibition or the giving of prizes for exhibits thereof.”85 
Agriculture was to be encouraged as an essential and virtuous pillar of white civilization.86  
 
6.3.1.2 The Inveterate Kwakiutl 
By 1900 the Potlatch ceremony was fading throughout British Columbia. The law 
had played its part, but the most significant factor was probably the wholesale 
Christianization of the Indian communities.87 However, the Southern Kwakiutl 
(Kwakwaka’wakw) remained inveterate, also practising the Tamanawas dance. Indeed, in 
March 1900, a Kwakiutl named George Hunt, was charged with the mutilation of an 
exhumed woman under section 114, namely the “the wounding or mutilation of the dead 
or living body of any human being.” The Prosecution alleged that the unfortunate lady had 
been dismembered and decapitated with selected portions of her consumed. The jury 
disagreed.88 
Various techniques were adopted to evade prosecution for Potlatching. The 
Kwakwaka’wakw decided they could evade the law by allowing six months to elapse 
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between the ceremony and its consecration by property distribution. This was because the 
Statute of Limitations meant that only six months were allowed to prosecute. Moreover, it 
could be argued, that such a delay circumvented the provision that the gift-giving “must 
form part of an Indian festival, dance or ceremony to be illegal.”89 Other tactics included 
coinciding ceremonies with Christian festivals such as Christmas and disguising the gifts as 
Christmas gifts or distributing them door to door instead of at the event.90 Still another idea 
was to distribute the gifts as prizes for the best speeches at gatherings, or for other notable 
achievements.91 However, due to the necessary subterfuge involved in concealing the true 
nature of the gifts, the public visibility and sacred validation of the ceremony was absent, 
thus rendering the Potlatch less meaningful both spiritually and as a “unifying force in 
Kwakwaka'wakw society.”92  
The law was sporadically enforced in the late 1890s and early 1900s until Duncan 
Campbell Scott assumed the Deputy Superintendency in 1913.93 At his prompting a more 
vigorous enforcement of section 149 (the previous section 114) was pursued.94  He 
nominated William Halliday as the agent of the inveterate Kwakiutl agency and he swiftly 
moved to secure a conviction in May 1914. In the case of R v. Harris and Bagway both 
defendants were initially acquitted. Justice Gregory defined a “festival as a religious 
gathering and a ceremony as something conducted by fixed rules.”95 The jury could not 
agree that a Potlatch fitted either description. At a subsequent retrial the next day the two 
were found guilty and given suspended sentences as the prosecution proved that there had 
also been prohibited dancing at the event.96 In another case concerning Kishwagila the 
grand jury determined that there was no true bill of indictment and dismissed the case.97 
Halliday was dismayed to discover that the jury “did not see any offence in Potlatching.”98 
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The bar of public opinion had perhaps pronounced the Potlatch as a harmless activity and 
had no enthusiasm for persecution and prosecution. 
Halliday saw the solution as bypassing the jury and the inconvenience of public 
sympathy by making the offences disposable by summary trial. Previously the agent, as 
Justice of the Peace, could take evidence and lay information for a county court hearing. In 
April 1918 the word “indictable” was replaced with “on summary conviction.” This gave 
the necessary authority to agents as Justices of the Peace.99 The omnipotent agent was now 
prosecutor, judge and jury.100  
The conviction rate unsurprisingly increased: in January 1920 Halliday convicted 
eight Potlatchers, all received two month sentences except for an old man who was given a 
suspended sentence. These were the first sentences actually served for Potlatching.101 In 
February 1922 thirty-two people were before Halliday for participation in the infamous 
Cramer Potlatch. An agreement was reached: all Potlatch paraphernalia had to be 
surrendered and promises never to Potlatch again in return for suspended sentences.102 
During the Great Depression the Potlatch seemed to disappear from public 
consciousness as it was dependent on the greater Canadian economy.  That, together with 
acculturation, the gradual demise of arranged marriages, and the threat of section 149, were 
all responsible for the decline.103 Following the Second World War, the Potlatch faded 
further from view, replaced as it was by more pressing social concerns such as housing, old 
age pensions, veterans’ benefits and healthcare. The criminal prohibitions on the Potlatch, 
dances and giveaways were only removed from the Indian Act in 1951. Two years after the 
repeal of the anti-potlatch law Chief Mungo Martin held the first legal potlatch for seventy 
years.104  In 1963 two Kwakiutl Indians went to Ottawa to request the return of their 
confiscated Potlatch paraphernalia. The Museum of Civilization eventually returned the last 
item in 1987.105     
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It is difficult to assess exactly to what extent the laws were effective. Rolf Knights 
suggests that the “relative effects of the Potlatch law seem often over-exaggerated.”106 Any 
reduction in native practice may be explained by a generalized acculturation and 
Christianisation process which diminished the role of tradition. It is perhaps significant that 
south of the border the Potlatch was legal, but had largely disappeared: the Makah of Cape 
Flattery who didn’t Potlatch, although it was legal, could be contrasted with the Nootka on 
Vancouver Island where it was illegal, but still practised.107 This would perhaps dilute the 
significance of the prohibition.  
 
6.3.2 Other Illegal Dances 
The Sun Dance was one of the listed offenses in the Courts of Indian Offenses in 
the United States.108 During the last part of the Nineteenth Century its practice began to 
attract the disapproval of Victorian England and thereby the Dominion of Canada. Deputy 
Superintendent Campbell Scott declared his policy was to “substitute reasonable 
amusements for this senseless drumming and dancing.”109 
As mentioned in the last section, the Indian Act prohibitions on the Potlatch and 
the Tamanawas Dance were broadened with the Indian Act 1895 amendment to include 
other festivals, dances and giveaway ceremonies. The original act of 1884 had only 
specified the Potlatch and the Tamanawas Dance. The amended act from 1895 required 
that either a giveaway or self-mutilation form part of the offence. Without these 
objectionable features there was no breach of section 114.110 
Sun Dance arrests were sporadic. One early example was that of Matoose, a 
Saskatchewan Cree, arrested in the summer of 1895 when the Indian Agent had stopped a 
ceremony in the Touchwood Hills Areas. He was bound over to keep the peace for three 
months.111 In 1896 Kah-pee-cha-pees was convicted of sponsoring a Sun Dance and 
sentenced to two months hard labour.112 1897 saw several convictions for dancing 
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including Yellow Bird, another “bad Indian”, who had used threatening language against 
the Indian agent after having been refused rations.113 The Cree Chief Piapot was arrested 
and convicted twice in 1897 and 1901. Despite being elderly he was given two months 
imprisonment on each occasion. Other convictions included that of a 90 year old blind 
man named Taytapashung who was also given two months imprisonment.114 In total there 
were two indictments for holding dances in 1900 with no convictions; twenty-seven arrests, 
nine cases and nine convictions in 1902; ten arrests and nine convictions in 1903; and two 
arrests and two convictions in 1904.115 
In 1903, Wanduta was charged and convicted by a single magistrate, following his 
“acknowledgement of guilt,” for holding a Grass Dance116 at a Rapid City annual fair the 
year before that had been organized by the white community.117 The Grass Dance, it was 
argued by the defence, had no objectionable features specified in the Act such as mutilation 
or giveaway. Alternatively it fell under the “agricultural show or exhibition” exception to 
the Act.118 White supporters did not argue on freedom of religion grounds but freedom of 
entertainment. They claimed that these laws, which were supposed to engender a 
protestant work ethic, harmed non-Indian prairie businesses.119 The white organisers could 
actually have been prosecuted under the “encouraged directly or indirectly” element of the 
offence yet in the entire history of the prohibition no whites were ever charged.120 Wanduta 
was forced to serve his four month sentence as his legal team failed to raise the glaring 
jurisdictional error: the offence was only made summarily disposable by the later 1918 
amendment. In 1903 a single magistrate had no authority.121 
Although the last recorded prosecution of a Sun Dance participant was in 1921 the 
fear of prosecution certainly discouraged the continuance of these forms of overt religious 
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expression.122 However, many Indians simply held their dances in secret, far from prying 
eyes, which on the vast prairie was not difficult.  
 
6.3.3 Off Reserve Dancing 
The Canadian Government seemed intent on destroying native religion and culture 
per se, not merely the elements deemed repugnant to white society, such as giveaways or 
mutilation. This was evidenced by a 1914 prohibition of off-reserve dancing “in aboriginal 
costume without the consent of the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs or his 
authorized Agent.” Furthermore, “any person who induces or employs any Indian to take 
part in such dance, show, exhibition, performance, stampede or pageant, or induces any 
Indian to leave his reserve or employs any Indian for such a purpose,” was guilty of an 
offence.123 Anthropologists feared that the “induces or employs” element would destroy 
their research.124 Wild West Show impresarios complained it would destroy their business. 
In 1933, another amendment deleted the words “in aboriginal costume” from section 149, 
which meant that any off-reserve dancing was prohibited, even in a tuxedo.125 
 
6.3.4 Legitimacy of the Proscriptions 
Cole and Chaikin suggest that, because the Potlatch law sought to assist those 
victimized by this “tyranny of tradition,”126it was morally justifiable. Furthermore, the 
apologists for the law pointed out the detriment to health by the crowded winter ceremony 
and the ill-treatment of Kwakiutl women due to the marriage system, together with the 
corresponding patriarchy of male prestige and rank as factors taking precedence over more 
humanistic principles.127 Yet pluralism and cultural relativism must profess distaste for 
governmental coercion and the oppression of a powerless minority, engaged in relatively 
harmless practices.128 Native autonomy was seriously compromised and Indian pitted 
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against Indian, pagan against Christian, conservative against progressive and traditional 
against acculturated. The main appeal must be to fairness, as this unjust law punished 
something that was essentially peaceful and private.129   
By contrast, the Tamanawas dance was less defensible on the grounds of cultural 
relativism. The exhumation and consumption of the dead and the mutilation of dogs, dead 
or otherwise, would in any age be deemed unacceptable. If for no other reason than health 
and safety concerns; even respect for the dead.  
Although there were, and indeed still are, certain extreme Christian sects that 
include self-mortification as part of their worship the Sun Dance ritual was seen as nothing 
short of a barbaric pagan rite.130 Yet other dances that involved no such mutilations were 
also banned, which suggests that the overriding motive was acculturation not revulsion. 
Similarly, the profligacy of the giveaway elements of certain ceremonies was specifically 
targeted implying that a lack of conformity with Victorian acquisitive capitalism was a 
determining factor. These largely harmless ceremonies should have remained private 
matters, yet Anglo-Saxon morality insisted that the Indians had to be saved from 
themselves.  The criminalising of off-reserve dancing, without self-mutilation and 
giveaways and whatever the attire, reached the height of absurdity. It revealed the extent to 
which the Canadian government would go to destroy Indian cultural identity even in the 
absence of any of the associated practices that had been deemed so objectionable. 
 
6.3.5 Legal Analysis 
There is no doubt that legislation for “Indians, and lands reserved for Indians”131 
was reserved to the National Parliament of Canada. Therefore, any federalist challenge to 
the nationally enacted Indian Acts would have been futile. Any equal protection 
jurisprudence was similarly absent during this period, even for other racial minorities, let 
alone those discretely apportioned to the national legislature by section 91(24). However, it 
is noteworthy that no whites were prosecuted under the section 115 prohibition on anyone 
“who encourages either directly or indirectly.... such a festival or dance.” Indeed, non-
Indian farmers escaped prosecution in the 1930s when openly sponsoring Rain dances132 
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out of desperation at the drought conditions, despite the fact that such conduct could have 
been interpreted as encouragement.133  
As discussed previously, before the Charter in 1982 there were no entrenched 
substantive fundamental rights to the free exercise of religion. The case of The Queen v. 
“Bear’s Shin Bone”134 confirmed that Indian religious practice, in this case polygamous 
marriage dictated by Blood Indian Rites, provided no shield from general criminal law. 
Thus parliamentary supremacy, empowered by section 91(24) and unfettered by any 
fundamental constitutional rights, could proceed without restraint.  
The change from indictable to summary offense in 1918 meant that the agent, who 
had both an executive role on the reserves and an alter ego as Justice of the Peace, could 
now act as prosecutor, judge and jury. This, together with the excessively wide drafting of 
the various amendments defining the offences, provided dictatorial powers of persecution.  
The Canadian government sought to consolidate their legal stranglehold on the 
indigenous people by passing legislation in 1927 that made it an offence for anyone to 
solicit funds for Indian legal claims without obtaining a licence from the Superintendent 
General.135 Ostensibly this was to protect Indians from unscrupulous lawyers; in reality it 
was to silence dissent.136 It further immunised the autocratic agent from challenge. 
 
6.4 Conclusion  
Motives for the suppression of the ceremonies varied across the border. In the 
United States, although the self-mortification of certain dances was a relevant factor, the 
suppression of these dances was an attempt to eliminate difference and foster 
acculturation. In Canada, the unsavoury aspects of the dance and the wastefulness of the 
giveaways were emphasised more as discordant with Victorian morality and capitalism, 
although this was suffused with an acculturative subtext.  
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The sweeping mandate of section 91(24) in Canada, the lack of any common law 
tribal rights, and the lack of any other constitutional restraint, meant that Canadian Indian 
Law could proceed largely free from any legal challenge. As mentioned above, the 1918 
Indian Act amendment in Canada made the offences summarily convictable by substituting 
“indictable” with “liable on summary conviction” in section 149. This meant that the agent 
was not limited to merely pressing charges for hearing by another official but could actually 
try the cases as well.137 This enhanced his despotic powers and casually swept away any due 
process.138  
By contrast, the United States had recognised the common law right to tribal 
sovereignty in the Marshall Trilogy of the early Eighteenth Century. Therefore, any 
legislative intrusion had to be incremental and demonstrably justifiable, however spurious 
the theoretical grounding, on concepts such as the Plenary Power.139 Alternatively, it had to 
be covert and administrative such as the Courts of Indian Offenses with the co-operation 
of some malleable natives. The United States Government decided that the co-option of 
Indians would make the Courts a more effective corrective instrumentality by promoting 
cultural self-destruction. As mentioned above, the clear violations of the United States 
Constitution included the First Amendment (Free Exercise Clause) the Fifth (Due 
Process), Sixth (Formal Accusation and Witnesses), Article III (Jury Trial) and Eighth 
Amendments (Bail) in addition to the absence of any congressional mandate for the 
courts.140 
Part II has demonstrated how aberrant culture and spirituality were generally 
crushed throughout the period from the early Nineteenth Century until the 1930s. Treaties, 
tribal sovereignty, equal protection, due process, religious freedom and thousands of 
stainless lives were all casually extinguished in the relentless quest for a homogeneous 
population.   
In Part III we will move forward from the 1930s and examine the evolution of a 
more pluralistic attitude to Indian spirituality with blind prejudice and the suppression of 
difference less gratuitously apparent. However, this more accommodating paradigm is not 
without its circumscription as will be seen. When a more material forfeit is required of the 
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majoritarian society, old prejudices re-emerge and contemporary legal principles are 
moulded to gratify them.  
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PART III  
 
ACCOMMODATION FROM THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
7 The Indians within the Twentieth Century North American 
Legal Systems 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Indian policy in the United States has demonstrated more fluctuation, or perhaps 
schizophrenia, than in Canada. The allotment period from the 1880s was designed to 
perfect the transformation from nomadic hunter to small-holding farmer, while 
simultaneously eroding the tribal landholding base. Following the Merriam Report of 1928, 
this devastating effect was partially reversed by the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),1 which 
ended allotment, provided money to consolidate the Indian land base, and actively 
promoted Indian self-government, albeit with prefabricated western-modelled tribal 
constitutions. From 1953 until 1962, the federal government re-assumed its assimilative 
pose and adopted a policy of terminating the federal status of certain tribes and imposing 
wholesale state criminal jurisdiction on approximately 25% of the reservation-based tribal 
populations.2 Again, from 1962 until the present, there was a change of approach, with a 
self-determination paradigm adopted and President Kennedy boldly declaring that, “there 
would be no change in treaty or contractual relationships without the consent of the tribes 
concerned. No steps would be taken to impair the cultural heritage of any group. There 
would also be protection for the Indian land base.....”3 
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In Canada, by contrast, there was simply a consistently paternalistic and assimilative 
administration of individual Indians starting from the Indian Act of 1876. In the words of 
Prime Minister Trudeau, “it’s inconceivable, I think, that in a given society one section of 
the society should have a treaty with the other section of society. We must all be equal 
under the laws and we must not sign treaties among ourselves.....Our answer is “no”. We 
can’t recognise aboriginal rights, because no society can be built on historical “might-have-
beens.”4 This changed with the aboriginal title case of Calder5 in 1973 at which point 
Trudeau conceded, “perhaps you had more legal rights than we thought you had.”6 
Chapter 3 described the development of the legal status of Indians both 
individually and tribally during the Nineteenth Century. This chapter will continue these 
developments into the Twentieth Century, concentrating initially on aboriginal title and 
aboriginal rights, which will provide a foundation for the sacred objects and sacred sites 
chapters that follow. The effect of Canada’s lack of historical definition of aboriginal rights 
will be contrasted with the United States’ more developed Indian law. The significance of 
the Canadian constitutionalisation of aboriginal rights in 1982 will also be assessed.   
The evolution of the Trust Relationship and Equal Protection will then be 
discussed and compared in each country. In particular, how the absolute and exclusive 
mandate of the Plenary Power can simultaneously circumvent Equal Protection, yet be 
tempered somewhat by the Trust Relationship.  
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7.2 Aboriginal Title 
7.2.1 United States 
The Marshall Trilogy, discussed in Chapter One, first articulated the nature of 
aboriginal title as a possessory interest, less than a full fee title, but still extinguishable for 
value. Nowadays there are two types: recognised title and unrecognised title. Recognised 
title means that the United States has taken some formal action by treaty, statute or 
agreement to confer or recognise a right of permanent occupancy.7 This right is 
compensable under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.8 By contrast, 
unrecognised title attracts no such compensation. The extinguishment of aboriginal title by 
Congress is not subject to review by the Supreme Court, merely the quantum of damages 
in the event of recognised title.9 Only Congress may extinguish title, such a power cannot 
be exercised by the President or a federal agency.10 
The practical significance of aboriginal title nowadays is reduced, as the vast 
majority of the United States has been either subject to Indian treaties or the Indian Claims 
Commission Act of 1946, which was intended to foreclose any future actions.11 However, 
tribes that can demonstrate that they and their ancestors have had uninterrupted possession 
of their ancestral lands have, at least in theory, a continued possessory interest.12  
The last major extinguishment of aboriginal title was the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act of 1971 although more recent, but smaller claims, have included the Maine 
Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980 and the Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act 
1983. Claims can therefore still occasionally occur, but usually due to historic, faulty, 
procedural extinguishment by the federal government; not by virtue of any fresh 
recognition of un-extinguished title or doctrinal development.13   
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7.2.2 Canada 
By contrast, the situation in Canada is still in flux. There has never been such 
extensive treaty extinguishment of title and vast swathes of British Columbia, the Yukon 
the Northwest Territories, Quebec and Atlantic Canada have not been the subject of any 
land cession.14 Indeed, there had never been any conceptual clarity that such a title had 
existed until the seminal case of Calder in 1973.15  
In Calder six of the seven judges affirmed that aboriginal title had existed in British 
Columbia based not on the Royal Proclamation, as they held that it did not extend so far west, 
but on prior occupation. However, three judges led by Justice Judson, held that it had in 
fact been extinguished by subsequent land transactions that were inconsistent with the 
continuance of such title.16  
The Supreme Court in Delgamuukw17 confirmed that aboriginal title was a legal right 
of occupation and possession of land, the ultimate title of which remains with the Crown. 
It is sui generic as it is inalienable to anyone but the Crown and communal, with its source of 
recognition in the Royal Proclamation, but its creation by common law possession.18 It has an 
inherent limit, in that certain activities that are inconsistent with aboriginal attachment are 
not permitted, such as strip-mining on sacred sites should, bizarrely, the aborigines be 
inclined to do such a thing.19  
To establish aboriginal title three general criteria must be satisfied. Firstly, there 
must be proof of occupation prior to the assertion of British sovereignty. Secondly, there 
must be a degree of continuity to the present day. Finally, at the point of the assertion of 
British sovereignty, there must have been exclusive occupation of the land.20 The critical 
time is the assertion of British sovereignty. This differs from the pre-contact time frame for 
establishing an aboriginal right and casts doubt on whether aboriginal title is a subset of 
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aboriginal rights.21 Aboriginal title confers the right to engage in a broader range of 
activities, not all of which need to be integral to a distinctive culture.22 Even should their 
occupation not be sufficient to establish title they may have rights over the land, for 
example to hunt and fish.23      
 
 
7.3 Aboriginal Rights 
7.3.1 United States 
Aboriginal rights in the United States have traditionally emanated from treaties, 
which have explicitly or implicitly reserved certain rights to hunt, fish and obtain water; or 
alternatively due to inherent tribal sovereignty. 
In United States v. Winans 24 the Supreme Court, only two years after Lone Wolf, 
(discussed in Chapter Three), articulated both the reserved rights doctrine, by which tribes 
retained all rights not specifically ceded in treaties and agreements, and also the canons of 
treaty construction, which meant that treaties should be interpreted from the Indian 
perspective. This seemingly pro-Indian holding incidentally determined that the states had 
no role in abrogating treaty-guaranteed fishing rights. In fact both cases affirmed federal 
supremacy: Lone Wolf over tribal interests and Winans over state interests. Indeed, as 
Wilkins cynically remarks, this decision meant less of an intrusion into the rights of the 
non-Indian community than Lone Wolf in which significant numbers of white squatters 
would have had to be relocated, and thus this affirmation of tribal sovereignty came at less 
cost.25  
The Marshall Trilogy’s model of inherent tribal sovereignty meant that aboriginal 
rights of, for example, self-government within tribal land, were complete but subject to the 
whim of congressional Plenary Power or the creativity of a hostile Supreme Court.26 Thus 
federal criminal law jurisdiction within tribal land over tribal members had to be 
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legislatively imposed27 and tribal criminal law jurisdiction over non-Indians had to be 
judicially removed.28 Similarly, Montana v. United States,29 laid down a principle of tribal civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. The court limited such jurisdiction to two categories: “where 
non-members enter consensual relations with a tribe or where territorial regulation is re-
quired to protect against a threat to a tribe's political or economic security.”30  
 
7.3.2 Canada 
There was no such inherent tribal sovereignty recognised in Canada and thus no 
derivative aboriginal rights. Indeed, the actual existence of any aboriginal rights in Canada 
only penetrated legal consciousness after the Calder aboriginal title case. So enamoured 
were the Canadian people with this novelty that aboriginal rights, whatever they may have 
been, were constitutionalised in 1982 by virtue of section 35 which reads: “the existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognised and 
affirmed.”  Section 35 rights are not subject to the section 1 circumscription of the 
seemingly absolute nature of Charter rights to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”31 Furthermore, section 25 
stipulated that any Charter rights do not affect any other rights held by aboriginals, thus 
whichever is the more favourable can be employed. The difficulty lay in a satisfactory 
determination of what exactly was an aboriginal right that had been deemed so important. 
Thus the constitutionalisation preceded the definition. 
Van Der Peet, and its two companion cases, form the Van Der Peet trilogy and 
provided some conceptual structure for determining the existence of aboriginal rights.32 
The Van Der Peet case brought in a “central and significant part of the society's distinctive 
culture” threshold for recognition as an aboriginal right.33 Furthermore, it “must not have 
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existed in the past ‘simply as an incident’ to other cultural elements” or merely as a 
response to European influences.34 Additionally, the practice must have been engaged in 
prior to contact with Europeans and there must be reasonable continuity from then to the 
present, although it can be the exercise in a modern form of a pre-contact practice.35 As 
Godlewska and Webber remark, the pre-contact test produces anomalies; for example, it 
obviates practices that evolved in connection with the fur trade.36 This “frozen rights 
approach” only protects those practices which existed at pre-contact and have continued 
largely unchanged. Any subsequent development of other rights is regarded as due to 
European influence and unworthy of protection, and therefore the protection is more of 
rights that are ab origine than aboriginal.  
As for the degree of continuity required, in Minister of National Revenue v. Mitchell37the 
court discussed Mohawk trade across the US-Canada border. In particular, the elements to 
be satisfied were “whether the tribe had established that its ancestral trading practices 
involved crossing the St. Lawrence River; whether that particular route was integral to 
Mohawk culture; and whether the tribe had engaged in the practice continuously from a 
date prior to European settlement until the present”38 
The requirement of centrality parallels U.S. religious freedom jurisprudence for 
Indians with its requirement of “central and indispensible,”39 yet in Canada centrality 
applies to all aboriginal rights.40 Of course an alien judiciary making such a determination 
is inherently paternalistic and colonial. Such a case by case evidential approach, according 
to Barsh and Henderson, means that “[h]istorians, anthropologists and lawyers should 
rejoice well into the next millennium.”41 The disparity in resources is crucial. As Wildsmith 
remarks, the tribes, with limited finances, must confront the federal government, with 
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unlimited resources, and its rather incongruent responsibility as a trustee pursuant to the 
Trust Power.42 
The section 35 constitutionalisation of aboriginal rights was a significant milestone. 
Yet this has developed into something less than an absolute concept alterable solely by 
constitutional amendment. Perhaps recoiling at the reckless and imprudent enthusiasm of 
the Canadian government the judiciary have developed certain criteria that, if satisfied, can 
justify an infringement of such seemingly inviolate rights. In particular, the courts will 
examine legislation that infringes aboriginal rights (including aboriginal title) under various 
Sparrow criteria.43 Firstly, the court asks if there is an aboriginal right affected. Secondly, is 
there a valid legislative objective which is “compelling and substantial” and which is 
“consistent with the Honour of the Crown.”44 Thirdly, whether this is the least 
infringement possible. Subsidiary questions include whether compensation has been 
provided (particularly for aboriginal title) and if there has been meaningful consultation. 
Johnson remarks that this enquiry is similar to equal protection and religious freedom 
strict scrutiny analysis in the US.45 Both provincial and federal infringements are subject to 
the same test of justification.46 As to actual extinguishment, “aboriginal rights cannot be 
extinguished and can only be regulated or infringed consistent with the justificatory test 
laid out by this court in Sparrow.”47 Extinguishment of aboriginal rights (including title) 
prior to 1982 had to be evinced by a “clear and plain intention” and was only possible by 
treaty or federal (not provincial) legislation.48 
Thus to summarise, the Van Der Peet Test is for the establishment of an aboriginal 
right and the Sparrow Test for the justifiability of any infringement. In Van Der Peet the 
limitation is on the aboriginal right due to inconsistency with the common law, in Sparrow 
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the reconciliation is a limit on governmental power by virtue of trust duties.49 These trust 
duties will now be examined in more detail.  
 
 
7.4 Trust Relationship 
7.4.1 United States 
There is a “symbiotic relationship between the plenary50 and trust doctrines: with 
every degree of liberty the United States takes with these people's lives through its plenary 
authority, the United States incurs a responsibility to them through the Trust Doctrine.”51  
The Trust Relationship varies in context. There is a general Trust Relationship 
on the federal government, but this carries few legal duties and merely moral 
obligations. By contrast, specific statutes, such as the General Allotment Act, import legal 
obligations enforceable by declaratory or injunctive relief. Still more stringent duties 
arise when trust monies are concerned and comprehensive and intimate federal 
management is involved. This amounts to a full fiduciary relationship, which can be 
legally forced, at least against the executive. 52 For example, in United States v Mitchell,53 
which concerned the federal government’s mismanagement of timber resources on 
reservation lands,54 the Supreme Court determined that when statutes “give the Federal 
Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of 
the Indians, . . . [t]hey thereby establish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours 
of the United States' fiduciary responsibilities.” The Court added: “Moreover, a fiduciary 
relationship necessarily arises when the Government assumes such elaborate control 
over forests and property belonging to Indians. All of the necessary elements of a 
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common-law trust are present: a trustee (the United States); a beneficiary (the Indian 
allotees); and a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds).”55  
There is of course a conflict of interest at the heart of government as the Court 
remarked on when discussing the congressional role as trustee and its power of eminent 
domain in Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation vs. United States, “Congress can own two 
hats, but it cannot wear them both at the same time.”56 Thus the benevolent disinterest 
that marks a wardship and a Trust Power only works in the absence of such a conflict.57  
 
7.4.2 Canada 
A similar conflict of interests exists in Canada as the National Chief of the 
Assembly of First Nations Phil Fontaine remarked in 2000: “DIAND [The Department 
of Indian and Northern Affairs], like the Government of Canada itself, suffers from a 
schizophrenic personality. It holds and administers fiduciary obligations to our peoples 
at the same time as it must observe its political obligations to the rest of Canada. ... It 
advocates one moment on our behalf and in the next moment, through the Justice 
Department, against us.”58 
In the absence of a federalism challenge the federal Plenary Power, conferred by 
section 91(24) of the British North American Act (1867), was practically absolute and 
unlimited. This has been tempered since 1982, by section 35 and the 
constitutionalisation of aboriginal rights. Similarly, the Trust Relationship, although not 
as evolved a concept as in the United States, now acts as something of a restraint.   
 The 1984 case of Guerin first articulated an enforceable fiduciary relationship 
between the Crown and aboriginal peoples.59 Such a relationship derived from 
aboriginal title and the Crown’s historical responsibility to protect Indian interest when 
dealing with their land. Dickson J described the key features as being fiduciary, trust-like 
and non-public. It did not include a generalised duty to receive government services, but 
merely a beneficiary’s right to enforce the trustee’s duty in regard to land.60 
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In R v Sparrow the concept of the “honour of the Crown” was articulated as a guide 
to whether actions that infringe other aboriginal rights can be justified.61 The honour of the 
crown is a broader and more generic concept than the more specific fiduciary duty.62 Both 
are paternalistic in tone and both are used as a metre of justification for infringing 
aboriginal duties with the “honour of the Crown” testing more the legitimacy and the trust 
duty the legality of the proposed action. The honour of the Crown has been described as 
“not a mere incantation, but rather a core precept that finds its application in concrete 
practices”63 
 As Rotman argues, the exact parameters of the fiduciary relationship have not 
been established and it enjoys an “axiomatic yet embryonic” status.64 Paradoxically, the 
more it is cited, he argues, the less need for its elucidation.65 He summarises the relevance 
of the duty. Firstly, “it acts as an important check on governmental legislative power (as 
seen in Sparrow, this applies to both federal and provincial power);” Secondly, it is the 
“”primary manifestation of the notion of the “honour of the Crown.” Thirdly, it is the 
“primary link between historic and modern Crown-Native relations,” and lastly it “animates 
the rights contained in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.”66  
At the very least this relationship imports a duty to consult. In Haida Nation 
McLachlin CJ remarked: “this requires the Crown, acting honourably, to participate in 
processes of negotiation. While this process continues, the honour of the Crown may 
require it to consult and, where indicated, accommodate Aboriginal interests”67 The duty is 
not dependent on an already established right but a mere putative claim and the “obligation 
arises when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of 
the aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it.”68 It 
was not contingent on a “final determination of the scope and content of the [asserted] 
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right.”69 Yet the duty is dependent on the prima facie strength of the claim and varies from a 
duty to merely give notice on a speculative and peripheral claim to something approaching 
involvement in the decision making procedure, although perhaps short of requiring actual 
consent, should a convincing claim exists.70  
Therefore, any trust responsibilities in Canada are often seen in the context of 
consultation over mere putative rights and title and the concept remains in its infancy, 
dating back merely from the 1984 Guerin case. The United States has a more clearly defined 
relationship of considerable pedigree and ancestry, owing largely to the fact that it has a 
more mature and defined set of aboriginal rights. These date back to the wardship model 
of the Marshall Trilogy in the Nineteenth Century, discussed in Chapters One and Three.  
 
7.5 Equal Protection71 
7.5.1 United States 
The unique and discrete mandate of the Commerce Clause complicates any Equal 
Protection Clause analysis for Indians within the United States. The leading case is Morton 
v Mancari72 in which  an Indian preferential hiring provision for the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs was upheld on the grounds that this was permitted by the Commerce Clause 
mandate or, alternatively, because it was a political rather than racial classification as the 
BIA restricted its application to members of federally recognised tribes. As the Court 
remarked, “[l]iterally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations, 
and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA, single[s] out for special treatment a 
constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from 
historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious 
racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be 
effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians 
would be jeopardized”73 Rice v Cayetano74 limited this approach when a Hawaiian statute 
                                                          
69 At para 28 
 
70 Mullan, D. (2009). "The Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples- The Canadian Example." Canadian Journal 
of Administrative Law and practice 22: 107-131, 113 
71
 Federal Citizenship was granted to U.S. Indians by the Citizenship Act 1924 and the Fourteenth Amendment 
confers state citizenship Canby, W. C. (2004) op.cit., p348. In Canada the Act to Amend the Canadian Citizenship 
Act of June 7 1956 conferred Canadian citizenship to Indians. 
72 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
73 ibid at 552 
132 
 
restricting the franchise to descendants of the indigenous was struck down as a violation 
of the more precise Fifteenth Amendment.75  
To circumvent the traditional strict scrutiny of equal protection and use rational 
basis review for Indian-specific legislation, one strand of Mancari suggested there be an 
assumption that the classification is political, rather than racial.76  Indeed, a citizenship 
response based on tribal membership circumvents the difficulty of race or ancestry. 
However, determining tribal membership is not always straightforward with certain tribes 
being without governing documents. More problematic is the fact that some tribal 
membership is based on blood quantum.77 Furthermore, a purely political categorisation 
would sweep away many laws based on ancestry that confer educational and cultural 
benefits.78  
By contrast, the Commerce Clause approach uses the specific language of Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution79 to trump the less specific equal protection 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires equal treatment in only general 
terms.80 This would also cohere with Rice as the Fifteenth Amendment is more specific in 
actually mentioning race.81 Potential problems emerge from the fact that it could also be 
questioned as applying only to tribes, not individual Indians.82  But as Goldberg remarks, 
from the earliest times legislation has been targeted at individual Indians when there was no 
formal enrolment.83 Goldberg does suggest the need for some nexus between individual 
Indians that are included and a valid tribal interest and points to federal criminal law, which 
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applies to individuals on a combination of descent and tribal recognition, and the Indian 
Arts and Craft Act (1990), which applies to enrolled tribal members and those certified by 
the tribe from which they have descent. 84   
Thus Mancari can shield legislative favour for Indians from equal protection 
scrutiny but, should the federal government be less benevolent, it could of course just as 
easily be employed to justify legislation which operated to Indian disadvantage. Yet the 
federal obligations to Indians under the Trust Power theoretically operate to contain such 
disfavour. 
 
7.5.2 Canada 
Equal protection, guaranteed by section 15 of the Charter of Right and Freedoms, is 
again complicated by the fact that Parliament has a mandate to legislate in regard to 
aboriginals by virtue of section 91(24) of the British North America Act (1867). 85 Morton v 
Mancari provides the template for analysis in the United States but Canada has not squarely 
faced up to this conundrum, at least for the federal government, since the enaction of the 
Charter in 1982. There has, however, been consideration under the Canadian Bill of Rights.  
In the appropriately titled case of Queen v Drybones86 the defendant was charged with 
being intoxicated off a reserve, contrary to s. 94 (b) of the Indian Act.  At the time there was 
legislation in the Northwest Territories which made intoxication in a public place an 
offence,87 with no minimum fine and maximum imprisonment of 30 days (compared to 3 
months in the Indian Act). There were no Indian reserves in the Northwest Territories and 
thus, as well as the sentence disparity for a public place, an Indian could be prosecuted for 
being drunk in his own home.88 It was held that these provisions violated the right of equality 
under the law contrary to the Bill of Rights. This was the only time that a federal statute was 
declared inoperative if it could not be construed as consistent with the Bill of Rights.89 This 
undermined section 91 (24) and its specific mandate to legislate for “Indians and land 
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reserved for Indians,” yet this jurisprudence was not developed as a potential challenge to 
the Indian Act in its entirety. 
Section 25 of the Charter claims that the rights contained within the Charter do not 
interfere with aboriginal rights guaranteed under section 35 thus the more advantageous 
right can be adopted. It is the extent to which the Charter can be employed to contain 
disadvantage that remains to be elucidated.  The particular federal mandate of section 
91(24) does not insulate provincial laws from traditional equal protection challenge.90  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Indian Law in the United States is a more developed discipline than in Canada, 
Indeed, until the Calder case of 1973 the notion that generic aboriginal rights even existed 
in Canada would not have been met with hostility but incredulity. Since that case there has 
been a confused and contradictory jurisprudence with little clarification, not least over what 
exactly has been constitutionalised by section 35.  Superficially protective of aboriginal 
rights, section 35, it could be argued, was a magnanimous but empty gesture as few rights 
actually existed. The Calder case did spark some land treaties and self-government 
agreements, although these reflected more a federal delegation than an acknowledgement 
of any inherent rights. The exact relationship between the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
section 35 remains unclear. 
The United States differs in that many treaties of land cession have been negotiated 
thus rendering the question of aboriginal title largely moot. Similarly, inherent tribal 
sovereignty has meant that aboriginal rights have been regarded as intact except when 
Congress or the courts have acted, although this has occurred increasingly frequently, 
particularly in regard to jurisdiction over non-members within Indian country. This is 
virtually the obverse of the Canadian situation in which each right has followed a 
painstaking and piecemeal judicial recognition or alternatively a parsimonious federal 
delegation. The exact relationship amongst the various doctrines of Equal Protection, the 
Trust Power and the Plenary Power remains subject to judicial whim and congressional 
mood. 
Thus to conclude, aboriginal rights in Canada would seem to be more protected 
by virtue of section 35  but less well established: as Cross and Lomond comment, 
“neither the Canadian parliament nor a province can extinguish a right and a province 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
90 Cross, J. and K. Lomond (1993) op.cit., p275. 
 
135 
 
may also be prohibited from infringing a right.”91 In Canada, there were no restraints 
either procedurally or in relation to subject matter before section 35 in 1982, and the 
fiduciary duties only developed from 1984 in Guerin. There must also be a compelling 
interest before impairing a right.92 In the United States Indian rights are more defined 
and precise due to the more prolonged evolution since the 1830s, but they are also more 
vulnerable as they have not been constitutionalised and remain vulnerable to the Lone 
Wolf congressional Plenary Power, although admittedly this is tempered somewhat by 
the Trust Relationship.93 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
8 Religious Freedom in the Twentieth Century and Beyond 
 
8.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Canada had no substantive constitutional right to 
religious freedom until the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. By contrast, the United 
States had an accelerating constitutional religious freedom jurisprudence with both the 
establishment and free exercise provisions enthusiastically litigated from the start of the 
Twentieth Century. This chapter will begin with free exercise case law in the United States, 
with particular emphasis on the seminal case of Employment Division v Smith (1990) which 
concerned the religious use of Peyote by Native Americans, but which had wider 
ramifications for all minority religions. There will then be a discussion of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, although it must be borne in mind that there is much overlap 
between the two concepts which do not exist in water-tight compartments and thus any 
separation is a somewhat artificial exercise. 
There will be only a brief section on Canadian religious freedom litigation before 
the Charter followed by a more detailed examination of post-1982 case law. However, the 
Charter is of relatively recent vintage and its interpretation is continually evolving so there is 
necessarily a less settled and definitive jurisprudence. 
 
8.2 United States 
8.2.1 Free Exercise of Religion 
The picture presented in Chapter Four was that of a country where freedom to 
believe was largely inviolate yet religious conduct, in pursuit of that belief, was 
circumscribed. Reynolds v United States (1878) had calcified this dichotomy and supposedly 
rejected the standards of the contemporary state constitutions which claimed to protect 
belief and action. Yet Reynolds merely stated that the religious action could be within the 
competency of the government to regulate, not that it necessarily had to be.  
In Cantwell v Connecticut,1 as well as extending the Free Exercise element of the First 
Amendment to the states, the Supreme Court, for the first time, struck down a law on the 
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basis of an infringement of religious conduct.2 This artificial distinction was finally explicitly 
rejected in Wisconsin v Yoder when the Court remarked that: “belief and action cannot be 
neatly confined in logic-tight compartments.”3  
A compelling interest test was introduced in West Virginia State Board of Education v 
Barnette4 and consolidated in the case of Sherbert v Verner5 when the Supreme Court 
stipulated that, in order to justify a governmental infringement of religious liberty, such an 
interest must be compelling and construed as narrowly as possible to exclude anything that 
did not pose a “substantial threat to the public safety, peace, or order.”6 Sherbert was also 
the first time that the Supreme Court applied such strict scrutiny to a generally applicable 
and neutral law,7 to which there were already secular exemptions.8  
There was some circumscription to the right in the case of Bowen v Roy9 in which a 
Native American requested an exemption from the system of universal social security 
numbers for his daughter, “Little Bird of the Snow,” on the grounds that it would have 
robbed her of her spirit. Justice Burger remarked, “[n]ever to our knowledge has the Court 
interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways that 
the individual believes will further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her 
family.”10  This would have been an intrusion into the internal affairs of government. The 
Lyng case, discussed more fully in Chapter 10, extended the ambit of internal governmental 
action that failed to trigger a substantial burden to religious practice.11 The Lyng plaintiffs 
were Native Americans who were deemed to have no protected rights to worship at sacred 
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sites on federal public land as the management of such land was regarded as an internal 
federal administrative matter. 
The law thus seemed relatively settled on the eve of the Smith case. In essence, the 
compelling interest test applied strict scrutiny to any governmental action that infringed 
religious exercise, including generally applicable and neutral laws, unless it could be 
categorised, however tenuously, as intruding into the internal workings of government.  
 
8.2.1.1 Employment Division v Smith12 
Smith determined that the First Amendment permitted Oregon to criminally 
proscribe the religious use of Peyote. The criminalization of Peyote was constitutional and 
therefore, as a consequence, the state’s denial of unemployment benefits to workers sacked 
for misconduct by using Peyote, failed to attract First Amendment protection.13 The 
majority decision was delivered by Justice Scalia, who purported to justify his decision on 
established precedent. In particular, he held that only purposeful discrimination triggers 
strict scrutiny; any incidental effect of generally applicable and neutral laws is largely 
irrelevant.  
Scalia selectively cited several cases to support his theory that neutral laws never 
involve free exercise issues. Yet in each of these cases the court did weigh the governmental 
interest with the infringement and only then decided in favour of the government.14  He cited 
Reynolds v United States and the government prohibition of polygamy, but this had been 
weighed as a sufficiently compelling governmental interest because it was an “overt act 
against peace and order.”15 Indeed, by discussing the importance of marriage, the 
implication was that there was logically a balancing process employed. Scalia also quoted 
from Minersville School District Board of Education v Gobitis 16 to support his principle that all 
neutral laws must prevail, in this case a flag saluting and pledging of the oath of allegiance. 
However, the narrow justification in this case was on national security grounds and any 
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wider holding specifically overruled three years later in Barnette.17 He also cited Prince v 
Massachusetts,18 in which the Court upheld the conviction of a mother who had used her 
child to distribute religious literature, but only after weighing up the governmental interest 
in preventing child labour.19 Finally, he referred to United States v Lee,20 in which an Amish 
employer sought an exemption from social security payments on the grounds that his faith 
prohibited him funding governmental support programmes. Again, after a careful 
consideration, the Court decided that the integrity of the social security system must prevail 
over more particular considerations. Scalia also asserted that the Court had never 
circumvented an otherwise valid criminal statute on free exercise grounds. This directly 
contradicts Yoder, in which Amish children were exempted from compulsory school 
attendance regulations.21  
 Thus in all these cases the governmental interest prevailed only after careful 
consideration and the application of a balancing test of some description.22 Because the 
government had usually prevailed did not mean that it should always prevail. As Justice 
O’Connor remarked, “[t]hat we rejected the free exercise claims in those cases hardly calls 
into question the applicability of First Amendment doctrine in the first place. Indeed, it is 
surely unusual to judge the vitality of a constitutional doctrine by looking to the win-loss 
record of the plaintiffs who happen to come before us.”23 
In the alternative, Scalia dismissed previous cases such as Yoder as “hybrid cases” in 
which a free exercise claim was in conjunction with another freedom such as speech, or the 
press, or in that particular case family life.24 But this would be to suggest, as Cook argues, 
that previous holdings have no precedential value if they could have been reached on other 
grounds or alternatively, that the free exercise clause is “subsumed within free speech and 
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parental rights” which is a judicial perversion of the Constitution.25 Indeed in Yoder, the 
court specifically applied the compelling interest before discussing parental rights.26 
Brownstein rightly rejects this hybrid rights approach as a violation of the basic principle 
that fundamental rights should be protected equally for all as otherwise, one religious 
practitioner with a “hybrid claim,” would enjoy greater protection for his religious 
exercise.27 As Gedicks remarks, if neither right is sufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny 
why should a combination do so?28 
Scalia admitted that this decision would prejudice minority religions, which should 
look to the legislature for protection.29 Yet the expression of the state’s police powers 
pertaining to morality is reflective of the state’s majoritarian religious traditions with which 
it is intertwined. One pertinent example being alcohol and hallucinogens: most Christians 
partake of alcohol but reject drugs whereas the Native American Church rejects alcohol 
and uses Peyote as part of worship.30 Indeed, as Celichowski remarks, “[m]ost people 
would be shocked if a priest and his parishioners celebrating an open air mass in 
Washington, D.C. were arrested and prosecuted for violating the district statute which 
prohibits the drinking of alcoholic beverages in public places' because they served and 
consumed wine.”31 
Justice Blackmun in his dissent saw the issue as requiring a compelling interest in 
denying the exemption rather than the overall legislation,  but found no such interest would 
outweigh the free exercise right.32 He suggested that the Smith court had ample precedent 
to choose from which would have produced a different outcome. For example, as 
mentioned above, in Yoder the Court granted an exemption from an otherwise valid 
generally applicable criminal law and anarchy did not ensue. The more cynical might point 
                                                          
25 Cook, T. (1991). "The Peyote Case: A Return to Reynolds." Denver University Law Review 68: 91-104,100. 
 
26 Beeson, A. (1992). "Dances With Justice: Peyotism in the Courts." Emory Law Journal 41: 1121-1184, 1175. 
 
27 Brownstein, A. (2006) op.cit.,., p144. 
 
28 Gedicks, F. M. (2005). "The Permissible Scope of  Legal Limitations on the Freedom of  Religion or Belief  
in the United States." Emory International Law Review 19: 1187-1275,1220 
29 Oregon did legislate subsequently to amend its Controlled Substances Act to provide an exemption for 
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30 Cook, T. (1991) op.cit.,  p102. 
 
31 Celichowski, J. (2000). "A Rough and Narrow Path: Preserving Native American Religious Liberty in the 
Smith Era." American Indian Law Review 24: 1-35, 2. 
 
32 Rugg, J. and  Simone, A (1990) op.cit., p130 
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out that the Amish were of white, Christian, European stock who were regarded as God-
fearing, hardworking, thrifty, independent and with a family-oriented existence.33 These are 
good all-American virtues, if perhaps taken somewhat to the extreme. He also remarked 
that in the Sherbert case the denial of a government benefit was overturned as it failed to 
demonstrate a compelling interest from a neutral and generally applicable law.34 Again, this 
should have controlled the outcome in Smith in which unemployment benefits were denied. 
 
8.2.1.2 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993 
Following Smith, Congress attempted to restore the compelling interest test for 
generally applicable laws with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (1993) which stated in 
section 3: “Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless it “demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person 1) furthers a compelling governmental interest; and 
2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that governmental interest.”35  
 The RFRA recited its connection to Smith and avowed its intention to “restore the 
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).”36 It also expressly disavowed any intent “to affect, interpret, or 
in any way address the establishment clause.”37 When President Clinton signed RFRA into 
law, he noted that the Act was an exercise of Congress’ “extraordinary” power to “reverse 
by legislation a decision of the United States Supreme Court.”38  
The Supreme Court was less impressed and struck down the Act as 
unconstitutional in City of Boerne v Flores39 because Congress had exceeded its powers under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment40 with respect to the states, by enacting 
substantive, rather than remedial legislation, and thus had violated principles of federalism: 
                                                          
33 ibid p1177. 
 
34 Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
35 42 U.S.C. s2000bb.  
 
36 ibid. s 2000bb(b)(1). 
 
37 ibid s 2000bb-4 
38 Eisgruber, C. and Sager, L (1994) op.cit.,  p437 
39 521 U.S. 507, (1997) 
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 “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of  this article.” 
(referring to the Fourteenth Amendment) 
142 
 
“[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may 
become substantive in operation and effect.”41 
 Furthermore, in attempting to reverse a constitutional determination by the Court, 
Congress had violated horizontal separation of powers:42 “Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is.”43 Indeed, regarding interpretations of 
constitutional law, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter and its determinations cannot be 
overruled by statute.44  
Significantly for Native Americans, Boerne did not declare RFRA unconstitutional in 
its application to the federal government, which encompasses federal governmental action 
pertaining to reservations and public lands. Yet, as Celichowski remarks, “it should be 
recalled that roughly half of the Native Americans in the United States do not live on or 
near a reservation. Like other citizens, this group is subject to the jurisdictions of the state 
and local governments where they reside.”45 In Gonzales v O Centro Espirito46 the Supreme 
Court did indeed sustain the RFRA for federal action (as opposed to states’ actions) which 
would appear to contradict its earlier vehement opposition to Congress’ determination of 
what exactly should receive First Amendment protection on horizontal separation of 
powers grounds. Of course, the operation of the RFRA can be defeated by failing to find a 
substantial burden to the free exercise of religion and thus denying the claim at the outset. 
This is what has happened in sacred sites cases, which will be discussed in Chapter Ten. 
Indeed, by specifically re-establishing the pre-Smith jurisprudence, the Lyng sacred site 
holding of 1986, which held there was no burden when government uses its own land in its 
own way, would seem to be left intact.47  
                                                          
41 Flores at 520 
 
42 ibid 520-535 and 536 
 
43 ibid 
44 Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) and its progeny Eisgruber, C. and Sager, L (1994) op.cit.,  
p441. 
 
45 Celichowski, J. (2000) op.cit.,p12. 
46 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006). 
47 Brucker, S. (2008). "Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service: Defining the Scope of  Native American 
Freedom of  Religious Exercise on Public Lands." Environs Environmental Law and Policy Journal 31: 273-
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As Justice Souter remarked, in the later case of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
Hialeah,48 the Smith holding was flawed as neither the respondents nor petitioners 
advocated abandoning the strict scrutiny test, and thus the Court’s determination was 
without “full dress argument” on this issue. Furthermore, the new test was not necessary to 
uphold the state criminal law as evidenced by Justice O’Connor’s application of the 
compelling interest test when finding in favour of the government.49 In Lukumi50there was 
a city council ordinance prohibiting sacrifice and slaughter of animals covertly targeted at 
the church’s religion (Santeria) and its rituals of animal sacrifice although non-religious 
slaughter was unaffected. The Supreme Court found a “religious gerrymander” in that the 
burdens singularly fell on Santeria adherents.51 The general applicability was not apparent as 
Colonel Sanders was not subject to the same restrictions.52 
Thus to summarise, O Centro means that the RFRA applies to federal action. At the 
state level the combined effects of Smith and Lukumi dictate the analysis of governmental 
action: Firstly, religiously neutral laws of general applicability are subject to merely rational 
basis scrutiny. Secondly, strict scrutiny applies in the case of a) hybrid rights cases which 
involve another constitutionally protected right or b) if laws provide selective exemptions 
that are granted to non-religious groupings but not religious groupings.53(individualised 
assessment rule).54 For both federal and state action an application of Lyng may mean 
governmental action is classified as an internal matter and any further consideration 
aborted. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) 
49 ibid at 572 and Briones, J. (2002). "We Want to Believe Too: The IRFA and Indigenous Peoples' Right to 
Freedom of  Religion." University of  California Davis Journal of  International Law and Policy 8: 345-361, 
354 
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51 ibid at 534-538  
52 Russell, S. (2008). "American Indian religion in the Iron House: Searching for 'some accommodation'." 
Contemporary Justice Review 11(3): 213-227, 218. 
 
53 Bluemel, E. (2004) op.cit., p488. 
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8.2.2 Establishment Clause 
Prior to 1947 there had only been two Establishment Clause cases: Bradfield v 
Roberts (1899) and Quick Bear v Leupp (1908), which were discussed in Chapters Four and 
Five respectively. Then in Everson v Board of Education (1947) the Court remarked that 
"[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”55 Justice Black 
stated: “The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must 
be kept high and impregnable.”56 Jefferson would have approved. 
There are two tests generally used to determine unconstitutional establishment: for 
legislation with an overt religious preference then an equal protection strict scrutiny 
analysis is used and there must be a narrowly tailored compelling interest which is 
extremely difficult to satisfy.57 For other legislation, the “Lemon Test” is the standard for 
determining Establishment Clause compliance. The government action “must have a 
secular purpose, must not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and 
must not involve excessive entanglement with religion.”58 Lynch v Donnelly determined that 
there must be a secular purpose, but not necessarily an exclusively secular purpose.59 
There are two other refinements which are used in addition to the Lemon Test: the 
Coercion Test and the Endorsement Test.60The Coercion Test asks “whether or not there 
is the effect of coercing persons into conforming their practices with those of a particular 
religion.”61 It takes into account the credulity of the potential audience, with a school 
prayer being more suspect than one undertaken at the start of a legislative session.62 The 
Endorsement Test holds that government “actions are impermissible if they have the effect 
of alienating non-adherents to a specific religion as outsiders.”63  
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58 Lemon v Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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60 Johnston, D. (2001) op.cit., p450. 
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As for the relationship between the two First Amendment clauses this was 
summarised in Locke v Davey64 in that “there are some state actions permitted by the 
Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause” and that “‘there is 
room for play in the joints' between them.”65  
 
 
8.3  Canada  
8.3.1 Pre-Charter Case Law 
As discussed in Chapter Four, there was no entrenched constitutional protection of 
religious freedom in Canada with any challenge being on procedural grounds by alleging 
that the wrong federal component had acted.  
According to Schmeiser, the case of Chabot v. School Commissioners of Lamorandiere 
(1957)66 was the only judicial authority pre-1960 that described religious freedom as a 
“natural right” that could not be taken away by either provincial or national legislation. In 
Chabot mandatory catholic teaching for Jehovah’s Witness pupils was declared invalid as a 
violation of this “natural right.”67  In Re Drummond Wren,68 a covenant forbidding the 
alienation of land to Jews was struck down as violating “diffuse notions of public policy.”69 
Beyond that, the search through the case law for any recognition of an entrenched natural 
right would be in vain.  
Much Twentieth Century case law involved the persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
As Doyle remarks, there was systematic discrimination against Jehovah’s Witnesses whose 
religion had been declared illegal in 1940 and who were banned from meeting, distributing 
their publications and speaking publicly for a period of three years.70 Such a proscription is 
hardly consistent with an entrenched or indeed any substantive freedom of religion right.  
                                                          
64 540 U.S. 712 (2004) 
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In Saumur v City of Quebec,71 a by-law was successfully challenged which prohibited 
the distribution of religious tracts without permission from the police. The case centred on 
the Quebec Freedom of Worship Act (1851),72 which had continued at confederation by virtue 
of section 129 of the British North American Act, and which, by a doctrine of statutory 
interpretation, continued unless specifically abrogated.73 As for a generalised fundamental 
freedom the court was perhaps a little quixotic: “Freedom of speech, religion and the 
inviolability of the person, are original freedoms which are at once the necessary attributes 
and modes of self-expression of human beings and the primary conditions of their 
community life within a legal order.”74Perhaps more realistic was Cartwight J’s dissenting 
view, which expressed the more correct assessment of the constitutional status of 
entrenched religious liberty protection: “Under the British North America Act ... the whole 
range of legislative power is committed either to Parliament or to the Provincial legislatures 
and competence to deal with any subject matter must exist in one or other of such bodies. 
There are thus no rights possessed by the citizens of Canada which cannot be modified by 
either Parliament or the legislatures, but it may often be a matter of difficulty to decide 
which of such bodies has the legislative power in a particular case.”75 The only 
constitutional enquiry, he maintained, was one of federalism. There were no other 
constraints.  
The Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960,76 a mere statute, purported to describe 
“freedom of religion” as a “fundamental freedom” in section 1(c). But this only applied to 
the federal government, was susceptible to contrary legislation by virtue of parliamentary 
supremacy,77 and crystallised the rights as those existing in 1960.78 In Roberts and Rosetanni v. 
                                                          
71 Saumur v. City of  Quebec, 4 D.L.R. 641, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 [Saumur cited to D.L.R.]. 
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The Queen79  section 1(c) was held to offer no protection against a conviction for operating a 
bowling alley in violation of the federal Lord’s Day Act (1952) which, it was argued, 
infringed the religious freedom of those that celebrated another Sabbath.80 The defendants 
contended that the Bill of Rights had repealed the statute. The court disagreed and held that 
the Bill of Rights did not repeal or alter former statutes but merely protected the rights and 
freedoms existing at the enactment of the Bill. The Lord’s Day Act was, in any case, 
classified rather disingenuously as a financial penalty not a religious freedom issue. Only 
Cartwright J., dissenting, saw the Act’s purpose as one of compelling the observance of a 
religious day objectionable to other faiths.81  
Thus before 1982 and the Constitutional entrenchment of “freedom of conscience 
and religion”82 jurisprudence had been sporadic and uncertain. Three “doctrines of 
reluctance” circumscribed the judicial enquiry: legal federalism, parliamentary supremacy 
and the essential purpose doctrine described in Chapter 4.83 Legal federalism limited the 
judicial inquiry to one of legislative competence between federal and provincial 
governments rather than any substantive subject matter.84 Thus Ontario’s Lord’s Day Act, 
unlike the federal Lord’s Day Act, was declared ultra vires the province not on freedom of 
religion grounds but purely due to criminal law being a federal competence.85 Parliamentary 
supremacy meant that the courts had to defer to parliamentary sovereignty and ensured 
that each parliament was legislatively omnipotent, within its sphere of competency, 
irrespective of any fundamental freedoms trampled.86 The essential purpose doctrine 
focused on the legislation’s ostensible purpose or “pith and substance” which, provided it 
falls within a head of legislative allocation, is left undisturbed even though it may have 
effects outside such a competence.87  
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8.3.2 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
The doctrines of reluctance are modified somewhat by the Charter. Legal federalism 
survives but as an additional ground of unconstitutionality alongside the Charter. Yet 
conformity with legal federalism alone cannot save a Charter violation. As for parliamentary 
supremacy, the Charter limits the doctrine somewhat but there is still the possibility of 
Section 1 justification or Section 33 override.88 For Section 1 any justification must be 
narrowly tailored as to means.89 As for the essential purpose doctrine, this is modified by 
the Charter as there is now a greater scrutiny of effects when considering Charter values.90 
As to the scope of application, in an early case it was held that the Charter only 
applies to governmental entities not purely private activity.91 By contrast, section 35 
aboriginal rights are also binding on private parties.92  Furthermore, “[t]he Charter is 
intended to set a standard upon which present as well as future legislation is to be tested. 
Therefore the meaning of the concept of freedom of conscience and religion is not to be 
determined solely by the degree to which that right was enjoyed by Canadians prior to the 
proclamation of the Charter.”93This rejects the frozen rights approach of the Bill of Rights. 
 
8.3.2.1 Religious Freedom and Section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter94 
The first step in a Charter freedom of religion case analysis is to determine whether 
the activity is religious. The Supreme Court of Canada helpfully gave a definition of religion 
in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem: “Religion is about freely and deeply held personal 
convictions or beliefs connected to an individual's spiritual faith and integrally linked to 
                                                          
88 Section 1: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject 
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one's self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of which allow individuals to 
foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual faith.”95  
The next step is the section 1 justification which is a qualification on the seemingly 
absolute rights contained in the Canadian Charter. According to Section 1, they are “subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society."96 In Regina v. Chaulk97 the Supreme Court explained that this 
meant that, once an infringement of religious liberty had been shown, the government 
must then demonstrate that a sufficiently important government interest exists and that the 
means used to fulfil this interest pass a proportionality test. To pass this test the means 
chosen must be rationally connected to the objective, infringe the right as little as possible 
and be proportionate to the objective.98 
The leading post-Charter case is Big M Drug Mart,99 which concerned a challenge to 
the Lord’s Day Act100 that prohibited opening a business on Sunday. The Supreme Court 
considered the act religious in purpose and moreover infringed the religious rights of non-
Christians: “If I am Jew or a Sabbatarian or a Muslim, the practice of my religion at least 
implies my right to work on a Sunday if I wish. It seems to me that any law purely religious 
in purpose, which denies me that right, must surely infringe my religious freedom.”101 
Similarly, the non-religious were equally protected from such coercion: there is a freedom 
from, as well as a freedom to, religion.102 Significantly Dickson J rejected the artificialities of 
a formal neutrality in favour of an anti-subordination approach: “The equality necessary to 
support religious freedom does not require identical treatment of all religions. In fact, the 
interests of true equality may well require differentiation in treatment.”103 Thus the federal 
Lord’s Day Act was held to violate section 2(a) because its purpose was observance of the 
                                                          
95 Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 at para 39 
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Sabbath. Significantly, pre-charter, the legislation was upheld104 as it could conceivably, if 
disingenuously, come within the federal criminal power of promoting “public peace, order, 
security, health [and] morality” but now is caught by section 2(a).105 This starkly illustrates 
the difference between the Charter and Bill of Rights. 
By contrast, in Edward Brooks (1986) the Supreme Court held that providing a 
“uniform day of rest,” which was the ostensible purpose of Ontario’s Sunday Closing Law, 
could come within provincial secular powers of “property and civil rights within the 
province” under s92(13).106 Once a conceivable secular purpose (although rather spurious) 
has been found, such as a uniform day of rest and it is within the federal entity’s 
competency then the court proceeds to a balancing analysis.107 The justices understandably 
were split: two thought there was no impingement on religious freedom and four thought 
there was but that it could be justified under section 1. Significantly, the law in Edwards 
Brooks did provide for a limited Saturday exemption: “retailers having no more than seven 
employees or 5000 square feet of store space could stay .open on Sunday if they closed 
their stores for a twenty-four hour period Friday to Saturday evening.”108 This undermined 
the sacrosanct nature of Sunday and emphasised the secular nature of the legislation. The 
law was actually challenged on the basis that there was no complete exemption for 
Sabbatarians. Although this was an infringement of religious freedom, it was not found to 
be disproportionate to the legislative objective after balancing under section 1.   
 
8.3.2 2 Establishment Concerns 
There is no non-establishment component to the religious freedom clause in the 
Charter as this would have been inconsistent with the history of constitutionally entrenched 
denominational schooling.109 The government need not remain neutral to religion or indeed 
observe a strict and formal neutrality between religions. It is only where the government 
endorsement has the effect of imposing “coercive burdens on the exercise of religious 
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beliefs” that there is a violation of section 2.110 This coercive element can be quite broad, 
for example in Re Zylberberg and Director of Education111 a section 2(a) challenge to a school 
bible reading and Lord’s Prayer was upheld even though there was a pupil opt-out. The key 
point was that it forced the pupil to make a religious statement, thus inviting stigma.112  
By contrast, Catholic denominational school funding and the refusal of funding for 
other denominations were unsuccessfully challenged in Adler v Ontario113 as a violation of 
the equal protection and religious freedom provisions of the Canadian Charter. The Court 
held that Catholic funding was constitutionally entrenched by section 93 of the British North 
American Act 1867 and immune to challenge.114 This holding determined that funding for 
other denominations is not mandated but is also not proscribed.115 It is left to the political 
process.116  In general in Canada the state may support religion, provided it does so in a 
non-coercive manner, which means usually it has to be spread evenly across denominations 
and similarly may fund religious education provided it is non-discriminatory. There is thus 
less of a rigid separation of church and state in the educational field than in the United 
States.117 
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8.4 Conclusion 
A comparison between the two countries is slightly artificial as the Canadian 
jurisprudence is still evolving, having only had entrenched substantive protection for 30 
years instead of 200 as in the United States.  
Although the Canadian Charter contains no explicit Establishment Clause, case law 
illustrates that any establishment of religion is policed indirectly via the free exercise clause 
and the prohibition of coercion, which often form the same analysis. In the United States 
there tends to be a more rigid dichotomy with cases categorised as either establishment or 
free exercise questions with the other element subsequently marginalised in the analysis.118 
The most glaring difference would be the permitted funding of Canadian 
denominational schools. Yet this does not proscribe nor does it mandate other 
denominational school funding. Outside this context Canadian courts demonstrate similar 
vigilance to the United States in policing any coercive effect on young and impressionable 
minds. 
The major facial differences would be the Section 1 justification provision for 
Charter abridgements that “can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society,” 
although admittedly this can operate in a similar way to the United States Compelling 
Interest Test. The section 33 “notwithstanding provision” that permits a province or 
parliament to circumvent sections 2 (and 7 to 15) has no equivalent in the United States. 
Yet Collins has speculated that this legislative override facility may make Canadian judges 
less risk-averse as their decision may not have the constitutional finality of their US 
counterparts.119 Having said that, the political costs of invoking section 33 are perhaps 
prohibitively high. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
9 Sacred Objects1 
 
9.1 Introduction 
During the dark days of the late Nineteenth Century Indian culture and religion 
were regarded by North American governments as something to be destroyed in the name 
of assimilation, although the private citizen was often not averse to attending a Wild West 
Show and buying the odd commemorative trinket. Yet to the scientist and the 
anthropologist, Indian cultural artefacts were objects of fascination which were destined for 
the laboratory and the museum. Gradually the governments themselves, by often funding 
such enterprises, endorsed a less assimilative but more acquisitive attitude. Cultural 
appropriation therefore replaced cultural destruction, but both policies resulted in 
acculturation. 
Museums have undoubtedly played a role in preserving disappearing cultures with 
the western viewpoint traditionally regarding cultural artefacts as universal patrimony.2 Yet 
when spiritual objects are displayed in museums they are unavailable for ongoing rituals 
and as such can represent another example of western cultural imperialism. In the final 
analysis, the scientist and tourist are seemingly prioritised before the practitioner of the 
religion.3 This attitude is at best paternalistic and at worst spiritual genocide.  
The museum argument is also problematic because it assumes that preservation and 
display are the only natural and desirable outcomes for such objects.4 Yet totem poles are 
meant to decay, not to be displayed in perpetuity within a glass case. Similarly, the 
destruction of items such as the Haida end-of-mourning ceremonial masks is not simply 
physical destruction but “returning the object to the spirit world by fire.”5 The conflict can 
thus be between the preservation of a sacred item and the perpetuation of a religion. 
                                                          
1 Sacred objects include ceremonial headdresses, sacred drums, totem poles, staffs, pipes, rattles, medicine 
bags, medicine bundles and ceremonial face masks. 
 
2 Cuk, N. (1997). "Carrying the Battle into the Form: Repatriating First Nations' Cultural Artifacts." 
Dalhousie J. Legal Stud. 6: 157-186, 167. 
 
3 ibid p171 
 
4 ibid p198 
5 ibid p188. 
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This chapter will discuss the treatment of Native American sacred objects. There 
will first be a discussion of how archaeological protection laws failed to extend to Native 
American resources until the passage of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation 
Act (NAGPRA) in 1990. There will then be a discussion of NAGPRA, which now obliges 
museums to catalogue their inventory of such artefacts, and imports a presumption that 
these items must be returned to tribal descendants of the original owners. The importance 
of articulating tribal law on cultural property will also be stressed, both as a litigation 
strategy for the recovery of cultural objects, and as a measure to prevent further alienation. 
The discussion will then turn to Canada and a comparison with her repatriation 
legislation. In particular, how cultural confiscation has not been so flagrant but neither has 
there been meaningful correction of the historical abuses that have occurred. 
      
9.2 United States 
9.2.1 Early Legislation 
The Antiquities Act of 1906 punished anyone “who shall appropriate, excavate, 
injure, or destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity 
that is situated on federal lands without first obtaining permission from the Secretary of the 
Department that has jurisdiction over that land.”6 This statute has been of limited use 
because of the mild punishments and the fact that the Ninth Circuit in Diaz held it 
unconstitutionally vague because it failed to define “object of antiquity” and “ruin.”7 Most 
importantly, it did not apply to Indian burials, graves or objects found therein which meant 
that federal agencies and private parties could loot them with impunity.8 
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) of 19799 was both a response to 
the Ninth Circuit in Diaz and an attempt to improve the 1906 act. It covers artefacts 100 
years old and before the issue of an excavation permit there must be consent from Native 
Americans if on Indian land and consultation if on public land.10 Excavation in violation of 
the permit provisions attracts criminal penalties of either a fine of $10,000 and/or 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
6 16 U.S.C. s 433 (1982). 
7 United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1974) Boyd, T. (1990) op.cit., 894. 
 
8 Trope, J. (1996). "Mending The Circle: A Native American Repatriation Guide." American Indian Ritual 
Object Repatriation Foundation, New York, NY. p76 
9 16 U.S.C. ss 470aa-47011 (1982). 
 
10 Boyd, T. (1990) op.cit., p898 
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imprisonment for one year.11 Nevertheless, it is of limited use as there is no citizen suit 
available in the ARPA, so enforcement depends on federal authorities.12 Furthermore, there 
is no provision ensuring confidentiality,13 although Section 9 permits federal land managers to 
withhold information from the public concerning the exact location and nature of 
archaeological resources.  
 
9.2.2 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (1990) 
NAGPRA extends protection to cultural items more recently excavated or 
discovered on federal or tribal land. Tribal land includes “all land within the exterior 
boundaries of any Indian reservation” and thus includes non-member lands within the 
reservation boundaries, in contrast to ARPA. For federal lands any removal must be after 
consultation with the relevant Indian tribes, for tribal lands there must be consent.14 As 
well as the restrictions on new excavations, the repatriation provisions of the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA) were an attempt to reverse 
the historical cultural appropriation.15  
NAGPRA is multi-faceted: it is property law, as it extends ownership over artefacts 
and bodies; human rights law, as it remedies longstanding violations; and administrative 
procedure law, as it establishes processes to be followed in repatriation.16 Furthermore, it is 
Indian Law, as it is based on a government-government relationship; as such the 
sympathetic Canons of Construction17 should be deployed to facilitate the Act’s purpose.18 
 
                                                          
11 Section 6(d) 
12 Suagee, D. (1996). "Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred Landscapes, Cross-Cultural Bridges, and 
Common Ground." Vermont Law Review 21: 145-224, 202. 
 
13 Ward, R. (1992) op.cit., p819. 
 
14 There is no application to state or private land. Dussias, A. (1996). "Science, Sovereignty, and the Sacred 
Text: Paleontological Resources and Native American Rights." Maryland Law Review 55: 84-159, 151. 
15 The National Museum of the American Indian Act (20 U.S.C. § 80q (2000) , which applied to the Smithsonian 
Institution, was a precursor to NAGPRA and has similar provisions relating to the return of human remains 
and funerary objects but only NAGPRA includes sacred items and other cultural patrimony. Trope, J. (1996) 
op.cit.,p1 The Smithsonian independently developed its own repatriation policy which does include sacred items 
and other cultural patrimony. Trope, J. (1996) op.cit., p40. 
16 Hutt, S. (2003). "If Geronimo Was Jewish: Equal Protection and the Cultural Property Rights of Native 
Americans." N. Ill. UL Rev. 24: 527-562, 547. 
17 Discussed in Chapters 3 and 7. 
18 Trope, J. and Echo-Hawk, W. (1992) op.cit., p76. 
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9.2.2.1 Main Provisions 
NAGPRA applies to all federal agencies, defined as any federal governmental 
entity, as well as all federally-funded museums.19 As well as human remains there are four 
other categories.20 For our purposes the most relevant are “sacred objects” and “objects of 
cultural patrimony.” “Sacred objects,” are defined in terms of their contemporary use as 
“specific ceremonial objects which are needed by traditional Native American religious 
leaders for the practice of traditional Native American religions by their present day 
adherents.”21 The legislative history suggests that this extends to the renewal of traditional 
religious ceremonies22 and the ultimate determination of continuing sacredness must be 
made by the Native American religious leaders themselves.23 This is the first time that 
federal entities must consider what is sacred from an Indian perspective.24 “Objects of 
cultural patrimony” are defined as: “[O]bject[s] having ongoing historical, traditional, or 
cultural importance central to the Native American group or culture itself, rather than 
property owned by an individual Native American, and which, therefore, cannot be 
alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by any individual”25 
There is a four-step process in securing repatriation.26 First, there must be an 
identification of the item as coming under the Act. Second, cultural affiliation must be 
established, 27 or an Indian grouping must demonstrate prior ownership or control either 
by the tribe or if individually by a lineal descendant. Thirdly, the claimant must demonstrate 
                                                          
19 25 U.S.C. 3001(4); 20 U.S.C. 80q-9. 
20 Please see Trope, J (1996) op.cit., for further details. The other two categories are associated funerary objects 
and unassociated funerary objects. 
 
21 25 U.S.C. 3001(3)(C). 
22 “the practice of some ceremonies has been interrupted because of governmental coercion, adverse societal 
conditions or the loss of certain objects through means beyond the control of the tribe at the time” H.R. 
REP. No. 877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990) at 14 
 
23 Trope, J. and Echo-Hawk, W. (1992) op.cit., p 66. 
 
24 ibid p 76. 
25 25 U.S.C.A. s 3001(3)(D). Items include nominally sacred items such as wampum belts and Zuni War Gods 
which may not fall under the definition of “sacred objects” if they are not regarded as necessary for the 
contemporary practice of Indian religions. 
26 Trope, J. and Echo-Hawk, W. (1992) op.cit.,  pp 65 et seq 
 
27 Trope, J. (1996) op.cit., p11 For “Cultural Affiliation” to be established “a reasonable connection ("shared 
group identity") must be shown between the present-day tribe or organization making the request and the 
earlier tribe or group.” Evidence used can be "geographical, kinship, biological, archaeological, 
anthropological, linguistic, folkloric, oral traditional, historical, or other relevant information or expert 
opinion.” s3005 (a) (4) 
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a prima facie case that the museum or organization does not have right of possession. 
Fourthly, the museum or organization must then rebut this and prove right of possession. 
Right of Possession is defined as. “[P]ossession obtained with the voluntary consent of an 
individual or group that had authority of alienation.”28  
Boyd remarks that burdening museums with the task of proving right of possession 
is unfair for several reasons.29 Firstly, demonstrating right of possession may be evidentially 
extremely difficult due to the passage of time and lack of documentation. Secondly, it may 
be prohibitively expensive to investigate and impossible to conclusively prove who had the 
original authority to alienate the object. Finally the requesting party has merely to make out 
a prima facie case on the preponderance of evidence, not a requirement to actually prove a 
better title.30  
Yet for sacred objects in particular, surely there could never have been a tribal 
consensus to convey them to museums and private collectors as this would have been to 
invite spiritual censure.31 Such alienation must have been by rogue individual tribal 
member. Shifting the burden to the government also quite rightly recognises that there was 
an acknowledged historical practice of excavating Indians’ graves and looting items and 
remains contained therein. This received governmental imprimatur as evidenced by the 
Surgeon General’s order of 1868 to excavate crania and funerary items for scientific study. 
Estimates of the number of Indian graves ransacked range from 100,000 to two million.32  
In the final analysis the assumption should be against lawful alienation, particularly for 
sacred objects, which should not receive a sterile property law analysis. 
Nafziger cites several weaknesses in the legislation.33 Firstly, only federally 
recognised tribes are protected. Secondly, there is no application to private land or indeed 
to privately-held property, unless the object was obtained from a museum or discovered on 
federal or tribal land after November 16 1990, as evidenced by the sale at Sotheby’s of two 
                                                          
28 S 3001 (13)  
29 Boyd, T. (1990) op.cit.,  p 930. 
 
30 ibid p930. 
 
31 Tsosie, R. (2002). "Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and Cultural Rights." 
Arizona State Law Journal 34: 299-358, 314. 
 
32 Trope, J. and Echo-Hawk, W. (1992) op.cit., p 40. 
 
33 Nafziger, J. A. (2006). "The Protection and Repatriation of Indigenous Cultural Heritage in the United 
States." Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution 14: 175-225, 219-222. 
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Hopi and one Navajo mask in May of 1991.34  Thirdly, although there have been some 
exemptions granted by NAGPRA’S Review Committee to the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requirements, these are piecemeal and unclear. Fourthly, the Review Committee’s 
findings are not binding but merely advisory. Lastly, civil penalties apply only to museums 
and not federal agencies. As for the considerable cost of conducting research, tribes may 
apply for grants from the National Park Service Tribal Preservation Program to help with 
research into the provenance of items.35 Similarly, there is a provision for grants under 
NAGPRA to assist in repatriation.36  
The National Association of Tribal Historic Preservation Officers (NATHPO) 
released a report in 2008 on governmental implementation of NAGPRA.37Government 
agencies reported lack of funding as seriously hampering compliance, with several still not 
having inventorised their sacred objects, despite the deadline being 1995. 38 Although, as 
mentioned above, tribes can apply for grants, there remains a lack of serious funding as 
tribes must sort through thousands of inventories and then enter into an exhaustive 
consultation to prove cultural affiliation and ensure repatriation. Between 1994 and 2004 
only $16.5 million was awarded for 562 federally recognised tribes. 39 Similarly, only $9.8 
million has been awarded to federal museums to assist their repatriation efforts. 40  
There are many items which have been classified as Native American but 
insufficient evidence exists to establish “cultural affiliation” with a tribe and thus ensure 
repatriation. 41 Strickland has suggested that hundreds of thousands if not millions of sacred 
objects may fall into this limbo. 42 Indeed, as of 2008, only 4629 sacred objects and items of 
cultural patrimony have so far been identified for repatriation. 43  
                                                          
34 Marsh, G. (1992). "Walking the Spirit Trail: Repatriation and Protection of Native American Remains and 
Sacred Cultural Items." Ariz. St. LJ 24: 79-133, 102. 
35 http://www.nps.gov/history/nagpra/FAQ/INDEX.HTM [Accessed 20 April 2010] 
 
36 25 U.S.C. 3008(a). 
37 Cryne, J. A. (2009). "NAGPRA Revisited: A Twenty-Year Review of Repatriation Efforts." American 
Indian Law Review 34(1): 99-122, 104. 
 
38 ibid pp106-107. 
 
39 Gunn, S. J. (2010) op.cit., pp524-525.  
40 ibid pp525-526 
 
41 ibid p507 
 
42 ibid p518 
 
43 ibid p521 
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9.2.3 Litigation and Tribal Law 
Outside the framework of repatriation legislation the refusal to return religious 
objects may give rise to a First Amendment claim to enable the performance of 
contemporary religious rites.44 However, it must be remembered that First Amendment 
claims against most museums are unavailable because they are non-governmental 
institutions.45 In such cases the return of sacred objects is dependent on goodwill or 
alternatively a reliance on principles of property law to defeat title. This naturally becomes 
more difficult the longer the period of alienation. 
Litigation for the return of cultural objects dates from 1899 when the Onondaga 
Nation failed in their lawsuit for the return of four wampum belts in the possession of a 
private New York collector that had been “sold” by a Chief.46 Subsequently, in 1909 the 
New York State Legislature passed the Wampum Law that bestowed upon themselves the 
title of “Wampum Keeper,” and “claim[ed] the right to any wampum once in the 
possession of any Iroquois, past, present or future.”47 The wampum belts were eventually 
returned to the Onondaga Nation on October 21, 1989,48 with the patronising proviso that 
the tribe display the belts to museum standards.49 
A different result may ensue when greater deference is shown to tribal law as the 
determining factor in demonstrating title. The relationship between tribal law and federal 
law was raised in the Ninth Circuit case of Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson.50 In 1976 The 
Chilkat Village Council passed the following ordinance: 
“No traditional Indian artifacts, clan, crests, or other Indian art works of any kind may 
be removed from the Chilkat Indian Village without the prior notification of and 
approval by, the Chilkat Indian Village Council.”51 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
44 Boyd, T. (1990) op.cit., p890 
 
45 ibid  p909 
 
46 Onondaga Nation v. Thacher 61 N.Y.S. 1027 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1899). 
 
47 Trope, J. (1996) op.cit., p76 
48 ibid p76 
 
49 Byrne, C. (1993). "Chilkat Indian Tribe v. Johnson and NAGPRA: Have We Finally Recognized 
Communal Property Rights in Cultural Objects." Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 8: 109-131, 
124. 
50 870 F.2d 1469 (9th.Cir 1989). 
51 Byrne, C. (1993) op.cit., p 115. 
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When several tribal members removed various cultural and religious artefacts in 
1984 for the eventual sale to a collector, the tribe sought their return. Judge Canby 
recognised the sovereign authority of the tribe to enact the ordinance and remanded the 
matter back to the tribal court on jurisdictional grounds.52   
In the context of the protection of sacred objects it is therefore crucial for tribes to 
articulate their own legal protections which, following Chilkat, can be dispositive. Although 
the acknowledged sui generic nature of tribal law can impede its applicability outside Indian 
country, and in certain circumstances within Indian country over non-Indians, it can 
influence the dominant society’s legal system as well as enhancing tribal sovereignty.53 
Defined tribal codes have the benefit of putting everyone on notice of potential alienation 
restrictions and can circumvent the perceived lack of transparency in indigenous customary 
law.54 A tribal code specifying the non-alienability of items would also be of evidential value 
for statutes such as NAGPRA.55 The actual codification and accompanying jurisprudence, 
although non-customary and perhaps assimilative, provides certainty, precedent and 
predictability.  Codification and detailed description facilitates the conferral of full faith and 
credit of tribal judgements in other forums and enforcement of judgements outside tribal 
jurisdiction.56 Furthermore, any conflict of laws is more likely to be decided in favour of 
tribal law should it be readily discernible.57      
Riley researched 351 tribal legal systems to determine which tribes protect tangible 
cultural property.58 The majority of tribes had desecration statutes protecting sacred sites, 
burial sites, tribal antiquities, sacred objects and monuments.59 One tribal example is the 
Navajo Nation's Cultural Resources Protection Act, 1988 which provides protection for any 
cultural property listed in the Navajo Register of Cultural Properties and prohibits anyone 
                                                          
52 870 F.2d 1469, 1476 (9th.Cir 1989). 
53 Riley, A. (2005) op.cit., p74. 
 
54 Conway, D. (2009). "Indigenizing Intellectual Property Law: Customary Law, Legal Pluralism, and the 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, Identity, and Resources." Texas Wesleyan Law Review 15: 207-256, 
252-253. 
 
55 Nakai, K. (2003). "When Kachinas and Coal Collide: Can Cultural Resources Law Rescue the Hopi at Black 
Mesa?" Ariz. St. LJ 35: 1283-1330, 1326. 
56 Riley, A (2005) p66 
 
57 ibid p67 
58 Riley, A. (2005) op.cit.,  p97 
 
59 ibid  p106. 
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other than enrolled members of the tribe from “visiting or investigating cultural property 
on non-public Navajo lands, destroying or removing cultural properties on Navajo lands, 
and selling or transporting cultural resources on Navajo lands.”60 There are criminal and 
civil penalties. 
The Center for the Study of American Indian Law and Policy at the University of 
Oklahoma has developed a model tribal repatriation law, the “Cultural Heritage 
Ordinance,” which may be of some use, although of  course with adaptation for inter-tribal 
variation.61 Of course any model repatriation law could be an exercise in homogeneity. Yet 
cultural distinctiveness could still be preserved by the parochial interpretation of the code 
rather than its formalistic application.62  
 
9.2.4 United States Reform 
Thus we may see how archaeological resources legislation provided little protection 
for Indian artefacts. NAGPRA was a considerable improvement and also sought to reverse 
the historical appropriation through its admittedly imperfect repatriation provisions. 
Successful implementation of NAGPRA’s objectives will depend on much greater funding. 
Furthermore, state entities remain outside its ambit.63 To obtain the return of objects from 
a non-federal entity recourse must be had to property law principles and demonstrating 
superior title, which is uncertain and expensive. Defined tribal codes on cultural property 
would import presumptions of inalienability and repatriation could thus be facilitated as an 
expression of tribal sovereignty. As for any free exercise claims, these are only available 
against governmental entities, which prevents litigation against private parties and most 
museums.  
 A more comprehensive legal framework for the return of all spiritual artefacts, 
held in both private and public hands and in federal and state possession, would redress 
such longstanding injustice. This could be either a judicially-recognised inherent right to all 
sacred objects or a statutory repatriation framework, reaching private and public parties, 
with market value compensation provisions.   
                                                          
60 Harris, S. (2005). Sacred Sites and Cultural Resource Protection: Implications for Mineral Development on, 
and off, Indian Lands. Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation: Natural Resources Development in Indian 
Country p18 
61 Trope, J. (1996) op.cit.,  p34 
 
62 ibid  p62 
63 Although several states have similar repatriation laws for example Arizona, Kansas, Nebraska and 
California the vast majority of sacred objects are in federal museums. Gunn, S. J. (2010) op.cit., p511. 
 
162 
 
9.3 Canada 
9.3.1 Archaeological Resources 
There is no federal law governing archaeological resources discovered on federal 
land.64 There is varying provincial law, a detailed treatment of which is outside the scope of 
this thesis. In general, sacred objects that are excavated can be protected by challenging 
provincial legislation on the grounds that it is assigning ownership to non-Indians. This 
goes to the “core of Indianness”65 and is ultra vires the province, or alternatively violates the 
fiduciary relationship.66 For Indian reserve lands the federal government makes no claim of 
title to items found and First Nations have in certain cases developed their own heritage 
policies and permit systems.67 Due to the limited geographical span of such reserves, in 
contrast to United States Indian land,68 these policies fail to provide comprehensive 
protection. 
As for the large scale land and self-government agreements that have been 
negotiated in recent times, the Nunavut Agreement provides that the Inuit Heritage Trust 
will grant or refuse permits and retain title to cultural objects found within Inuit-owned 
land.69 On the other hand the federal or territorial government will determine the fate of 
other objects found within Nunavut Territory and retain title but must surrender 
possession to the Inuit government if requested.70  
The Nisga'a Final Agreement provides that legal title to any Nisga'a artefact currently 
held by the Canadian Museum of Civilization and the Royal British Columbia Museum will 
                                                          
64 Kagan, T. (2005). "Recovering Aboriginal Cultural Property at Common Law: A Contextual Approach." 
University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 63: 1-43, 11. 
65 “Indians and land reserved for Indians” remain nominally a federal competency under section 91(24) of the 
British North American Act 1867. However provincial laws of general applicability can apply to Indians 
provided they do not go to the “core of Indianness” which broadly means anything which would fall within 
the Van Der Peet category of “integral to a distinctive culture.” Monahan, P. (2006)op.cit., p459 but also see s88 
of the Indian Act 
 
66Bell, C.(2008) op.cit.,  pp37-38.  
 
67 ibid p36 
68 0.5% of Canada and 3% of the United States. Morse, B. (1997) op.cit., p123. 
69 Kersey, A. (1994). "The Nunavut Agreement: A Model for Preserving Indigenous Rights." Ariz. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 11: 429-468, 461 
 
70 ibid  p462 
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be transferred if requested.71 It also recognised that the Nisga’a have control over 
archaeological sites and materials on their lands.72 Paragraph 17 requires that joint custodial 
arrangements “must respect Nisga’a laws and practices relating to Nisga’s artefacts and 
comply with federal and provincial laws of general application and the statutory mandate of 
the Canadian Museum of Civilization.” Noble notes the differences: Nisga’a laws must be 
respected while federal and provincial laws must be complied with.73  
 
9.3.2 National Repatriation Legislation 
There is no legislation obliging federal museums to inventorise and repatriate native 
items similar to NAGPRA in the United States.74 Nor is there a positive duty to notify or 
indeed provide grants to assist First Nations as there is under NAGPRA.75  
The Canadian Museum of Civilization, under the Museum Act,76 may dispose of or 
loan materials on approval by the Board of Trustees. It has also developed an informal 
repatriation policy which aims to balance the needs of First Nations and the museum’s 
responsibility to the Canadian public at large. Objects will be returned to claimants who can 
demonstrate “an undisputed historical relationship to objects that are alleged to have been 
acquired under conditions which were illegal at the time.”77 Sometimes burdensome 
conditions are placed on the repatriation of objects, in particular that there should be 
suitable museum facilities for their display. This can impose considerable costs on the 
receiving tribe, which should ideally be borne by the society that benefited from their illegal 
confiscation.78 
                                                          
71 FN51 FROM  Kagan, T. (2005) op.cit., Enacted in British Columbia as Nisga'a Final Agreement Act, S.B.C. 
1999, c. 2, and federally as the Nisga'a Final Agreement Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17, s. 1, online: Department of Justice 
Canada <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/N-23.3h., ss. 8(a), 22(a). 
 
72 McLay, E et al (2008) op.cit., p190 
73 Noble, B (2008) op.cit., p471 
74 Paterson, R.K. “Ancestral Remains in Institutional Collection: Proposals for Reform” in Bell, C. E. and 
Paterson R. K. (2008) op.cit.,p171 
75 ibid p172 
 
76 S.C.1990 c3 
 
77 Bell, C.E.  (2008) op.cit., p48 
78 Bell, C and Napoleon, V. “Introduction, Methodology, and Thematic Overview” in Bell, C. E. and 
Napoleon, V. (2008) op.cit., p70 
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First Nations have submitted claims under the generic Specific Claims Process, 
although this has the disadvantage that monetary compensation is the only remedy 
available and there is no provision for the return of cultural objects.79 Furthermore, the 
federal government is both defendant and arbiter of the validity of the claims.80  
There may actually be a greater chance of obtaining the cross-border repatriation of 
objects from the U.S. Smithsonian Institution, which developed its own policy enabling 
Canadian Indians to apply for repatriation. Several items have already been returned from 
the Smithsonian, specifically Alert Bay potlatch paraphernalia.81 Indeed, the absence of a 
specific inter-governmental agreement does not stop cross-border co-operation between 
tribes.  
The U.S. NAGPRA may also be recruited. In 2000 the Canadian Blackfoot enlisted 
the help of the American Blackfoot to receive medicine bundles recovered under 
NAGPRA and then transfer them across the border.82 Similarly, under Alberta’s Repatriation 
Act the Theodore Last Star Medicine Pipe Bundle was claimed in 2002 and then shipped 
from Canada to the Montana Blackfoot. In a ceremony to commemorate this event on 1 
July 2002 the bundle was opened for the first time since 1942.83  
 
9.3.3 Provincial Repatriation Legislation 
As for provincial repatriation legislation, protection varies with Alberta’s First 
Nations Sacred Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act84providing the strongest protection which 
mandates the repatriation of a “sacred ceremonial object...used in the practice of sacred 
ceremonial traditions” and that continue to be vital to those traditions.85 Vital, as Bell 
remarks, is a stricter approach than the standard aboriginal right threshold of “integral to a 
distinctive culture test.”86 Pursuant to the Act, the Blackfoot First Nations Sacred Ceremonial 
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80 ibid p85 
81 ibid p70 
82 Bell, C et al “Repatriation and Heritage Protection: Reflections on the Kainai Experience” in Bell, C. E. and 
Napoleon, V. (2008) op.cit.,  p222 
83 Bell, C (2008) op.cit., p372 
84 R.S.A. 2000, c. F-14. It applies to objects in the care of the Provincial Museum of Alberta or the Glenbow-
Alberta Institute 
 
85 Section  1(e) 
 
86 Bell, C (2008) op.cit.,  p41 
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Objects Repatriation Regulations87 came into force in May 2004 and requires that for any 
agreement to repatriate an object there must be an undertaking to put it back in use.88  
Similar phraseology is found in the Royal British Columbia Museum Repatriation 
policy which applies to items “of religious significance and essential to the continuation of 
ceremonial and ritual life among aboriginal people.”89 Furthermore, First Nations must 
demonstrate that “the materials are needed by a traditional aboriginal leader or leaders for 
traditional aboriginal practices”90 
The difficulty is that provincial legislation may prove to be unconstitutional as it 
applies solely to First Nations culture and could be ultra vires the province as it relates to the 
“core of Indianness.”91 In any case, federal laws over provincial property within provincial 
borders may be politically unfeasible as well as illegal.92 However, culture per se is not a 
federal competency,93 and in the absence of challenge the laws would continue to operate. 
Bell suggests the use of parallel federal legislation to endorse provincial initiatives in an 
attempt to solve the fundamental jurisdictional impasse that federal jurisdiction does not 
extend over provincial property and provincial jurisdiction does not extend over matters 
relating to the core of Indianness.94 
 
9.3.4 Litigation and Tribal Law 
Tribal law is marginalised in Canada as the Indian Act swept away virtually all 
sovereignty conferring merely a municipal level of government. Any recognition of 
aboriginal rights to self-government, as discussed in Chapter 7, is speculative and uncertain. 
Therefore, in contrast to the United States tribes, any full faith and credit or recognition of 
tribal jurisdiction is unavailable as a practical matter. Litigation must therefore rely on pure 
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property law principles and proving better title as tribal law is unavailable to create a 
presumption of inalienability. 
A major difficulty is that remedies for interference with real property centre on the 
uniqueness of the land whereas actions for personal property more often involve pecuniary 
remedies.95 Cultural property is in an anomalous position as a non-fungible chattel and the 
common law has never recognised different categories of personal property based on a 
cultural or religious hierarchy.96 Yet some legal systems do recognise a category of res sacrae, 
for example the Quebec Court of Appeals set aside sales of liturgical silver objects which 
had been alienated in violation of canon law.97  
Property law strategies could include a contractual claim to defeat title, for example 
the forced alienation by spurious “sale,” to avoid imprisonment, of potlatch paraphernalia 
could amount to “fraud, mistake, or undue influence, [and] a court might be inclined to 
void the contract.”98 Potential hurdles of limitation periods and equitable defences remain. 
As for limitation periods the Supreme Court in City of Kamloops v. Nielson and Central Trust 
Co. v. Rafuse,99 held that discoverability, which triggered the start of the limitation period, 
would only occur when facts relevant to determine that a cause of action exists were 
known. In M (K.) v.M (H.),100in a case regarding stolen artwork during World War II,  the 
plaintiff had to be reasonably aware that a cause of action did in fact exist and the court 
said that the “larger social context” could not be ignored. This could be relevant for the 
covert dispossession of indigenous cultural property. 
As a response to these rulings some provinces enacted legislation that specified 
“ultimate limitation periods” which were to be binding irrespective of any discoverability 
issues. The Ontario Limitations Act now stipulates that “a plaintiff has no claim for the 
recovery of personal property against a good faith purchaser after two years have passed, 
notwithstanding any notion of reasonable discoverability.”101Kagan suggests that the “good 
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faith” element could be targeted which refers to a purchaser who “buys something for 
value without notice of another’s claim to the property and without actual or constructive 
notice of any defects against the seller’s title.”102 This would not protect a purchaser who 
knew or ought to know of the provenance and history of the item, which may be the case 
with sacred objects. 
Paterson has analogised the theft of sacred objects to the Nazi looting of the 
Second World War. Like crimes against humanity, recovering the proceeds from such 
crimes should not be subject to limitation periods due to the gravity of crime committed 
and the nature of the property taken.103 If such a suspension of limitation periods can be 
regarded as Customary International Law then this could be applied domestically.104 In any 
case, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was enacted into Canadian Law by the 
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (the Act) which dispenses with limitation 
periods for crimes against humanity.105 Categorising the treatment of First Nations and 
their sacred objects as a crime against humanity may however be a step too far for 
Canadian jurisprudence.  
 
 
 
9.3.5 Canadian Reform 
It must be remembered that much of the federal repatriation detailed above is 
policy rather than legislation. There should be a U.S. style national repatriation statute such 
as NAGPRA, both to enhance federal policies and to bolster the uneven provincial 
legislation with its varying and difficult thresholds.106 As for the jurisdictional impasse 
regarding federal legislation over provincial property and provincial legislation pertaining to 
Indianness, simultaneous and identical legislation by each federal component could be 
enacted.   
Mclaughlin suggests alternatives to repatriation such as negotiated access, more 
culturally sensitive display and storage, replications, computer-imaging, on-line access, as 
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well as loans and shared control.107 Indeed the International Law Association (ILA) 
Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and Transfer of Cultural Material (the 
ILA Principles), adopted at the June 2006 meeting of the International Law Association in 
Toronto, endorses alternatives such as long term loans, exchanges of objects, and the 
making of copies.108 However, these compromises are unsatisfactory with their paternalistic 
and colonial emphasis on First Nations having to beg favours to gain access to their 
culture. Furthermore, for First Nations to have to continually prove concepts such as 
“vital” and “essential” in regard to sacred objects is offensive in the extreme. 
Other more general strategies include the use of the Canadian Charter and its 
freedom of religion rights. However, it is more relevant in striking down legislation rather 
than forcing positive government action thus its application in the context of repatriation is 
limited.109 Furthermore, it provides no rights against private entities, only governments.110 
An unsuccessful attempt at obtaining the return of a ceremonial face mask occurred in 
Mohawk Bands of Kahnawake, Akwesasne and Kanesatake v. Glenbow Alberta Institute.111 Mohawk 
Indians had objected to the display of the mask as part of the 1988 Calgary Winter 
Olympics presentation. The request for return was refused on the grounds that it had been 
displayed elsewhere by the Royal Ontario Museum for sixty years despite Mohawk protests 
that it was equivalent to “putting the Catholic Host in a strip show.”112 It was stressed that 
the Glenbow-Alberta Institute Act states that the museum collection is held for the benefit of 
all the people of Alberta.113 This is symptomatic of the Western doctrine that culture is a 
universal patrimony.  
Ultimately, the recognition of a right to repatriation of a particular sacred object as 
a section 35 right would be the best solution. In Canadian Law there are aboriginal rights to 
hunt, fish and hold land which should be joined by a right to possess their own spiritual 
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artefacts.114 Furthermore, section 35 aboriginal rights are enforceable against private entities 
such as museums.115Kagan has suggested that a claim for control over specific cultural 
objects could be made under the test articulated in R. v. Van der Peet.116 The Van der Peet 
requirements are that the right must be of “central significance to the aboriginal society” 
and have existed prior to contact and has been in continual, although not necessarily 
unbroken, existence since then.117 Of course demonstrating continuity for an item that has 
been in a museum is not straightforward.118 
Simpler and more comprehensive would be a generic section 35 aboriginal right to all 
sacred objects without a tortuous incremental proof, object by object. It would be assumed 
that all sacred objects were integral to culture, together with a presumption of their 
inalienability. While it could be conceivable that an indigent indigene could sell other 
cultural items, the sacred would surely not have been voluntarily and consciously 
relinquished. 
There is a further difficulty to circumvent: section 35 only conferred protection to 
rights that had not been extinguished prior to 1982. To meet the test for extinguishment 
the sovereign’s intention had to be “clear and plain.”119 Under the specific object analysis of 
Van der Peet this could potentially pose problems for individual items removed during the 
relentless assimilation of the late Nineteenth Century.  Under a generic right this is 
circumvented as it would be impossible to demonstrate that the federal government 
extinguished wholesale the right to the possession of all sacred objects.  
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9.4 Conclusion 
Indians must request that sacred items be returned to them with various thresholds 
to cross such as “needed” for contemporary spiritual practices as in NAGPRA or 
essential/vital as found in Canadian provincial legislation. Furthermore, NAGPRA and the 
Canadian provincial legislation are not binding on private parties and so the ultimate goal 
of returning such objects to Indian tribes can only ever be partially accomplished. Export 
controls merely prevent trans-border movement and do not facilitate repatriation.  
As for litigation, this is expensive and protracted and the creative avoidance of 
limitation periods and various other litigation strategies are uncertain. Analogising the theft 
of sacred objects to the proceeds of crimes against humanity may be a step too far. 
In general, Canada has repatriation policy whereas the United States has national 
legislation. Although laudable in intent NAGPRA has its disadvantages, the most 
fundamentally objectionable being that Indians must actively claim for a return of their 
culture. Comprehensive legislation and/or the recognition of inherent aboriginal rights to 
all spiritual objects would be the ideal solution. 
This chapter has demonstrated how the governments have been sporadically 
magnanimous when conferring rights of repatriation for objects held by third parties. The 
next chapter will show that when the government itself has to make a more tangible and 
significant sacrifice over its own public land then accommodation has its limits.   
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                                       CHAPTER TEN 
      
     10 Sacred Sites 
 
10.1 Introduction 
“The irony of the situation is, you can go on public lands to ski, to strip a mountain to 
mine, or leave a cyanide pool, but you can't go on public lands to pray for its continued 
fertility.”1(Vine Deloria Jnr.) 
 
Sacred sites can be places where gods reside and direct spiritual contact is obtained, 
places where creation stories originated, where ancestors were buried or where important 
tribal events occurred.2 Each site is spiritually unique and access by non-practitioners, or 
even divulging the location, may disturb the inherent sacredness.3  
Sacred sites on Indian land usually present few problems of desecration as tribal 
sovereignty, at least in the United States, mostly ensures protection, secrecy and access for 
prayer. However, due to massive land dispossession many sacred sites are now on public 
land and the Indians feel, in the words of Charlotte Black Elk, that “when we go back to 
these places we have to get permission from the government, or we have to sneak in as 
tourists to pray.”4  
The previous chapter discussed some areas in which the North American 
Governments have recognised that both the destruction and appropriation of Indian 
culture had to be corrected. This magnanimity came at little governmental cost; if at times 
there was substantial cost to third parties. Yet when the government itself is required to 
exercise restraint over the use of its own land and thus make a more tangible concession 
then accommodation becomes somewhat less enthusiastic. 
This chapter will begin with the case law in the United States up to the seminal 
Supreme Court holding in Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Association.5 In particular, there 
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will be an investigation into the extent to which a nominally independent judiciary has been 
complicit in preserving not the sanctity of religious sites, but the sacrosanct nature of 
property rights. Such a tension has always existed, but it must be remembered that the 
seizure of churches, under legal doctrines such as eminent domain, means they can be built 
elsewhere, the destruction or desecration of a unique and geographically-specific Indian 
sacred site is irretrievable.6  
The degree of federal agency accommodation will then be examined and in 
particular how this can be circumscribed by Establishment Clause strictures. Indeed, how 
framing Indian religious activities as cultural, rather than religious, can paradoxically 
circumvent this limitation. Other potentially protective strategies include the use of heritage 
and environmental legislation, which can provide an incidental protection for sacred sites. 
Similarly, a creative pleading and sympathetic interpretation of retained rights in treaties 
may prove to be of some use. Finally, there will be an appraisal of direct congressional 
intervention in conveying selected sacred sites to Indian tribes. Although this has only been 
sporadic and limited it remains perhaps the most realistic hope for any definitive 
protection. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, aboriginal land in Canada, in contrast to the United 
States, has not been subjected to any large scale treaty process or any Canadian equivalent 
to the US Indian Claims Commission. This influences the legal strategies pursued since 
Canadian tribes, as well as having other constitutional claims, also have the option of 
claiming un-extinguished aboriginal title to those areas which contain sacred sites. Since the 
passage of section 35 such rights may enjoy constitutional status and cannot therefore be 
casually extinguished. As for any aboriginal free exercise rights under section 2(a), this 
provision is of fairly recent vintage and its effectiveness in this context remains to be 
proven. Similarly, the relationship between section 2(a) and section 35 requires elucidation. 
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10.2 United States 
10.2.1 Introduction 
Tribal sovereignty is robust in the United States and any adverse development 
affecting tribal land can usually be prevented by the tribe, as the Navajo did with rock 
climbing on Shiprock, a sacred site in 2003.7 Alternatively, it could be defeated as a 
violation of the federal trust relationship, although Attakai v. U.S8 held that this applies 
only on a tribe’s own land and not on that of another tribe.9 However, it is on public land 
long since alienated by, or stolen from, the tribes that the tensions primarily occur. 
There is no discrete rubric of sacred site protection in federal land management and 
therefore any protection under historic preservation, environmental laws or endangered 
species legislation is incidental.10 It is a bitter irony that the Tennessee Valley Authority was 
temporarily prevented by injunction from building the Tellico Dam, which is the subject of 
the Sequoyah case, on the grounds that it would harm the habitat of the Snail Darter, a tiny, 
oily, inedible, and unattractive fish with the considerable good fortune to be endangered.11 
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) (1978) was a congressional 
apologia for the history of religious suppression carried out by the federal government and 
seemed to signal new respect for sacred sites. It boldly proclaimed that “henceforth it shall 
be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their 
inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the 
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access 
to sacred sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through 
ceremonials and traditional rites.”12 It provided no substantive cause of action, had no 
penalty provisions and was little more than a policy statement. 13  At most, it required 
courts to consider Indian interests14 and thus did not require “any result, only process.”15  
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10.2.2 Case Law 
In many sacred site cases Indians have been required to prove that the site was 
“central or indispensable” to their religions. In Sequoyah v Tennessee Valley Authority16  the 
Cherokees failed to stop the construction of the Tellico Dam as the potentially flooded 
area  was not regarded as the cornerstone of, or sufficiently central to, their religion.17 The 
claims were described as personal cultural preferences and not convictions shared by an 
organized group.18 There was thus no need to proceed to the compelling interest test. 
This central or indispensable threshold is greater than that required in non-Indian cases 
reviewed in Chapter 8. Indeed the centrality requirement in non-Indian cases such asYoder 
and Woody merely served to qualitatively illustrate the religious nature of a seemingly secular 
activity in order to overcome unfamiliarity to the dominant society. It was not intended to 
act as a quantitative threshold for First Amendment protection.19 In essence, such a 
requirement means that a religion must be threatened with virtual extinction before 
attracting First Amendment relief.20 
There was some comfort in the Sequoyah ruling as, crucially, it was acknowledged 
that Indians need not have a property interest in the land at issue to have a First 
Amendment right.21 As the Cherokees had successfully argued, environmental and 
endangered species claims had never been disabled by the lack of a property right. 
Indeed, as the court remarked, this was particularly poignant “in view of the history of the 
Cherokee expulsion from Southern Appalachia followed by the “Trail of Tears” to 
Oklahoma.”22  
                                                                                                                                                                          
15 McDonald, A. (2004). "Secularizing the Sacrosanct: Defining Sacred for Native American Sacred Sites 
Protection Legislation." Hofstra Law Review 33: 751-784,767. 
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17 Trope, J. (1992) op.cit., p378.  
18 Ibid at 1164-1165 
19 Boradiansky, T. (1990). "Conflicting Values: The Religious Killing of Federally Protected Wildlife." Natural 
Resources Journal 30: 709-754, 739 
 
20 Falk, D. (1989) op.cit., p557. 
 
21 Fish, J. (1990). "Sacred Site Free Exercise Claims on Government Land: The Constitutional Slighting of 
Indian Religions." New Mexico Law Review 20: 113-134, 123. 
22 At 1164 
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In Badoni v Higginson,23 Navajo gods were submerged under a lake in the pursuit of 
recreational boating with any potential accommodation of the Navajos regarded as an 
Establishment for First Amendment purposes. Yet the protection of a non-proselytising 
minority faith from government action can hardly be said to violate the Establishment 
Clause by acting as a coercive, evangelical force. The courts in Sherbert and Yoder, 
discussed in Chapter 8, managed such accommodation without inadvertently establishing 
the Seventh Day Adventist religion in South Carolina or the Amish in Wisconsin.24  
The Badoni court established a specific limitation on the accommodation of Indian 
religion on public lands: the “[e]xercise of First Amendment freedoms may not be 
asserted to deprive the public of its normal use of an area.”25 In addition, excluding 
tourists would mean creating a “government-managed religious shrine.”26The district 
court analogised the case to someone claiming that the Lincoln Memorial was a religious 
shrine and seeking to exclude visitors. Yet this ignored the fact that Rainbow Bridge had 
been a sacred site long before the United States came into being and the Navajos were 
not seeking exclusive possession.27  
In Crow v Gullett,28 the construction of viewing platforms, parking areas and trail 
roads trumped the necessary tranquillity required for Lakota prayer as tourism was a 
sufficiently compelling interest. Thus the grotesque result was that the non-Indians’ right 
as a spectator of Indian religion outweighed the right to practice it in peace. The Indians 
failed to establish “that they are being injured or penalized by their adherence to the 
tenets of their religion, or that their conduct in the course of exercising their beliefs has 
been unduly restricted.”29 Religious practices needed to be indispensable to be worthy of 
protection.30  
This case exceeded in crass insensitivity the other cases in that Bear Butte was 
being deliberately marketed as a tourist attraction for non-Indian consumption due to its 
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spiritual significance to Indians.31 Any establishment concern in accommodating the 
Indians was surely defeated by the fact that the Butte had indeed been purchased by the 
state in the knowledge that it was something of a religious shrine, and thus there was 
already an entanglement. Indeed, there was conceivably an endorsement of Indian 
religion, not qua religion and out of deference to the practitioners, but merely as a tourist 
attraction and spectacle. Indeed, the state remarked in the trial that “the Indian religious 
tradition helps define the value and importance of Bear Butte to this region.”32  
It was at this point in a dismal catalogue of the destruction of Indian religious 
practice at sacred sites that the Supreme Court made its definitive statement on the 
relationship between Indian free exercise of religion and the government’s property rights 
in Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Association.33 
 
10.2.2.1 Lyng 
This case concerned the building of a logging road on public land through an area 
of California considered sacred by various Indian tribes. The Supreme Court, in an 
opinion written by Justice O’Connor, determined that there was no free exercise 
infringement as there was no governmental coercion.34 She admitted that the threat to the 
Indian religion was extremely grave yet seemed to take an inviolate and absolute view of 
the government’s property rights to use its land as it wished:  “whatever rights the Indians 
may have to the use of the area, . . . those rights do not divest the Government of its right 
to use what is, after all, its land.”35 O’Connor did remark that “a law [actually] forbidding 
the Indian respondents from visiting the area would raise a different set of constitutional 
questions.”36 There was no such barrier to physical access, yet when the government 
destroyed the tranquillity needed for spiritual access the First Amendment was not 
implicated.  
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In his dissent Justice Brennan questioned Justice O’Connor’s comparison to Roy,37 
in which the Court had remarked that the “Free Exercise clause cannot be understood to 
require the Government to conduct its own affairs in ways that comport with the religious 
beliefs of particular citizens.”38  He rejected the characterisation of the matter as being 
merely an internal affair of the government as the land use decision had “substantial 
external effects that government decisions concerning office furniture and information 
storage obviously will not, and they [should therefore be] correspondingly subject to public 
scrutiny and public challenge.”39 Indeed, as Brown remarks, “Lyng involved 5000 tribal 
members plus various environmental organizations, not one citizen (Roy) challenging a 
rational federal scheme of social security.”40 Ironically, in Roy, O’Connor herself had 
strenuously resisted the call for a wider abandonment of the compelling interest test for 
government behaviour indirectly burdensome to religion.41  
As a result of Lyng, once the conduct has been categorised as an internal 
governmental matter, the sole inquiry the court makes is whether the government is 
directly coercing or imposing a penalty on a religious practice. It is a purposive rather than 
effects-based inquiry. This excessive formalism, as Falk describes it, relies on form rather 
than substance, intent rather than effect.42 
As Justice Brennan commented: “The incongruous result is that when the 
government forces an individual or group to choose between their beliefs and a benefit, it 
is an impermissible burden, yet when the government prevents a practice and entirely 
eliminates the element of choice, no burden exists...”43 He remarked that the Indian tribes 
faced a destruction far greater and more immediate than the Amish had faced in Yoder.44 
Furthermore, the “respondents here do not even have the option, however unattractive it 
                                                          
 
37 Please see Chapter 8 
 
38 Roy at 699 
39 485 U.S. at 470-71. 
 
40 Brown, B. E. (1999) op.cit.,  p156 
41 ibid p159 
42 Falk, D. (1989) op.cit.,  p546. 
43 Loesch, M. (1993) op.cit.,  p 355 
44 Brown, B. E. (1999) op.cit.,  p165 
178 
 
might be, of migrating to more hospitable locales; the site-specific nature of their belief 
system renders it non-transportable.”45 
The sacred site was eventually saved when Congress passed protective 
legislation in 1990 adding the area to Siskiyou Wilderness.46 Yet this was protection 
of wilderness, not Indian religion,47and does not alter the adverse precedent. 
 
10.2.2.2 Post Lyng Case Law 
Although the Lyng sacred site was eventually saved by environmental legislation, in 
general, Indian attempts simultaneously to invoke environmental concerns have been 
unsuccessful. For example, in 1996 they failed to prevent the construction of an 
observatory on the top of Mount Graham, an Apache sacred site,48 when they 
unfortunately allied with conservationists and their Red Squirrel crusade. Eventually, after 
protracted litigation and expensive lobbying, Congress exempted the telescope project 
from the Endangered Species Act and so the Red Squirrel, and incidentally the sacred mount, 
were doomed. University of Arizona astronomers were said to have beaten a Red Squirrel 
piñata to pulp in celebration.49 
Again, parallel environmental concerns were incidentally raised to no avail in Navajo 
Nation v United States Forest Service.50 The Court confirmed that a ski resort extension, using 
treated sewage effluent to make artificial snow on the most sacred Navajo mountain, did 
not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act51 as it “does not place a substantial burden on 
their exercise of religion by forcing them to act contrary to their religion under the threat of 
a legal penalty or choose between their religion and the receipt of a government benefit.”52 
The dissent remarked, “[A] court would surely hold that the government had imposed a 
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‘substantial burden’ on the ‘exercise of religion’ if it purchased by eminent domain every 
Catholic Church in the country.”53 Yet on this analysis the government would not be 
coercing Catholics to act contrary to their beliefs under the threat of sanctions nor would 
there be the conditioning of a government benefit.54  
To conclude, according to Lyng and progeny, it is only government activity on 
public land which penalizes or coerces religion that violates the First Amendment.55  
 
10.2.3 Executive Accommodation 
Lyng determined the minimum protection for Indian sacred sites provided by the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Yet government agencies can give greater 
protection as long as there is no violation of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. Thus executive accommodation is about what is constitutionally permissible, 
whereas the Lyng case was about what was constitutionally required.56 
 
10.2.3.1 Executive Order 13007 
Executive Order 13007 directed “executive branch agencies to (1) accommodate access to 
and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian religious practitioners and (2) avoid 
adversely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred sites.”57 The language was hardly 
mandatory with phrases such as “to the extent practicable, permitted by law, and not 
clearly inconsistent with essential agency functions” and “[w]here appropriate, agencies 
shall maintain the confidentiality of sacred sites.” 
Ultimately, Executive Order 13007, like AIRFA, does not create rights of action, is 
dependent on administrative good will, and does not actually prevent administrative agencies 
from adversely affecting sacred sites.58 
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10.2.3.2 Case Law on Executive Accommodation 
In Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt59 a National Park Service Management 
Plan, which included a voluntary ban on rock climbing at the Indian sacred site of Devils 
Tower, was challenged on the grounds that it violated the Establishment Clause by 
favouring Indian religion. The court dismissed the challenge and found that the potential 
threat of a mandatory climbing ban was hypothetical and not an injury-in-fact.60 As for any 
establishment concerns, such accommodation could hardly be coercive by forcing rock 
climbers to either participate or encouraging a feeling of alienation that they are not full 
members of the Sioux religious community.61 
In 2004 the Tenth Circuit upheld a Park Service Management Plan requesting 
similar voluntary compliance on the part of tourists who were asked to refrain from 
walking beneath a sacred Navajo natural arch.62 These examples illustrate that agencies 
may, but are not required to, accommodate sacred sites.63  
Again, a recent Forest Service ban on all rock climbing at Cave Rock, a sacred site 
of the Washoe Indians, but the permitting of non-invasive recreational activity such as 
boating fishing and picnicking, was held not to violate the Establishment Clause.64 
Significantly, the rock climbing involved permanent bolts and the construction of a 
masonry floor within the cave. Applying the Lemon Test, (discussed in Chapter 8) the 
secular purpose was satisfied by the preservation of a cultural historic area. As for the 
second and third prongs, advancing religion or excessive entanglement, the plan passed 
constitutional muster as it did not impose a total ban on recreational activity, which was the 
Washoe preferred option, nor did it attempt the imposition of a Washoe orthodoxy.65  
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When cries of Establishment Clause violations by excessive entanglement are raised 
it must be remembered that federal agencies are already heavily entangled with religion, 
particularly Christianity. Indeed, the National Park Service (NPS) owns and leases churches 
and other religious properties on government lands imposing restrictions on interference 
with services. Additionally, twice a year at Tumacacori National Historic Park in Arizona, 
the Park Service waives park fees and even sponsors a Catholic mass re-enacting 18th 
century religious traditions.66 The NPS also manages the church in which Martin Luther 
King was a pastor, closing it periodically for religious services,67 and furthermore endorses 
a non-profit Christian proselytisation mission in 35 national parks.68 Even the Pope was 
allowed to conduct a mass on the National Mall in Washington DC.69  Thus, as Carpenter 
reminds us, Christians have been permitted to exclude the public at least temporarily.70 As 
for the solemn duty to climb rocks this is banned on Mount Rushmore which incidentally 
is closed to visitors on Christmas Day.71 The disappointed tourist must also find other 
entertainment during religious services at Arlington Cemetery.72 
 
10.2.4 Culture or Religion 
In some sacred sites cases the courts have categorised the Indian activity as cultural, 
which has two important implications. Firstly, it appropriates the ability of Indians to self-
define their own culture. Secondly, it should circumvent the Establishment Clause as the 
federal government cannot violate the Constitution by establishing a culture. Indeed, it 
could be claimed that the federal government has a positive mandate, via the Trust 
Relationship, to support Indian culture. Of course any privileging of Indian culture, by 
means of the Trust Relationship, is theoretically circumscribed by the concept of Equal 
Protection.73 However, following Morton v Mancari, this is merely subject to rational basis 
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review. It may therefore be beneficial for the Indian litigant himself to plead that the 
activity is cultural,74 or paradoxically collaborate with a judiciary that regards it as little more 
than pagan superstition.75  
 
10.2.5 The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 2000 
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 2000, although introduced to 
enable religious land use to, in certain circumstances, circumvent zoning laws, held out 
some promise for sacred sites. It mandated the compelling interest test for land use that 
restricts religious practice. However, it is not applicable to land use decisions on public 
land,76 and only applies when the plaintiffs have a property interest in the religious 
institution or place,77 such as “an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other 
property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest”78 
In Northern Cheyenne v. Martinez79 an Indian nation successfully asserted a property interest 
sufficient to trigger application of RLUIPA by virtue of owning small parcels of land 
adjacent to Bear Butte, and furthermore all had a right of access to the Butte which also 
constituted a sufficient property interest.80  
In Cutter v Wilkinson81 the Supreme Court recently held that the institutionalized 
portions of the act, which have similar provisions (Section 3), were constitutional but 
made no comment on the land use provisions.82 If the land use provisions of RLUIPA are 
ultimately determined to be constitutional it means that Congress can specifically, but not 
                                                          
74 ibid  p497 
75 Sewell, E. (1984). "The American Indian Religious Freedom Act." Arizona Law Review 25: 429-472, 463. 
 
76 See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1077 (2008).“ RLUIPA applies only to government land 
use regulations of private land—such as zoning laws—not to the government's management of its own land.”   
FN147 FROM Key, J. (2010). "This Land is My Land: The Tension Between Federal Use of Public Lands 
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act." AFL Rev. 65: 51-106. 
 
77 Carpenter, K. (2006) op.cit., p996. 
 
78 42 U.S.C. s 2000cc-5(5). 
 
79 Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, N. Cheyenne Tribe v. 
Martinez, No. Civ. 03-5019 (D.S.D.W.D. May 23, 2003). 
80 The case concerned a challenge to a shooting range on private land which would have had detrimental 
effects on Indian worship at Bear Butte, a state park purchased from private owners in 1961. Leach, J. (2005). 
"A Shooting Range at Bear Butte: Reconciliation or Racism." SDL Rev. 50: 244-292, 279 
 
81 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005). 
82 Brucker, S. (2008) op.cit.,  p280. 
183 
 
generally, enact remedial legislation.83 In attempting to satisfy the congruence and 
proportionality requirement of Boerne the legislative history listed several examples of land 
use regulations and their effect on religion.84 This was an attempt to avoid the 
disproportionality objection raised in Boerne to congressional remedial enforcement, by 
way of the RFRA, of the Fourteenth Amendment by section 5.85 For the RLUIPA, 
Congress drew on a study by Professor W. Cole Durham of Brigham Young University 
which found that minority religions, although representing only 9% of the population, 
were involved in over 49% of cases over the right to use religious buildings at a local site 
and over 33% of cases that sought approval of accessory uses. He argued that this 
demonstrated that minority religions were overrepresented in zoning disputes.86  
The difficulty, as discussed in Chapter 8 in the context of RFRA, is that applying 
Lyng may mean that a “substantial burden” is never found to trigger application of the 
statutes.87 This would mean that RLUIPA merely changed the definition of the exercise of 
religion88 not the test of a substantial burden.89  
 
10.2.6 Establishing a Property Right 
The diverse property interests that were recognised in RLUIPA as triggering the 
Act’s protection were “an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property 
interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest”90 There 
are several advantages of a property rights framework: Firstly, they run with the land thus 
negating fears of a lack of perpetuity.91 Secondly, they can protect a greater range of 
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interests than the Constitution and its free exercise protection.92 Thirdly, property-based 
claims can be pleaded alongside constitutional or treaty claims as there is no conflict and 
often no significantly different remedy sought.93 Lastly, property rights can compel agency 
action.94  
The framing of claims within a property rights paradigm runs the risk of diluting 
the free exercise component. However, as Worthen remarks, relying purely on the First 
Amendment has had little success anyway.95 Two examples, easements and adverse 
possession may be relevant in the context of sacred sites. 
 
10.2.6.1 Easements and Adverse Possession 
There is no federal law establishing easements.96 Prescriptive easements are 
established under state law by demonstrating that the “claimant’s use of the property was 
open, notorious, exclusive, adverse or under claim of right, continuous and uninterrupted 
for the statutory period.”97 Because state-imposed statutory periods for such establishment 
do not run against the federal government there may be a difficulty for federal public 
land.98 Furthermore, a defence of “permissive use” may be raised as evidenced by 
government recognition of the importance of the use of public land by Native Americans 
for cultural (but of course not necessarily religious) practices.99 
More promising is the use of prescriptive easements against private land, for 
example the Zuni successfully gained access rights to a path across private land that they 
had been reportedly using since 1540. The court found that their use was “actual, open 
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and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted.”100 The statutory time period of 10 years 
was easily evidenced by the four yearly pilgrimage documented since 1924.101 
Easements are not absolute: the owner in certain circumstances may change the 
servient parcel which for a sacred site would be disastrous. Furthermore, only individuals 
may obtain easements, which is problematic when tribes seek to establish a right.102 Should 
an easement be found then a declaratory judgement as to continued use or other equitable 
remedy should be requested; monetary damages for infringement would of course be 
inappropriate.103However, the threat of money damages could be used as leverage to exact 
other more relevant concessions.104 
Claims for adverse possession are also not generally available against a government. 
Yet some state lands not reserved for public use may be so acquired as well as sub-state 
government owned land.105 The denial of adverse possession was held in one case as 
“inconsistent with the federal posture of trust and vigorous protection of Indian rights.”106  
The bitter irony is that “[as] American law stands today, organized churches can 
acquire title through adverse possession by praying on a site for less than a lifetime, while 
Indians’ prayers do not make out title even after a millennium.”107 
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10.2.7 Historic Preservation and Environmental Legislation 
Two potential sources of sacred site protection, albeit incidental, are the National 
Historic Preservation Act (1966)(NHPA)108 and the National Environmental Policy Act 
(1969)(NEPA).109 The NHPA has been described as a procedural statute or a “stop, look 
and listen” statute.110 It authorised the Secretary of the Interior to “maintain a register of 
structures, areas and districts considered significant in American history, architecture, 
archaeology, engineering and culture.”111 However, it was the first preservation law to 
require Native American involvement,112 as the 1992 amendment gave tribes the option of 
taking over the role of Preservation Officer for sites within tribal lands and gave them the 
statutory right to be consulted in the section 106 consultation process, should a federal 
undertaking potentially affect a historic property.113 The 1992 amendments also specifically 
added “properties of traditional religious and cultural importance” to Native American 
tribes as types of properties eligible for listing.114 
The parameters of the duty of agency consultation vary from mere notice to actual 
consent. In Attakai v United States the court remarked that the NHPA regulations “clearly 
require that an Indian Tribe participate as a consulting party and that it must concur in any 
agreement regarding undertakings which affect its lands.”115   
Bluemel criticises the act as ineffective as there is no private right of action to 
prevent the destruction of sacred sites on public land.116 It is merely a procedural statute 
requiring consultation, although consent if on Indian lands.117 Injunctive relief is available 
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but only for failure to pursue the required procedures, not for a substantive destruction. 
Importantly, it did contain a special mandate to keep information about traditional cultural 
properties confidential if such disclosure could result in an “invasion of privacy,” “risk 
harm to the historic property”, or “impede the use of a traditional religious site.”118 
Although environmental concerns were incidentally pleaded in the Mount Graham 
and Navajo Nation cases above, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) provides an 
explicit framework for considering Indian concerns. Under NEPA consultation is with 
tribal leaders, in contrast to NHPA when it is with tribal and religious leaders.119 
Unfortunately, it is also a largely procedural statute with the major requirement being to 
produce an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and/or Environmental Assessment. 
Failure to complete an EIS when renewing geothermal leases caused them to be set aside in 
Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service.120 Yet there is no substantive protection of Indian 
religion as religion and only procedural protection for the environment.  
National antiquities laws, such as NHPA and the ARPA (discussed in Chapter 9), 
recognise the importance of secrecy for Indian sacred sites by permitting agencies to refuse 
to disclose the “location or character” of historical or archaeological sites whenever there is 
a “substantial risk of harm, theft, or destruction.”121 For environmental legislation there is 
no specific mandate but rather a reliance on generic administrative procedure.122 In 
administrative proceedings on the adverse impact of a hydroelectric project on the 
Kootenai religion, the Judge refused a blanket protective order over details of Kootenai 
rituals, vision quests, and the names and functions of spiritual entities but ruled that any 
such materials should remain confidential.123 In effect, the final decision was split into two 
parts, one for full distribution and the other containing the sensitive information for 
restricted distribution.124 However, as Barsh remarks, judges are often reluctant to 
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compromise Sixth Amendment requirements of a public tribunal.125 Indeed the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) creates a judicially enforceable public right to agency records in 
particular the Environmental Impact Assessment produced pursuant to NEPA.126 
Furthermore, since the decision in Klamath, which held that the Trust Relationship was not 
sufficient to exempt information from FOIA,127 there is no automatic protection from the 
disclosure provisions of the FOIA.128 
 
10.2.8 Treaty Rights 
The reserved rights doctrine may be useful to establish a continuing right of 
worship, or religious usufruct, on ceded lands in the same way that it has been employed 
to establish water, fishing and hunting rights.129 These implied rights were to accord with 
Indians’ reasonable expectations at the signing of the treaty. Similarly, a tribe could argue 
that only the exclusive right of occupation of the ceded land was relinquished by treaty, 
not the lesser right of visitation.130 It could also be argued that compensation from the 
Indian Claims Commission was merely for economic uses of the land and was not 
intended to, and indeed could not, compensate for spiritual use.131  
Should a retained treaty right be demonstrated then this would circumvent First 
Amendment and Equal Protection analysis. Furthermore the Indian Canons of 
Construction, which state that treaties should be liberally read in favour of the Indians 
with ambiguities resolved in their favour, could be deployed. Thus it may not be necessary 
or indeed possible to find the words “religious” or “sacred” in treaties.132  
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In all 60 Indian treaties contained reserved rights on public land.133 The argument 
goes that the reservation of hunting and fishing rights would have included an implicit right 
to travel, camp and even pray in the ceded grounds.134 Yet, as Carpenter remarks, any 
implication of retained religious rights for those treaties that were signed during the period 
of suppression in the Nineteenth Century is problematic.135 When the federal government 
had embarked on a relentless criminalisation and assimilation programme an implied and 
retained right to continue with such “heathenism” seems hardly plausible.   
 
10.2.9 Congressional Land Grants 
Much of the above is vulnerable to the caprice of an unsympathetic Executive and 
Judiciary, requires an imaginative interpretation of treaty rights, or involves a circuitous 
recruitment of heritage and environmental protection law. Direct congressional legislative 
intervention circumvents these difficulties. One example in 1970 was legislation that gave 
trust title to approximately 48,000 acres of federal land in New Mexico. This had been 
taken from the Taos Indians in 1906 by presidential order and without the payment of any 
compensation. Although the Taos Indians had been granted a fifty year special use permit 
in 1933 they wanted a more permanent and exclusive arrangement, in particular at Blue 
Lake, one of their more sacred shrines. This would enable non-Indian use to be restricted 
and give more privacy to their religious practices.136 Even President Reagan signed the 
“Zuni Heaven” bill,137 which protected a Zuni sacred place.138 This expanded the Zuni land 
base to include an area named Kolhu/wala:wa, which is also called Zuni Heaven or Kachina 
Village.139 Other legislative interventions include protection of the El Malpais monument in 
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1987 and the Timbisha Shoshone Homeland Act in 2000, which purchased strips of land that 
were part of tribal ancestral homeland.140  
This case by case congressional intervention is a more definitive outcome than 
relying on judicial whim or agency accommodation. In addition, any repatriation of 
ancestral lands can be justified more easily if the federal government had appropriated the 
land for a specific purpose which has now been fulfilled. For example in 2000, the 
Department of the Army transferred part of the land base of the former Fort Wingate 
Army Depot in New Mexico to the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the use of the Navajo and 
Zuni Tribes.141  
 
10.2.10 Sacred Site Statute 
These specific congressional interventions are welcome, if sporadic, whereas a 
generic sacred site statute would be a more comprehensive solution.   Such a statute should 
include a wide-ranging definition of the adverse effects to the site that are prohibited, in the 
absence of a compelling interest, such as “any action that would, directly or indirectly, 
desecrate, destroy, disturb, inhibit, interfere, infringe upon, substantially alter or burden a 
Native American sacred site or the free exercise of traditional religious and cultural 
activities that are conducted at a sacred site.”142 “Religious and cultural” are included to 
avoid any characterisation dilemma and pre-empt establishment concerns, but a statute 
preserving the status quo of uninhabited federal land would hardly be an excessive 
entanglement.143 In any case, no court as yet, that has considered the merits of a violation 
of the Establishment Clause by governmental accommodation of sacred sites, has held 
such action unconstitutional.144  
Alternatively, a sacred site statute need not explicitly create a denominational 
preference. The preference may simply be to site-specific religions, Indian or non-Indian. 
The fact that non-Indian religions do not have such an intimate relationship with the land 
in North America is beside the point. As Winslow remarks, a law exempting religions from 
                                                          
140 Zellmer, S. (2002) op.cit., p456. 
 
141 Tsosie, R. (2003) op.cit.,  p306. 
142  Lee, S. (2000) op.cit.,  p299 
143 Johnston, D. (2001) op.cit., p451. 
144 Suagee, D. and Trope, J. (2008)  op.cit., p5 
 
191 
 
gender discrimination would favour the Catholic Church, but if there were no explicit 
mention of a denomination it would pass muster.145   
Both public and private land could be included in access provisions. There would 
be a specific confidentiality provision and a facility for a temporary closure to non-
practitioners, but this would need to be narrowly drawn up both geographically and 
temporally.146 There should also be a criminal penalty for any intentional damage to a site 
and for releasing confidential information.147Access by non-Indians cannot be completely 
denied. However any lack of confidentiality could provoke what Professor Nash calls the 
“irony of victory” in which the revelation of the site encourages desacralisation by tourists 
and backpackers.148 
 
10.2.11 Summary 
Lyng was a seminal case in that the Court definitively held that any accommodation 
of Indian use of federal public land was not required by the Free Exercise Clause. Agency 
accommodation is permitted provided there is no violation of the Establishment Clause. 
When federal property rights, mining interests or engineering projects are at stake or even 
the sacred right to tourism is infringed, the nation’s first residents must usually yield. The 
greater the non-Indian interest at stake the less chance of any meaningful accommodation 
of aboriginal spirituality. Magnanimity must above all be cost-effective.  
Other circuitous uses of treaty rights and property rights are uncertain and require 
litigation to establish which is expensive and protracted. Direct congressional intervention 
to delineate and protect sacred sites has been sporadically successful, but is a more 
permanent solution which is less susceptible to governmental whim. A sacred site statute, 
carefully drafted to circumvent establishment concerns and circumscribe the number of 
sites, would be an attainable objective.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
145 Winslow, A. (1996) op.cit., p1334 
 
146 Neal-Post, J. (1994). "Sacred Sites and Federal Land Management: An Analysis of the Proposed Native 
American Free Exercise of Religion Act of 1993." Natural Resources Journal 34: 443-478, 461 
147 Lee, S. (2000) op.cit.,  p305 
 
148 Ward, R. (1992) op.cit.,  p841 
 
192 
 
10.3 Canada 
10.3.1 Introduction 
The Indian Act sets aside reserves for Indian bands and, while the Crown retains 
legal title and the Act circumscribes activities that can be carried out therein, sacred sites 
within their boundaries have been left largely within band control.149 This has not been 
based on any serious recognition of tribal sovereignty but perhaps due to the fact that 
reserves in Canada account for only 0.5% of the land mass compared to 3% for 
reservations in the United States.150 
For sacred sites outside reserves certain legislation provides for consultation. For 
example the British Columbia Heritage Conservation Act section 13(4)151 requires the minister, 
before making any decisions, to provide “an opportunity for consultation with the First 
Nations whose heritage sites or objects would be affected.”152 Similarly, section 12(1) of the 
Canada National Parks Act instructs the Minister to “where applicable provide opportunities 
for public participation at the national, regional and local levels including participation by 
aboriginal organizations ...”153 Such hortatory provisions do not impose a requirement of 
First Nations consent and so their effectiveness as a protection for sacred sites on public 
land is limited.  
There are several other reasons for the vulnerable state of sacred sites on public 
land. Firstly, there has been no Indian-specific free exercise legislation such as the US 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act 1978 which, although flawed, did at least articulate a 
certain empathy. Secondly, there have been no executive orders entreating, if not 
mandating, executive agencies to protect sacred sites. Thirdly, there is a much less vigorous 
and mature general free exercise jurisprudence in Canada that can be invoked. Finally, 
treaty-reserved rights have been articulated to a lesser extent than in the United States. 
As to the final point, there is a general lack of clearly defined and delineated 
aboriginal rights in Canada. In particular, as discussed in Chapter 7, much uncertainty 
remains because of the latent acknowledgement of the potential existence of continuing 
aboriginal title over wide areas of Canada due to the lack of wholesale title extinguishment 
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by treaty that was pursued in the United States. Such uncertainty could paradoxically be an 
advantage: a claim for putative aboriginal title over sacred sites cannot be peremptorily 
dismissed particularly since section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 constitutionalised such 
a right. Such a claim may prompt interim relief due to such uncertainty which, due to the 
protracted enquiry required to prove or disprove such title, is certainly not a matter suitable 
for summary disposal. It is such interim relief that presently provides the best strategies for 
protecting sacred sites.  
 
10.3.2 Interlocutory Injunctions 
Interlocutory injunctions have been employed to protect aboriginal rights from a 
variety of threats. They have been granted to prevent forestry operations on Crown 
Land,154 mineral exploration,155 golf course construction,156 restrain pesticide spraying157 and 
the construction of a railway line.158 Indeed as Sweeney remarks, the issue of an 
interlocutory injunction led to the negotiation of the James Bay and Northern Quebec 
Agreement.159  
There are several difficulties in granting such injunctions based on a putative 
aboriginal title or aboriginal right of undisturbed access to a sacred site.160 Firstly, as the 
injunction is likely to remain in place for some time, due to the evidential complexity in 
preparing for trial, there may be considerable judicial reluctance. Indeed the aboriginal 
claim may be so unclear and inchoate at this stage that even granting interlocutory relief 
may be premature. Secondly, the other party may be acting on the basis of statutory rights 
and a suspension of activity may result in hardship. Thirdly, a large industry may be 
suspended raising public interest concerns. Fourthly, laches or unreasonable delay may be 
raised against the aboriginal claim. Lastly, straitened finances of the aboriginal claimants 
                                                          
154 MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin (1985) 2 C.N.L.R. 28 (C.A.), (' Meares Island case'); Hunt v. Halcan Log Services 
Ltd. (1986) 4 C.N.L.R. 63 (S.C.) (involving both Aboriginal title and treaty rights); Westar Timber Ltd. v. Ryan 
(1989) B.C.L.R. (2d) 352 (C.A.) 
155 Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development [1979] 1 F.C. 487; (1978) 87 D.L.R. 
(3d) 342, 7 C.E.L.R. 75 (F.C. TD.). 
 
156 Jules v. Harper Ranch Ltd. [1989] 3 C.N.L.R. 67 (B.C. S.C.),  
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may prevent the paying of monetary damages at an eventual trial, thus discouraging 
interlocutory relief.161 
Lord Wilberforce listed the common law criteria for granting an interlocutory 
injunction in Hoffman La Roche v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975].162 A three step 
inquiry is made.  Firstly, there must be a serious issue to be tried. Secondly, there must be a 
likelihood that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of relief. Lastly, the 
balance of convenience must favour the relief requested.163 
As for the serious issue test, the British Columbia Court of Appeals in MacMillan 
Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin remarked that “a great amount of factual evidence will have to be 
heard and considered, opinion evidence of those knowledgeable in these matters will have 
to be assembled and related to the factual evidence and there will have to be a meticulous 
study of the law.”164 The complex issues thus favoured the granting of interlocutory relief 
as such a determination could not be made at an early stage and must await determination 
at a full trial.  
To prove irreparable harm it must be demonstrated that the nature of the harm is 
such that it cannot be adequately remedied by eventual monetary damages. In the case of 
spiritual sites an analogy can be made with specific performance in real estate transactions 
in which the uniqueness of each parcel is relevant. Monetary damages would clearly be 
inappropriate and insufficient.165  
The balance of convenience test is especially problematic when different types of 
irreparable harm will ensue, which is the typical scenario in aboriginal title cases. For non-
Indian interests irretrievable damage to a going concern could be caused by delay.166 This 
was rejected in the logging case of MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin: “If an injunction 
prevents MacMillan Bloedel from logging pending trial and it is decided that MacMillan 
Bloedel has the right to log, the timber will still be there”167 Yet other cases may reach 
another conclusion should a “window of opportunity” close on private finance or a spike 
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in natural resource prices demands an urgent development.168 Ultimately, the status quo 
may be preserved in finely balanced cases, which underscores the importance of an early 
application before any major expenditure or significant work has been completed. Thus in 
Macmillan the injunction was granted, yet in other cases, when logging had already 
commenced, it was not.169  
The public interest can influence the balance of convenience test with the spectre 
of a floodgates scenario and the consequent paralysis of all commercial activity.170 Public 
interest arguments have been successful in building new roads where existing ones were 
unsafe171 and the preservation of employment.172 By contrast, double-tracking a railway to 
increase capacity was not regarded as a serious enough public interest to prevent an 
injunction.173 In the Westar case, the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en, who were the same 
plaintiffs in the Delgamuukw case described in Chapter 7,  asserted both a claim of title and 
jurisdiction over their traditional territories when requesting an injunction to stop logging 
activities. The decision was a partial victory as an injunction was granted over logging 
operations on part of the territory.174 The court recognised that certain specific and 
localized sites with unique qualities should be protected, yet the public interest and 
economic consequences did not support a total and widespread injunction.175 
The question of the plaintiff being in a position to make an undertaking to pay any 
subsequent damages was highlighted by Lord Diplock in American Cynamid Co. v. Ethicon 
Ltd.: “If damages in the measure recoverable under such an undertaking would be an 
adequate remedy and the plaintiff would be in a financial position to pay them, there would be no  
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reason on this ground to refuse an interlocutory injunction”176However, the  inability to 
make such an undertaking will not preclude an injunction yet will be weighed in the 
balance of convenience.  In Ominayak v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd177 and Hamlet of Baker 
Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development178 the plaintiffs conceded they were 
not in a financial position to provide such an undertaking, yet this was only regarded as 
one factor to be taken into account.  In MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v. Mullin179 and Pasco v. 
Canadian National Railway Company180no undertaking was actually requested. By contrast, in 
Tlowitsis Nation v. MacMillan Bloedel Ltd.181the plaintiffs’ ability to pay subsequent damages 
was a factor in the refusal of an injunction. 
As an injunction is an equitable remedy laches may be pleaded by the defendants 
which of course emphasises the importance of acting promptly. In the Meares Island case 
Seaton J.A. remarked: “The Indians have pressed their land claims in various ways for 
generations. The claims have not been dealt with and found invalid. They have not been 
dealt with at all. Meanwhile, the logger continues his steady march and the Indians see 
themselves retreating into a smaller and smaller area.”182 Injunctions can have long-lasting 
effects, the one relating to Meares Island is still in effect.183 However in the Westar case the 
injunction was removed on 31 March 1995.184 
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10.3.3 Judicial Review and the Duty to Consult 
In addition to the interlocutory injunction strategy discussed above, a further 
strategy based on judicial review also asks a court to give effect to an asserted but un-
established aboriginal right.185 Yet what Ross calls the Haida strategy asks the court for a 
declaration that their rights already have a measure of legal effect, rather than that they have 
such potential at a later trial.186 The doctrine stems from two decisions issued by the 
Supreme Court of Canada on 18 November 2004 (Taku River and Haida Nation)187 
confirming that un-established aboriginal title and rights already trigger the Crown’s 
constitutional duties of consultation and possibly accommodation.188  
The Taku River case concerned a challenge to a decision by the Minister of Energy, 
Mines and Petroleum Resources and the Minister of Environment, Land and Parks to 
reopen a copper mine and construct a service road 160km long in the heartland of the 
Tlingit people’s ancestral land, thus threatening their economic sustainability.189 The court 
doubted that a duty of consultation only applied to those rights that had been established 
in the courts by litigation. If so, then the recognition and affirmation of constitutional 
rights in section 35 would be limited to say the least. Thus some legal effect must attach to 
such putative rights prior to their definitive recognition at trial.190 
The actual Haida case also concerned the Crown’s sanctioning of resource 
exploitation, this time timber. Like the Taku case this occurred after the Supreme Court’s 
Delgamuukw decision.191 The Haida successfully challenged a minister’s decision to grant 
logging licenses on the grounds that they had a presumed aboriginal title which, until 
rebutted, remained an encumbrance on the land within the meaning of section 35 of the 
Forest Act,192 and also that it existed as an equitable encumbrance triggering the Crown’s 
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fiduciary duty. Furthermore, they successfully showed that the minister had failed to 
consult with the Haida nation in good faith before granting the licence.193 
To summarise this doctrine, there is a duty on the Crown, both at the federal and 
provincial level, to consult and possibly even accommodate aboriginal rights that are 
asserted but only if the Crown has notice either from First Nations claims or having been 
established by the courts.194  
 
10.3.4 Section 35 and Section 2(a) of the Constitution Act 1982 
In addition to putative section 35 aboriginal rights discussed above there may also 
be a section 2(a) freedom of religion claim. There can be confusion as to which provision 
provides the best protection for Canadian Indian religious rights. Switlo argues that section 
35 and the Sparrow framework for permissible infringements195 is less protective than the 
section 2(a) protections which can only be infringed in extremely rare circumstances such 
as the safety of the person.196 As mentioned in Chapter 7, section 25 of the Charter states 
that the rights contained within the Charter (including 2(a)) do not interfere with aboriginal 
rights guaranteed under section 35 thus the more advantageous right can be adopted. 
Although the criteria required to justify an infringement may be more demanding for 
section 2(a) it must be remembered that section 35 rights may ultimately be more 
protective as they also bind private parties, whereas section 2(a) only applies to 
governments. Furthermore, section 2 rights are vulnerable to a section 33 legislative 
override.197 
There has been very little pleading on section 2(a) grounds due perhaps to the 
relatively recent enactment of the Charter and also the co-existing more specific section 35 
rights. In the Kitkatla 198case, which concerned British Colombia’s decision to issue permits 
for the cutting down of 40 out of 178 culturally modified trees, a section 2(a) argument  
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was not raised and only section 35 was argued. Furthermore, the plaintiffs in Kitkatla 
challenged the legislation on federalism grounds claiming that it fell outside provincial 
competence in that it was pertaining to “Indians and land reserved for Indians” which, 
according to section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, was a federal competency. Furthermore, 
the permit system had the potential to destroy aboriginal rights. The Supreme Court 
disagreed saying that the act was in pith and substance related to “property and civil 
rights” and thus within provincial matters by virtue of section 92 (13), and that even 
though there may be a disproportionate effect on aboriginal people it did not single them 
out. As Ziff and Hope remark, such legislation could still be challenged on federalism 
grounds by proving that it went to the core of Indianness.199 
It must be admitted that the courts in Canada, apart from specific questions of 
putative aboriginal title, have focussed mainly on the physical effects such as deforestation, 
the reduction in wildlife resources, pollution and the physical destruction of burial sites 
with little concentration on the cultural and spiritual effects per se.200 In Tlowitsis Nation v. 
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd201 the argument that the effect of logging would be a desecration to 
sacred ground was summarily dismissed.202 Three months later the Lil’wat were similarly 
unsuccessful in a case which held that aboriginal rights on unoccupied Crown land were 
merely usufructuary and non-exclusive, and that the Lil’wat were still free to roam the area 
and absorb the spiritual surroundings.”203 In the same year the Poplar Point Ojibway failed 
to obtain an injunction to protect a sacred burial site.204 Lastly, the Siska were equally 
unsuccessful in the Siska Indian Band v British Columbia  (Minister of Forests)205case in which 
they failed to demonstrate the uniqueness of a sacred site to obtain an injunction. 
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10.3.5 Heritage and Environmental Legislation 
Heritage and environmental legislation have various sporadic and hortatory 
provisions relating to aboriginal people. The Historic Sites and Monuments Act (1985)206 
establishes a Board to designate certain places of national significance and approximately 
10% of the 900 sites are of aboriginal relevance.207 
British Columbia’s Heritage Conservation Act (1996) aims to protect and conserve 
heritage property within the province, such sites include those that have “heritage value to 
British Columbia, a community or an Aboriginal people.” 208 Should a site be designated 
then prima facie they are protected against desecration or alteration, although crucially the 
province can issue a permit to override this, which is subject to a balancing approach.209 
The Yukon Historic Resources Act (2002)210 is similar but has a more proactive approach to 
First Nations consultation. Significantly half of the advisory and appeals boards are First 
Nations representatives.211 
The Canada National Parks Act (2000)212 covers parks and park reserves and 
provides for the protection of cultural resources and their use by aboriginal people for 
spiritual and ceremonial purpose as well as designation as a national park. Other provincial 
park acts have no express acknowledgement of aboriginal rights. One exception is 
Saskatchewan’s Wanuskewin Heritage Park Act213 which incidentally states that one purpose 
is to contribute to the “interpretation and preservation of Indian culture through the 
heritage sites, artefacts and knowledge.”214  
As for environmental protection, the Crown Forest Sustainability Act came into effect 
in Ontario on 1 April 1995215 and has several provisions for indigenous consultation: the 
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Forest Service Report must contain, inter alia, “sites of local archaeological, historical, 
religious and cultural heritage significance to those communities; including indigenous 
graveyards, spirit sites and burial sites;”216 together with notice and consultation 
requirements, which may trigger application for interim relief. The spiritual relevance of 
forested areas finds specific recognition in British Columbia’s Forest Practices Code which 
refers to sustainable use as “balancing productive, spiritual, ecological and recreational 
values of forests to meet the economic and cultural needs of peoples and communities, 
including indigenous peoples.”217  
As in the United States much of this legislation merely provides for consultation 
and possible accommodation. Thus they facilitate, but do not mandate, the protection of 
aboriginal cultural and religious sites. 
 
10.3.6 Treaty Rights 
A retained right to visit sacred sites within ceded land could be implied in a treaty 
with the Canons of Construction operating in a similar fashion to the United States. Yet as 
discussed in Chapter 7, vast swathes of Western Canada were never subject to a 
comprehensive treaty process. Furthermore, the retention of water and other rights has 
not been as extensively recognised in Canada and thus an extrapolation to sacred sites may 
be ambitious. 
First Nations cultural sites in Canada may be more effectively protected by virtue 
of a property right under a modern treaty such as the Nisga’a Treaty. Indeed the preferred 
solution is of course the return of ancestral lands to aboriginal ownership. The greatest 
indigenous success is the creation of Nunavut, a self-governing Inuit territory. With such a 
land base and self-government then religious site protection becomes an exclusively 
internal matter.218 Expecting more large-scale conveyances may be optimistic.  
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10.3.7 Summary 
The lack of a comprehensive system of Indian treaties over much of the Canadian 
landmass leaves the potential for un-extinguished aboriginal title and other aboriginal rights 
of access to sacred sites. Since the passage of section 35 such rights cannot be casually 
disregarded, certainly not at the interlocutory stage. Thus the government’s historical 
disregard of Indian rights may prove advantageous in the modern era. 
Environmental and heritage legislation, as in the United States, hold out little concrete 
hope to protect sacred sites as sacred and provide merely a hollow process of consultation. 
A more proactive approach to the pleading of section 2(a) freedom of religion rights would 
be beneficial, if for no other purpose than clarifying to the dominant society what is at 
stake for indigenous peoples. The negotiation of large real estate agreements with 
corresponding rights of self-government provides a better if not entirely practical solution.  
An ideal solution would be a judicially-recognised aboriginal right of undisturbed 
access to all sacred sites. The judiciary may however baulk at the implications of such a 
step, considering that such a right would enjoy constitutional status by virtue of section 35. 
This would obviate the costly and time-consuming establishment of access by litigation on 
a case by case basis. However, such an aboriginal right would be susceptible to the claims 
that access to certain sites had been extinguished prior to 1982.  
A more democratically acceptable option for non-Indians would be a sacred site 
statute with similar provisions to the suggested U.S. version above. Unlike the United 
States there would appear to be no establishment concerns for privileging Indian religion 
quite apart from the fact that there is already a constitutional mandate under s91(24) to 
treat Indians as a discrete object of legislation. This is because Canadian jurisprudence on 
establishment, via its section 2(a) free exercise provision, requires coercion, peer pressure 
and an obligation to make a statement about religion, none of which would be triggered.219  
Alternatively treaties could be negotiated providing access to sacred sites. Such 
treaties would enjoy constitutional status due to section 35 (3), which clarified that the 
treaty rights entrenched by section 35(1) “includes rights that now exist by way of land 
claims agreements or may be so acquired.” They would also obviate any concern of pre-
1982 extinguishment as they would, in effect, be new rights. 
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10.4 Conclusion 
Sacred sites are vulnerable on both sides of the 49th parallel. U.S. tribes rely on a 
combination of the AIRFA 1978; Executive Order 13007 and executive agency 
accommodation; First Amendment free exercise rights; and incidental protection by 
environmental and heritage legislation.  
In Canada the situation is somewhat different as the concept of aboriginal rights is 
a relatively recent phenomenon. Yet paradoxically this means that one such right, 
aboriginal title, remains an important if inchoate concept as much of the Canadian land 
mass has not been subject to treaty extinguishment. Although heritage and environmental 
legislation, a recently articulated free exercise right, and duties to consult all have a role, it is 
the novelty of the claim for aboriginal title that forces the government to the table. Its use 
to potentially paralyse the forestry and other industries may ensure that projects are 
designed around sacred sites not through them.  
In the absence of a large scale conveyance of North America to the aborigines, one 
solution would be judicially recognised rights, in each jurisdiction, to sacred site access 
similar to the U.S. water and fishing rights. A judicially-recognised generic right of access to 
all sacred sites without case by case recognition would be better still; such a right in Canada 
would enjoy constitutional protection by virtue of section 35. An effective lobby of the 
legislature resulting in a sacred site statute would perhaps be more realistic and palatable 
politically, rather than a judicially-imposed right. Negotiated treaties guaranteeing access 
would be another option and would enjoy constitutional status in Canada by virtue of 
section 35(3). 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
 
11 International Law and Indigenous Peoples  
 
11.1 Introduction 
Chapter One described how the inchoate discipline of International Law, or more 
accurately the European Law of Nations, articulated the Doctrine of Discovery by which 
the confiscation of the North American continent was given a veneer of legality and 
legitimacy. For several centuries International Law was largely silent on the rights of 
indigenous peoples, who were regarded as a solely domestic competency. Indeed, until the 
decolonisation movement, which emerged following the two worlds wars of the Twentieth 
Century, imperial rule remained largely unchecked by any supranational censure. 
This campaign to secure self-determination, according to the United Nations 
Charter1 and subsequent human rights documents,2 failed to encompass indigenous 
enclaves within states. That would have amounted to secession and violated the territorial 
integrity of the state. This received endorsement in the 1960 General Assembly Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which rejected “any attempt 
aimed at the partial or total destruction of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a 
country.”3  Any decolonisation of “peoples” referred to the entire population of a 
geographically discrete entity, the parameters of which were transformed by uti possidetis 
from administrative conveniences into inviolable borders. 
In this context any specific indigenous rights were regarded as unnecessary, as the 
regime of individual human rights sufficed.4 Furthermore, the indigenous were merely 
offered the emollient of equality and absorption into the colony. Indigenous peoples were 
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 regarded simply as disadvantaged minorities whose greatest aspiration was supposedly 
affiliation and homogeneity with the majoritarian mainstream.  
This last chapter will chart the evolution of International Law on indigenous 
peoples from the ILO Conventions to the United Nations Declaration. In particular, how 
the realisation slowly dawned that indigenous peoples actually wanted a tribal, communal, 
and culturally sovereign existence somewhat removed from Western Liberalism. It must be 
admitted however, that much of International Law on indigenous peoples has either a 
limited global subscription, or exists as soft law with an ambiguous status.  
 
11.2 The International Labour Organization Conventions 107 and 169  
The International Labour Organization (ILO), founded in 1919, is the oldest of the 
United Nations specialized agencies and its mandate includes establishing international 
standards on work-related issues.5 The ILO also assumed competence over wider social 
justice issues and gradually began to concern itself with indigenous peoples, although not 
without receiving criticism for exceeding its remit.6  
ILO 107 (Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal 
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June 26, 1957) seemed to reflect the 
contemporary view that indigenous peoples’ aspirations were assimilation into majoritarian 
society. Its language was unfortunate in parts, referring as it did to “less advanced.”  The 
rights were heavily qualified, for example article 7(2) protected customs and institutions of 
indigenous populations only where “these are not incompatible with the objectives of 
integration programmes.” 
By contrast, ILO 169 (Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, June 27, 1989), was less assimilative and more empathetic. It recognised 
indigenous peoples’ aspirations to preserve their own culture and traditions, develop their 
own institutions and progress their own community development. Among the relevant 
provisions was article 5, which stated that, “in applying the provisions of this Convention: 
(a) the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be 
recognized and protected.” In addition, article 14 stated that, “measures shall be taken in 
appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not 
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exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their 
subsistence and traditional activities.”7 The major limitation imposed by the ILO 169 was 
that any “right to retain their own customs and institutions” must not be “incompatible 
with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with internationally 
recognised human rights.”8 
The ILO conventions 107 and 169 have only 18 and 20 parties respectively and in 
neither case did the U.S. or Canada participate. Thus the limited subscription must cast 
serious doubt over their status as establishing or evidencing customary law.9 When viewed 
alongside each other they do perhaps reflect a limited evolution in international thought 
between 1957 and 1989. 
 
11.3 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)10 
This is the most widely-subscribed, complete and detailed articulation of human 
rights within the United Nations system. Both Canada and the United States have ratified 
the Covenant, but only Canada has ratified the Optional Protocol which permits individual 
petition.11  
Article 27 expresses the principal international minority, although not specifically 
indigenous right:12 “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language.”13 This seemed to affirm a limited communal 
                                                          
 
8 Article 8.2 
9 Korman, S. (2010) op.cit., p444. 
 
10 The companion International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) has not been ratified by the 
United States. (Canada acceded on 19 May 1976) This will not be discussed due to space constraints and the 
fact that there is no Optional Protocol permitting individual complaints. Furthermore, although article 15 
obliges “state parties ..  to recognise the right of everyone to take part in cultural life” the language overall is 
heavily qualified as states are required to undertake steps “to the maximum of their available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures” (article 2) 
11 Sucharitkul, S. (2002). "The Inter-Temporal Character of International and Comparative Law regarding the 
Rights of the Indigenous Populations of the World." The American Journal of Comparative Law 50: 3-31, 30. 
12 Kingsbury, B. (2001). "Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples' Claims 
in International and Comparative Law." New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 34: 
189-250,204 
 
13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, (ICCPR). 
 
207 
 
expression of rights.14  
As to the meaning of article 27, case law has been limited, although in Ominayak v. 
Canada15 the Human Rights Committee held that historical failure to provide a reservation 
for the Lubicon Lake Band, combined with the continuing threat of the oil and timber 
industries, constituted a threat to their culture under section 27.16 Similarly, in Lovelace v 
Canada,17  the committee found an infringement of article 27 as well as articles 2 (1), 3, 23 
(1) and (4) and 26 of the ICCPR by section 12 (1) (b) of the Indian Act and its exclusion of 
Indian status to an Indian woman marrying a non-Indian man together with her children, 
although this exclusion had been upheld by her own Indian band.18 This led to an 
amendment of the Indian Act.  
 As for any domestic application, the US Senate inserted a non self-executing 
clause which means it has no legal effect within the United States.19 It has also not been 
explicitly implemented in Canada, 20 yet the Canadian Supreme Court has stated that the 
rights in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be at least as great as in similar 
international human rights documents.21 Furthermore, they are relevant in assessing 
section 1 justifications of derogations from the Charter. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14  Charters, C. and  Stavenhagen, R (2009). Making the Declaration Work : The United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Copenhagen, IWGIA ; [New Brunswick. p35 
15 Omniyak v. Canada, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 9, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990). 
16 Kingsbury, B. (2001) op.cit., p207. 
  
17 Lovelace v. Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 
18, at 166, U.N. Doc A/36/40 (1981). 
 
18 Kingsbury, B. (2001) op.cit.,  p207. 
 
19 Gabrieldis, A. M. (2006). "Human Rights Begin at Home: A Policy Analysis of Litigating International 
Human Rights in US State Courts." Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 12: 139-195, 147. 
 
20 De Mestral, A. and Fox-Decent, E. (2008). "Rethinking the Relationship Between International and 
Domestic Law." McGill LJ 53: 573-648, 624. See Ahnani v Canada (A.G) (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 107 
 
21 Harland, C. (2000). "The Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in the 
Domestic Law of State Parties: An Initial Global Survey through UN Human Rights Committee 
Documents." Human Rights Quarterly 22: 187-260, 210. 
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11.4 The Inter-American System of Human Rights 
There are three sources of law in the Inter-American system. The American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the Organization of American States Charter are 
binding on all member states. The American Convention on Human Rights is only binding on 
those states that have ratified it. Neither the Convention nor the Declaration specifically 
mentions indigenous peoples.22 
 
11.4.1 The Inter-American Commission 
The Commission is an autonomous body of the Organization of American States and all 
member states are subject to its jurisdiction. It investigates complaints of human rights 
violations with regard to the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the 
American Convention on Human Rights. Neither the U.S. nor Canada is a party to the 
Convention so any complaints must be framed under the Declaration.23 The Commission 
may also investigate complaints of violations of jus cogens norms irrespective of any formal 
inclusion in a document.24 The Commission also publishes reports on human rights 
situations within selected countries, thus heightening the embarrassment factor and 
exacting political forfeit. 25 
 If there has been no ratification of the Convention, that is the end of the matter.26 If 
the Convention has been ratified and the state has formally accepted the Inter-American 
Court’s jurisdiction then complaints still begin with the Commission but can subsequently 
proceed to the Court for a binding judgement.27 There is no individual petition to the 
Court, only the Commission can refer cases should the states be parties. For the U.S. and 
                                                          
22 Hetzel, K. (2002). "Reaching Regional Consensus: Examining United States Native American Property 
Rights in Light of Recent International Developments." Tulane Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 10: 307-331, 311. 
 
23 Cline, C. (1990). "Pursuing Native American Rights in International Law Venues: A Jus Cogens Strategy 
after Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association." Hastings Law Journal 42: 591-633, 615. 
24 ibid  p616 
 
25 Al Attar, M et al (2008) op.cit., p324 
26 Pasqualucci, J. (2009). "International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples." Winconsin International Law Journal 27: 51-98, 52. 
 
27 Thompson, T. (2009). "Getting Over the Hump: Establishing a Right to Environmental Protection for 
Indigenous Peoples in the Inter-American Human Rights System." Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 
19: 179-209, 194 
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Canada the Commission is the sole competent body28 and this prevents difficulty in 
enforcement. For example in the Dann case the Commission, although holding that the 
U.S. extinguishment of Western Shoshone land title had not complied with international 
human rights norms as the treaty had only been executed by one of their constituent bands, 
could not proceed the case any further. U.S. arguments that the gradual encroachment of 
settlers had extinguished title to their ancestral lands were rejected.29 The Commission 
emphasised the importance of land which provided the “geographic space necessary for the 
cultural and social reproduction of the group.”30 
 
11.4.2 The Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Negotiations have been ongoing since 1998. The participation of Indigenous 
Peoples was initially discouraged by some states but since 2003, in a similar way to the UN 
Declaration, they have played an integral role.31 Many of the provisions are similar to the UN 
Declaration, such as rights to a spiritual relationship with traditional lands, (Article XXIV) 
access to sacred sites (Article XV) and the right to “full enjoyment of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” (Article IV).32 
The proposed American Declaration may already be influential. For example, in Carrie 
and Mary Dann v. The United States the Commission applied principles from the Draft 
Declaration.33 Furthermore, Canada is a prominent OAS member and, irrespective of the 
present status of the Draft Declaration, would be susceptible to the politics of “naming, 
blaming and shaming.”34  
 
                                                          
28 ibid p191. 
 
29 Anaya, S. and Williams, R.Jr (2001). "The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights over Lands and Natural 
Resources under the Inter-American Human Rights System." Harvard Human Rights Journal 14: 33-86, 40. 
30 Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, 0EA/Ser.L.N/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 
¶ 128 (2003). 
31 Overview of United Nations’ Structure with Particular Regard to Indigenous Peoples from 
Indian Law Resource Center website  http://www.indianlaw.org/en/node/412 [accessed 20 
December 2010] 
 
32 Please see Comparative table of the OAS Draft Declaration and UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous peoples (October 24, 2007) at the Indian Law Resource Center website ibid  
33 Al Attar, M et al “Indigenous Cultural Heritage Rights in International Human Rights Law” in Bell, C. E. 
and Paterson, R. K (2008)  op.cit.. p325 
 
34 ibid p326 
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11.5 The International Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination 1965 
Both Canada and the United States have ratified the Convention but neither has made 
a declaration under Article 14 authorising individual complaints to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Yet circuitous monitoring is possible under the 
Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure.35 This is the procedure by which the CERD 
heard the Dann case.36 In a judgement rendered by the Committee in March 200637 the 
United States was directed to stop the violation of Shoshone land rights under article 5.38 
The decision found that the attempt to deny the right of the Shoshone “to use and occupy 
their lands and their natural resources in accordance with their traditional land tenure 
patterns”39 was discriminatory and also condemned any action “disregarding the spiritual 
and cultural significance they give to their ancestral lands.”40 This was the first 
determination by a UN committee on US Indian law and policy.41 The US has ignored the 
ruling.42 
The CERD had previously criticised the unilateral abrogation of Indian treaties by 
the US government as a violation of the equal protection rights in article 5(c) of the 
Convention.43 Similarly, the failure to protect sacred sites and traditional religious practice 
violated article 5(d)(vii) and (e)(vi) of the Convention.44 Moreover, the CERD has expressed 
                                                          
35
 McCauley, M. T. (2009). "Empowering Change: Building the Case for International Indigenous Land 
Rights in the United States." Ariz. St. LJ 41: 1167-1204, 1182  
36 McCauley, M. T. (2009) op.cit., p1191. 
37 Decision 1(68) (United States of America), CERD, 68th Sess., from 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/25eeac288211bee9c1257181002a
3cfb/$FILE/G0641251.pdf [accessed 5 November 2010] 
 
38 Evans, M. (2005) ibid p95. 
  
39 Decision 1(68) supra n172 para 6 
 
40 ibid para 8 
41 McDonald, B. (2009). "How a Nineteenth Century Indian Treaty Stopped a Twenty-First Century 
Megabomb." Nev. LJ 9: 749-774, 759. 
 
42 McCauley, M. T. (2009) op.cit.,  p1200 
 
43CERD 2001 Concluding Observations at para. 400; CERD General Recommendation 23 at para. 4(d). From 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
p9 http://ilrc.xinsys.net/es/node/77 
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shock that the US relies on Johnson v M’Intosh45 and the Doctrine of Discovery as the 
foundations of its Indian law.46 
The CERD has also criticised Canada for the requirement that aboriginal claimants 
must relinquish aboriginal rights and natural resources in settlement of land claims and the 
disproportionate costs to aboriginal litigants.47  Of course recommendations, general 
comments and observations on treaties by UN supervisory bodies are not legally binding.48 
 
11.6 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(2007) 
Eide and Daes of the working group for the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (2007) pointed out three differences between the aspirations of minorities and 
indigenous peoples. Firstly, minorities usually seek “institutional integration,” whereas 
indigenous peoples prefer “institutional separateness.” Secondly, minorities seek to 
exercise individual rights, whereas indigenous peoples’ rights tend to be collective. Thirdly, 
indigenous peoples seek “self-government, whereas minorities seek non-discrimination.”49 
The international law documents detailed above were an expression of what 
traditional western liberalism believed was the universal aspiration of all minorities.  By 
contrast, the Declaration, being the product of consultation with the indigenous peoples 
themselves, revealed their desire for a more discrete, communal and culturally sovereign 
status. Indeed, such was the indigenous input that during the protracted gestation period of 
25 years an informal procedure evolved that required any substantive change to the text to 
have broad indigenous acceptance.50 Thus the Declaration has made indigenous peoples 
subjects rather than objects of International Law.51 
                                                          
45 Please see Chapter One 
46 Fishel, J. A. (2007) op.cit., 77 
 
47 Press Release, March 8, 2007 “The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination calls upon 
Canada to immediately endorse the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” from  
http://www.treatycouncil.org/PDF/CR%20Press_Release_CERD_3%208%2007.pdf  [accessed 20 January 
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49 Kymlicka, W. (2008). "The Internationalization of Minority Rights." International Journal of Constitutional 
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The Declaration is the most comprehensive statement on the rights of indigenous 
peoples yet produced, although as a mere General Assembly Resolution its legal effect is 
uncertain. It was adopted on 13 September 2007 with 143 in favour, 4 against (Australia, 
Canada, the United States and New Zealand) and 11 abstentions.52 Subsequently, Australia 
and New Zealand, in April 2009 and April 2010 respectively, retracted their opposition and 
endorsed the Declaration.53 The Canadian Government eventually endorsed the Declaration, 
on November 12th 2010.54 President Obama also signalled U.S. support for the Declaration 
on 16th December 2010, although the accompanying exhaustive explanation described it as 
“not legally binding or a statement of current international law” but as expressing 
“aspirations.”55 
 
11.6.1 Provisions 
Quite rightly there is no definition of “indigenous peoples” in the Declaration 
which is consistent with the trend of self-identification.56 Among the relevant provisions, 
Article 25 states, “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their 
distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and 
used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their 
responsibilities to future generations in this regard.”57 There have been several 
endorsements of this article (or its draft predecessor) in the Inter-American system. In 
Saramaka Peoples v. Suriname it was held that indigenous peoples had a right to maintain their 
“spiritual relationship with the territory they have traditionally used and occupied.”58 
Similarly, in Plan de Sanchez Massacre v. Guatemala indigenous peoples the court held the view 
                                                          
52 Errico, S. (2007). "The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is Adopted: An Overview." 
Human Rights Law Review 7(4): 756-759, 757.  
53 Organick, A. (2009). "Listening to Indigenous Voices: What the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Means for US Tribes." U.C. Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 16: 171-212, 
175. 
 
54 http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ap/ia/dcl/stmt-eng.asp [accessed 20 March 2011] 
55 Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153223.pdf [accessed 20 March 2011] 
56 Barelli, M. (2009). "The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
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[accessed 20 June 2010] 
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that “harmony with the environment is expressed by their spiritual relationship with the 
land.”59  
Other significant provisions include the first explicit recognition of the “right to the 
full enjoyment, as a collective ....of all human rights and fundamental freedoms,”(Article 
1)and the protection of sacred sites and ceremonies by Article 12: “Indigenous peoples 
have the right to manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual and religious 
traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in 
privacy to their religious and cultural sites,” and the right to the “use and control of their 
ceremonial objects.” 
Importantly, Article 19 requires governments to obtain the “free, prior and 
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures 
that may affect them.” Article 46 (1) seems to circumscribe the self-determination right of 
article 3 by qualifying all the preceding rights as not to be “construed or authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.” Indeed, the self-
determination right in the Declaration is linked to the “exercise of autonomy or self-
government in matters relating to internal and local affairs” (Article 4) implying purely 
internal self-determination, which is the minimum that indigenous peoples have repeatedly 
demanded.60 It must also be remembered that self-determination is a process and its 
manifestation may not necessarily reach the endpoint of statehood but perhaps a looser 
cultural aggregate or similar endpoint.61 Indian threats to secede are in fact rare, the only 
specific example being the James Bay Cree Indians who threatened to secede from Quebec 
if Quebec had seceded from Canada.62 Self-determination may also mean merely the 
collective rights to make decisions on the preservation of religion and language rights.63  
Attempts by some countries to exclusively domesticate indigenous rights were 
resisted, although Article 46 (2) states that “the exercise of the rights set forth in the 
                                                          
59 Plan de Sanchez Massacre v. Guatemala, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 116, ¶ 85 (Nov. 19, 2004). Also 
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Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law, and in 
accordance with international human rights obligations.”64  
 
11.6.2 Influence of the Declaration 
Of course there is no international dispute mechanism for the Declaration, but article 42 
stipulates that, “The United Nations, its bodies, including the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, (PFII) and specialized agencies, including at the country level, and States 
shall promote respect for and full application of the provisions of this Declaration and 
follow up the effectiveness of this Declaration.” The PFII advises the ECOSOC on 
indigenous issues and half of its 16 members are indigenous.65  
Monitoring would also include the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(EMRIP) and the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People. The PFII has indicated that it will use the Declaration as 
its legal framework and both the Special Rapporteur and EMRIP have stated the 
Declaration to be their normative framework.66 The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
Peoples produces periodic reports which combine promotion of the Declaration and 
individual state recommendations. Although advisory and non-mandatory, the political 
costs of ignoring such a report may be considerable.67 
Ultimately, much of the influence of the Declaration will depend on its perceived 
legitimacy. This depends on “the justice inherent in its content, and the extent to which 
international actors, be they individuals, civil society, trans-national corporations, states, 
indigenous peoples and so on, engage with it.”68 
Fundamental fairness of content was evidenced by the involvement of indigenous 
peoples at all stages. Indeed, as mentioned above, during the myriad revisions, many states 
refused to countenance any change to the agreed text without the specific endorsement of 
indigenous peoples.69Conceptual coherence was more elusive due to the differing situations 
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of indigenous peoples, although there is enough flexibility in the document to adapt to 
parochial variations with minorities’ rights, individual and collective rights and sui generic 
rights.70 Ultimate determinacy was perhaps neither achievable nor desirable as this would 
freeze the rights and discourage any interpretational evolution.71 
Legitimacy by engagement will depend on a relentless promotion, quotation and 
reiteration. Indigenous peoples can facilitate this by framing claims in terms of the 
Declaration which will oblige states to at least engage with it.72 Charters argues that, under 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), the Declaration is also relevant to the 
interpretation of other human rights law and the ILO conventions.73  
In essence, the perceived legitimacy of the Declaration can encourage adherence to a 
formally non-binding document even when this is politically inconvenient. A momentum 
can build almost obliging a state’s compliance should political costs and international 
opprobrium be the alternative. Moreover, the overwhelming vote in favour perhaps already 
suggests a moral and political obligation to comply. A similarly overwhelming vote was 
observed for the Universal Declaration on Human Rights which may itself have evolved into 
Customary International Law.74  
Bartolome Clavero gives reasons why the Declaration may already be legally binding. 
First, the language of article 42 “uses the strong expression of full application”, as distinct 
from other similar human rights instruments.” Second, the Declaration “is the first 
Declaration that describes its own binding character without a foundation either in a 
Convention or a Treaty, or, for that matter, in a relevant Committee” and thus with no 
need for consummation by ratification. Lastly, the Declaration had significant input from 
indigenous peoples themselves.75 As Bartelli remarks, the constant use of the term “shall” 
illustrates the intentions of the drafters.76 
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Nevertheless, this does not negate the clear difference in International Law 
between a declaration and a convention or treaty even though, often in the field of 
human rights, the distinction between the binding nature of hard and soft law has often 
been more theoretical than practical.77  As for any claim that the Declaration represents 
Customary International Law, that is indeed controversial. 
 
11.6.3 The Declaration as Customary International Law 
Customary International Law is an exception to the doctrine that only parties to a treaty are 
bound by it. It is not a universally accepted phenomenon: United States Supreme Court 
Justice Scalia has described it as a “20th-century invention of internationalist law professors 
and human rights advocates.”78  Nevertheless, the Declaration is binding in the United States 
to the extent that it codifies existing Customary International Law, which, in the recent case 
of Sosa v Alavarez-Machain, was described by the Supreme Court as federal common law, 
enforceable in US courts.79 The Supreme Court has also used international and foreign 
human rights law as an aid in interpreting the Constitution, for example in Roper v Simmons, 
in which the Eighth Amendment was held to prohibit the execution of juveniles.80 
International Law, in the domestic setting, remains ultimately however “subject to the 
Constitution”81 and merely provides at best an indirect effect by virtue of the doctrine of 
consistent interpretation,82 or alternatively as a persuasive element.83  
In Canada, the Doctrine of Adoption holds that Customary International Law, in the 
absence of express legislative derogation, is part of Canadian law without enactment.84 
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Furthermore, international human rights norms are regarded as “persuasive and relevant” 
when interpreting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.85  
To establish Customary International Law there must firstly be state practice that is 
relatively uniform and by a substantial number of states; and secondly opinio juris or a belief 
that such practice is required by law.86 The Chronological Paradox questions the 
requirement that there already be “evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered 
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”87 
The extent of state practice necessary is difficult to define, but the behaviour of 
specially affected states, such as Canada and the United States would be especially 
pertinent. Yet the danger in accepting state practice as establishing a constellation of 
indigenous rights would be to ignore the differing nature and variety of such rights. For 
example indigenous property rights exist as a myriad of different domestic schemes and 
doctrines worldwide which lack the uniformity required to evidence state practice.88 Opinio 
juris is similarly difficult to prove but may be evidenced by government statements or votes 
in favour of UN Assembly resolutions yet problematically involves a subjective element 
which thus imports a psychological analysis.89   
The status of other General Assembly Resolutions was addressed by the 
International Law Association in 200090 and it was concluded that as a general rule “they do 
not ipso facto create new rules of customary law” but can “constitute evidence of the 
existence.... contribute to the formation of ...or help to crystallize emerging customary 
law.”91 Very exceptionally “resolutions accepted unanimously or almost unanimously and 
which evince a clear intention on the part of their supporters to lay down a rule of 
international law, are capable.....of creating general customary law by the mere fact of their 
adoption.”92 Absent unanimity, then all affected states should consent and any dissenter 
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enjoys the benefit of the persistent objector exemption.93  
Canada and the United States, with their large indigenous populations, have 
consistently maintained that the Declaration is non-binding.94 Yet, it could also be argued 
that by participating in the negotiations for many years these states may have at least 
accepted the framework of the Declaration’s indigenous rights if not the exact parameters.95 
Indeed, as Korman argues, Canada and the United States objected initially more on the 
grounds of the vagueness of language rather than the overall message.96  
Although elements of the Declaration are reflective of existing international law such 
as the prohibitions against racial discrimination97 and genocide98 and the right to self-
determination99 the Declaration as a whole does not yet represent customary international 
law.100 The International Law Association was itself unsure whether the Declaration as a 
whole had as yet “crystallised into customary law.”101 Perhaps the balanced view is that it is 
contributing to the formation of such law.102 
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11.7 Conclusion 
Although the ILO conventions have a limited subscription and other International 
Law instruments have concentrated on discrimination against minorities, an evolution can 
be seen from a promise of individual equality to a recognition of communal difference. The 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is the culmination of this process, 
yet only elements of it can be regarded as expressing Customary International Law.  
Ultimately, the North American governments determine the level of engagement 
with International Law to serve their own ends. The Doctrine of Discovery was embraced 
as an instrument of colonisation and subordination and moreover remains part of the 
Indian law canon. By contrast, the United Nations Declaration and ILO Conventions, with 
their messages of decolonisation and empowerment, are either rejected or deprecated. 
Indians remain, as ever, powerless objects of such caprice. 
This does not mean such International Law is completely redundant. For example 
states’ periodic reports to human rights bodies should be scrutinised for inconsistency and 
anomaly, with the greater use of shadow reports being produced by indigenous lobbyists.  
Ultimately, in the domestic context, it may be better tactically to argue that any 
relevant soft law and putative Customary International Law are merely persuasive and an 
aid to interpretation. This is because a forlorn claim of a legally binding status may 
concentrate judicial minds on refuting such a bold assertion, rather than on engaging with 
the substantive human right in question.103   
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 CONCLUSION 
“The Indian plays much the same role in our American society that the Jews played in Germany. 
Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh air to poison gas in our political 
atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects 
the rise and fall in our democratic faith.”1 
 
The Doctrine of Discovery had its origins in the late middle ages and was a 
manifestation of the European Law of Nations, which, at the time, consisted merely of 
Christian tenets disguised as temporal law. The Doctrine was derived from the 
pronouncements of Popes and Christian Kings and reinforced by biblical authority that 
seemed to consign anyone who refused to subdue the earth to a rather precarious 
sovereignty and land rights. Despite these medieval origins it continues to resonate as it 
remains the foundation for much of the legal relationship between the Colonials and the 
Indigenes. Some Christians have the good grace to remain embarrassed by this, for 
example the Episcopal Church in the United States passed a resolution in 2009 at its 76th 
General Convention, repudiating and disavowing the Doctrine of Christian Discovery.2 
The Catholic Church remains intransigent, despite requests by indigenous peoples at the 
Parliament of the World’s Religions in 2003 to revoke the Inter Caetera of 1493,3 and in 
2009 to disavow the Doctrine of Discovery.4 Yet it is the North American governments, 
more than the churches, which need to renounce this Doctrine that continues to dominate 
Indian law. As Newcomb has remarked, “Indian nations have been denied their most basic 
rights ... simply because, at the time of Christendom's arrival in the Americas, they did not 
believe in the God of the Bible, and did not believe that Jesus Christ was the true 
Messiah.”5 
                                                          
1 Cohen, F. S. (1953). "The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy." The Yale 
Law Journal 62: 348-390, 390.  
2“An Indigenous Peoples’ Statement to the World” from 
http://earthspiritcommunity.blogspot.com/2010/06/indigenous-peoples-statement-to-world.html [accessed 
11 January 2011] 
3 http://bullsburning.itgo.com/Papbull.htm [accessed 29 October 2011] 
 
4 http://earthspiritcommunity.blogspot.com/2010/06/indigenous-peoples-statement-to-world.html 
[accessed 30 December 2011] 
5 Newcomb, S. (1992) op.cit., p309. 
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Discovery was originally intended to merely confer pre-emption rights between 
European nations in a vacant New World. When confronted with the inconvenience of an 
existing population, it evolved to sweep away the legal rights of non-Christians and 
undermine their land title, with derisory compensation and the hollow consolation of the 
bible offered in exchange.  In the words of Indian scholar Vine Deloria, “First you had the 
Book and we had the Land. Now we have the Book and you have the Land.”6 
Although the United States, with the Marshall Trilogy in the early Nineteenth 
Century, subsequently articulated a common law model of internal tribal sovereignty, to 
temper the absolute nature of the Doctrine, Indians, being infidels, were only permitted 
to exercise a de facto internal sovereignty that remained subject to an overarching and de 
jure Christian sovereignty. However, any intrusions into tribal sovereignty had to be at 
least justified on some doctrine, however tenuous, such as the Plenary Power or Trust 
Relationship. By contrast, in Canada any common law recognition of tribal sovereignty 
had to wait until the Calder case in the 1970s. Moreover, the St Catherine’s Milling case in 
1899 had rejected any form of land tenure in favour of a mere usufruct, or right to roam. 
This also highlights the fact that Indian Law in the United States has been developed over 
200 years, whereas in Canada the concept of aboriginal rights has only gained traction 
within the last 40 years. Yet Canada, by virtue of section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982, 
constitutionalised her aboriginal rights, which are therefore less well defined, but better 
protected. It is submitted that, just as Canada can learn from her neighbour’s prolonged 
jurisprudence, the United States could follow Canada’s example and pursue the 
constitutional entrenchment of her aboriginals’ rights.  
In the Eighteenth Century and early Nineteenth Century, during the power 
struggle between the United States, France and Great Britain, Indians often held the 
balance of power, at least at a local level. Thus in the early years of the Great Republic, 
when there was still a vestigial threat to her territorial integrity, the United States pursued 
a bilateral and conciliatory treaty-based policy with the Indians and realism dictated that 
the Doctrine of Discovery’s mandate lay dormant. When peace broke out between the 
European states, any accommodation of the Indian interests was regarded as no longer 
necessary and so the relationship became more coercive and unilateral, with the 
overarching sovereignty of the Doctrine manifesting itself in incremental legislative 
intrusions into tribal sovereignty. Similarly, in Canada, before the existence of a critical 
mass of European settlers, the attitude towards the Indians was accommodating and 
                                                          
6 Deloria, V (1969) op.cit., p101 
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deferential. This changed during the middle of the Nineteenth Century, when the 
comprehensive Indian Act regime casually swept away any internal tribal sovereignty and 
assumed, without any serious debate or justification, complete competence over all 
aspects of Indian life both tribally and individually.  
Towards the end of the Nineteenth Century, with the Indians rendered largely 
quiescent and confined to reservations, the U.S. government sought to assimilate them, 
using the churches as the instruments of government policy. This seemed a direct 
contradiction of the claim to have perfected the division between church and state as, 
although Christianity had provided the rationale for the Doctrine of Discovery and served 
to justify the legal relationship with the Indians, the United States had purported to order 
their own affairs to reflect enlightenment attitudes and create a secular polity, by means of 
the Establishment Clause. The Peace Programme, which involved the employment of 
missionaries from only selected denominations as Indian agents, was a flagrant violation of 
this Establishment Clause. Children were also targeted in an attempt to eradicate the 
vertical transmission of culture. The vehicle chosen was the denominational contract 
school, which, had it stuck to a secular education but with a sectarian vehicle, could have 
survived such an establishment challenge. Yet the relentless proselytisation and suppression 
of Indian religion was surely a breach of both clauses of the First Amendment. It therefore 
appeared that any establishment tensions were only triggered when one mainstream 
Christian church was given preference over another, not seemingly when one church was 
favoured over no church. Similarly, any freedom of religion in Nineteenth Century United 
States extended to a free choice between mainstream variants of Christianity, anything else 
seemed beyond comprehension. As the Supreme Court remarked, without apparent irony, 
as recently as 1989, "[t]his Nation is heir to a history and tradition of religious diversity that 
dates from the settlement of the North American Continent."7 
In contrast to the United States, Canadian missionaries did not enjoy much of an 
executive role and were not employed as Indian agents. However, in the case of 
denominational residential schools, there was significant church-state collaboration. Yet 
such collaboration provoked little suspicion in a country without an Establishment 
Clause. Indeed the right to denominational education was thought worthy of 
constitutionalisation in 1867 and thus its application to Indian children raised no 
                                                          
7 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 589 (1989)  
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difficulty. However, treaty provisions, stipulating as they did a reserve-based education, 
were undoubtedly breached. The most generous assessment of the death toll in Canadian 
residential schools (and also U.S. schools) would suggest criminal neglect, yet conceivably 
they operated as systematic extermination programmes.8  
Despite these evangelical efforts Indians remained largely unconvinced of the 
advantages of Christianity and so the governments initiated a comprehensive suppression 
of their religious practices. Having crushed them physically the government sought to 
crush them spiritually. The U.S. Courts of Indian Offenses, as mentioned above, were 
flagrant breaches of the constitutional guarantees of Free Exercise, Due Process, Formal 
Accusation and Witnesses, Jury Trial and Bail. This is in addition to the glaring 
infringements of tribal sovereignty by these dubious fora.  
Canadian suppression of Indian religious practices was just as vigorous yet could 
proceed without a constitutional right to freedom of religion, or indeed other substantive 
constitutional fundamental rights, as nominal obstacles. Moreover, the rejection of the 
Doctrine of Discovery’s emollient of internal tribal sovereignty meant that Canadian 
Indians were vulnerable to any legislative intrusion. Furthermore, the specific mandate 
given to the federal government over “Indians and land reserved for Indians” under s91 
(24) of the Constitution Act ensured there was no infringement of federalism.  
As well as the spiritual destruction there were differing levels of physical 
destruction. In 1877 Prime Minister Alexander Mackenzie described the Canadian policy to 
Indians as “humane just and Christian.”9 He contrasted the “deplorable war waged 
between the Indian tribes of the United States territories and the government of that 
country” with the fact that “no difficulty had arisen with the Canadian tribes living in the 
immediate vicinity of the scene of hostilities.”10 Such an assessment is “general and 
impressionistic.”11 Although more United States Indians than Canadian Indians were shot 
during the Nineteenth Century this was probably due to geography and the relative lack of 
an acquisitive frontier European population rather than a policy of benevolence.12  
                                                          
8 Please see Appendix B for further discussion. 
9 St. Germain, J. (2001).op.cit.,.pxvii 
10 ibid 
11 Higham, C. L. (2000) op.cit., p3 
12 ibid p123 
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The direct suppression of Indian religions became less prevalent in the Twentieth 
Century but instead the governments endorsed an acquisitive attitude to cultural artefacts.  
The resultant alienation of sacred objects seriously impacts the contemporary practice of 
Indian religious rites and therefore amounts to another infringement of the freedom of 
religion. Thus there has been an escalating campaign for the repatriation of such material 
which has resulted in the laudable, if flawed, U.S Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) of 1990. Yet this fails to secure the return of sacred objects 
held by non-federal entities and thus more comprehensive legislation mandating the 
return of all sacred objects, with market value compensation, is required.   
In Canada, although the plunder of sacred objects was not as systematic or 
widespread, there has also been less of an attempt to correct past abuses. The continued 
alienation of such objects also infringes the recently introduced right of free exercise of 
religion provided by section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982. 
Although some progress has been made there is a need for national repatriation legislation, 
similar to the United States NAGPRA, to bolster the provincial laws of varying compulsion 
and the collection of hortatory repatriation policies. Better still would be the recognition of 
an aboriginal right to all sacred objects, entrenched by virtue of section 35, which would 
also bind private parties.  
U.S. initiatives for the repatriation of sacred objects are commendable attempts to 
decolonise Indian culture and religion but have come with minimal governmental forfeit. 
The treatment of Indian sacred sites confirms that there is a limit to governmental largesse 
when powerful commercial stakeholders have diametrically opposed interests. Tourists, 
mining companies, logging interests and transport infrastructure projects often trump any 
free exercise rights. Any executive accommodation of Indian sacred site worship provokes 
cries of government establishment of religion and a violation of the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment, yet surely such concerns should be inversely proportional to the 
size of the denomination. In the final analysis, it would seem that any extension of First 
Amendment protection to the country’s first inhabitants must be, above all, affordable. A 
sacred site statute, conferring exclusive rights of access, would perhaps be an attainable 
objective, provided that there was reasonable geographical and temporal circumscription. 
The comprehensive treaties of land cession in the United States, carried out during the 
Nineteenth Century, although coercive and usually representing a fraction of fair value, 
mean that any claim of lingering aboriginal title to their sacred sites is largely futile.   
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The situation in Canada differs as, due to the relative lack of land treaties, there 
remain putative Indian property rights that may be a more effective encumbrance on the 
commercial despoliation of such sites, binding as they are on governments and private 
parties. Therefore, paradoxically the lack of any historical recognition of aboriginal rights 
and title in Canada and their subsequent treaty extinguishment can prove an advantage. 
First Nations in Canada should combine this aboriginal title approach with, as in the 
United States, a more pro-active pleading on the grounds of an infringement of the free 
exercise of religion at their sacred sites. A judicially-conferred aboriginal right of access to 
sacred sites would perhaps be a little ambitious, due to the fact that the courts may be 
reluctant to establish what would be an entrenched right by virtue of section 35. Again, a 
sacred site statute from the legislature may be a more democratically palatable objective. A 
negotiated treaty guaranteeing access to sacred sites would be another option, which in 
Canada would enjoy entrenchment as an aboriginal right.  
The opening chapter described the Christian origins of the Doctrine of 
Discovery. In the final chapter the evolution of International Law on indigenous peoples 
in the Twentieth Century was described and the promise of the reintroduction of a more 
secular International Law was offered to reverse the centuries of colonisation. Yet much 
of the International Law specifically on indigenous peoples has either been soft law or has 
failed to attract Canada and the United States as signatories. Ultimately, the North 
American governments have selectively embraced supranational law to suit their ends: the 
Doctrine of Discovery’s mandate to deprive the indigenes of rights was enthusiastically 
adopted, yet more recent International Law, with messages of empowerment and 
decolonisation, are consistently rejected. 
The United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples (2007) was a comprehensive 
statement yet any claim that it reflects Customary International Law is premature. Indeed, 
it may be tactically more astute to argue that it is merely persuasive, rather than risk 
antagonising a hostile judiciary by an over-ambitious claim that it is legally binding. The 
Declaration did consolidate the paradigm shift started by ILO Convention 169, from the 
promise of an individual and assimilated equality to a communal, discrete and collective 
existence. This was primarily due to the fact that indigenous peoples were, for the first 
time, actually consulted during the prolonged gestation period. Ultimately, its 
effectiveness may depend on its ability to invoke supranational censure or perhaps 
provoke national embarrassment, assuming countries are capable of such an emotion.  To 
this end, a detailed study of U.S. and Canadian compliance with each individual provision 
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of the Declaration would reinforce the dissonance with international indigenous legal 
norms and could be a worthwhile future project.  So just as the unwritten principles of 
International Law, together with the Papal-inspired European Law of Nations, sustained 
the Doctrine of Discovery and the dispossession of the indigenes, the hope that a more 
secular, contemporary International Law may conceivably be used to call to account the 
heirs of the discoverers is perhaps premature. 
Thus we may see that both countries’ treatment of their indigenous populations 
has amounted to spiritual, and in some instances physical genocide. Canadian treatment 
has perhaps been more ignorant than malevolent in comparison to the United States. 
Commendable, if sporadic, attempts have been made to reverse at least some of the 
cultural destruction within the last century, more so by the United States. The present 
may be less sanguinary than the past, yet the future is less than sanguine.13 Indian religions 
are not regarded with the same level of horror of a century ago but depreciated in a more 
subtle and insidious manner. It remains the case that, whatever generosity of spirit that 
the dominant societies have demonstrated has needed to be, above all, cost-effective.  
 
 
It matters little where we pass the remnants of our days. They will not be many...But why should I 
mourn at the untimely fate of my people?...Your time of decay may be distant, but it will surely 
come, for even the white man, whose God walked and talked with him as friend, cannot be exempt 
from the common destiny. We may be brothers after all, we will see.14(Chief Seattle in 1855) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
                                                          
13  Vecsey, C. (1991) op.cit., pp15-16 
14 Rosenstiel, A. (1983) op.cit., . p126 
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    APPENDICES 
 
A) Methods and Methodologies 
 
Methods and Challenges 
This research was library-based, both at the university and electronically. Without a 
direct, live and immediate informant there is of course the danger that research can become 
“a post-colonial ventriloquism of speechless subalterns” with Indians as “objects rather 
than subjects of study.”1 There is perhaps no conclusive answer to this criticism, except to 
confirm that a generous hearing was given to native legal and cultural scholars. Perhaps of 
greater relevance was the danger that the use of semi-structured interviews would have 
imported an asymmetry, as the inquiry was part-historical, and thus some voices have been 
forever stilled. Moreover, selecting individual tribes for a more detailed and ethnographic 
study would have been partial, superfluous and incomplete as there are several hundred 
tribes on the North American continent. The study is in any case one of conflict with the 
dominant legal systems and must therefore focus on that point of contact and 
corresponding jurisprudence, rather than a more detailed,  theoretical and intra-tribal 
enquiry.  
As Geertz remarks, there is also a danger that any study of Indian religions is 
incomplete without an immersion in indigenous languages as spiritual concepts may have 
no English equivalent.2 Indeed, “any student of Eastern religions without knowledge of 
Sanskrit, Chinese or Japanese would not be taken seriously.”3 To situate any study within 
its rightful place in the overall culture one perhaps needs to reside within the community 
“as a relative.”4 However, as mentioned previously, this is not a pure study of Indian 
religions but a treatment of them in the majoritarian legal system, and any description of  
 
 
                                                          
1 Feldman, A. (2000). "Othering Knowledge and Unknowing Law: Oppositional Narratives in the Struggle 
for American Indian Religious Freedom." Social & Legal Studies 9(4): 557-579 575 
 
2 Geertz, A. W. (1996). "Contemporary Problems in the Study of Native North American Religions with 
Special Reference to the Hopis." American Indian Quarterly 20(3/4): 393-414, 397 
 
3 ibid 
 
4 Jocks, C. R. t. (1996). "Spirituality for Sale: Sacred Knowledge in the Consumer Age." American Indian 
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beliefs and practices will only be intended to illustrate differences between mainstream 
faiths and to highlight difficulties with the dominant jurisprudence. 
One of the main practical challenges was the imbalance between the amounts of 
material available in the two countries. In the United States the academic discipline of 
Indian Law dates from the earlier Cohen handbook of the 1940s, whereas in Canada, 
Indian Law was not deemed a serious subject for study until the 1970s. There is also less 
jurisprudence, even accounting for the disparity in population. For example, Morse found,  
in a study of 1995 litigation, much less on Indian issues in Canada: only 48 aboriginal cases 
compared to 399 in the United States,5 despite the populations in Canada and the United 
States being 0.75 million (1.9% of the population) and 2.2 million (0.9% of the population) 
respectively.6 Despite this, sufficient material was found to enable comparisons to be made 
in the areas covered. Had this thesis required an exhaustive treatment of all Indian rights, 
rather than an illustrative comparison of Indian religious freedom, this would have posed a 
greater problem. 
A significant limitation is perhaps the ethnicity of the author (white European), a 
matter over which I have no control. Indeed it must be admitted that “non-Indians can 
know about Indians but can never assume that they know what it means to be Indian.”7 
There is a general debate over the legitimacy of those “made powerful by colonial history 
presuming to speak for those marginalised by colonial history.”8 A plea of disinterest is 
only partially convincing as many academics, and indeed putative doctorates, have 
considerable financial and professional interest in the discipline.   Yet being Indian is not 
necessarily a sign of authority although it is a unique standpoint.9 It imports an “embodied 
authenticity” but not an exclusive voice.10 Furthermore, regarding any inquiry as illegitimate 
that does not involve one’s own culture would reduce any thesis to the level of 
“autobiographical confession.”11 A balance must be struck, and sufficient engagement with 
                                                          
5 Morse, B. (1997) op.cit., p140. 
6 Morse, B. (1997) op.cit., p121 
7 Zimmerman, L. J. (1996). Native North America : Belief and Ritual, Spirits of Earth and Sky. London, 
Duncan Baird Publishers p7. 
  
8 Bucko, R “Religion” in Biolsi, T. (ed) (2004). A Companion to the Anthropology of American Indians. 
Malden, MA, Blackwell Pub. pp171-196, 173 
 
9 Bucko, R (2004) op.cit., p173 
 
10 Grimes, R. L. (1996). "This May Be a Feud, but It Is Not a War: An Electronic, Interdisciplinary Dialogue 
on Teaching Native Religions." American Indian Quarterly 20(3/4): 433-450, 444 
 
11 ibid p436 
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the native voice, although written, will avoid what Pommersheim describes as “Indian Law 
Liberalism,” 12 a non-Indian attitude which assumes that it knows what is best for Indians 
without listening to their perspective. Ultimately, the research into another’s culture must 
be undertaken with “humility and open ears.”13  
 As for a European purporting to comment on North American jurisprudence, 
sometimes the topography can only become clear when viewed from a distance.  
 
Methodologies 
The framework of inquiry is Historical and Comparative, with a qualified 
contribution from anthropology, whereas the perspective is Realist, or more accurately a 
form of Realism which is as yet without name, but which I have tentatively labelled Critical 
Indigenous Legal Theory. As described in the Introduction, this is an amalgam of Critical 
Legal Studies, Peri-Colonialist study, Critical Race Theory and American Legal Realism.  
 
Historical 
“Even more than other domains of law the intricacies and peculiarities of Indian Law 
demand an appreciation of history.”(Justice Blackmun)14 
 
There is perhaps no domestic legal discipline in North America that is more 
dependent on a historical inquiry than Indian Law. Indeed, the historian’s intervention can 
be decisive: the outcome of the United States v. Sioux Nation15 case, which determined the 
Black Hills controversy, turned on the unearthing of a letter by historian Fred Nickleson in 
1975 that had been written by President Grant 100 years before.16 The letter described 
Grant’s secret withdrawal of protection of the Sioux homeland, which had originally been 
promised in the Fort Laramie Treaty (1868), in favour of permitting exploitation by gold 
prospectors. Similarly, in the case of Harjo v Kleppe17 both sides agreed to use Angie Debo’s 
                                                          
12 Pommersheim, F. (1997). "Representing Native People and Indian Tribes: A Response to Professor 
Alegretti." Fordham Law Review 66: 1181-1184 
 
13 Grimes, R.L. (1996) op.cit., p437 
 
14 South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe inc. , 476 U.S. 498, 511 (1986) 
 
15 United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) 
 
16 Valencia-Weber, G. (1994). "American Indian Law and History: Instructional Mirrors." Journal of Legal 
Education 44(2): 251-266, 260. 
  
17 Harjo v. Kleppe 420 F.Supp. 1110 (D.D.C. 1976) 
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seminal histories of the Creek Nation as accepted fact.18 When historical accounts are used 
to such an extent then the Indians’ concept of a cyclical time frame, where ancestors and 
the living reside and the past and present co-exist is especially relevant; the past not merely 
informing but determining the present. 
Much of the development of Indian Law can indeed only be understood by a 
contextualised history. For example, the Marshall Trilogy of cases must be situated in the 
context of the Cherokees’ vain attempts to resist the ethnic cleansing policy of the 
Jacksonian presidency. Similarly, the introduction of the Courts of Indian Offenses in the 
United States and the Potlatch laws of Canada must be viewed alongside the assimilation 
policies of both countries in the late Nineteenth Century.19  
The contribution of history is of course also seen in aspects of the Common Law, 
in particular the interpretation and application of historical precedent to contemporary 
judicial determination. Yet Indian Law requires almost a double-retrospect. It is the fact 
that it is both heavily driven by case law and dependent on history evidentially that 
distinguishes it from other elements of North American legal theory in its reliance on the 
past.  
These factors require the historian to sometimes undertake an unfamiliar task. As 
McHugh remarks, “the common lawyer [is] concerned with problem-solving in the present, 
the historian with problem-solving in the past.”20 The historian may be uncomfortable with 
a role as forensic rather than academic historian;21 with an adversarial rather than 
inquisitorial use of history.22 Unlike the lawyer, whose quest is for courtroom finality and 
ultimate resolution, the historian usually proffers a qualified opinion, not intended for 
calcification by “laches, estoppel, res judicata  ....and stare decisis.”23  
Indian legal theory embraces (Relativistic) Historicism. The Canons of 
Construction were developed as a judicial tool to emphasise and privilege the Indians’ 
contemporary understanding of Nineteenth Century treaties, particularly as they were 
                                                          
18 “And Still the Waters Run” and ”The Road to Disappearance” from ibid 
 
19 See generally Prucha, F. P. (1976) op.cit.,. Pettipas, K. (1994) op.cit.,; Cole, D. and I. Chaikin (1990) op.cit., 
 
20 McHugh, P. (1998). "Common-Law Status of Colonies and Aboriginal Rights: How Lawyers and 
Historians Treat the Past, The." Saskatchewan Law Review 61: 393-429, 394. 
  
21 Valencia-Weber, G (1994) op. cit., p263 
 
22  ibid p261 
 
23  ibid p264 
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drafted in a foreign language and according to an alien legal culture.24 Of course Relativistic 
Historicism has been mobilised to excuse and even justify much injustice in the American 
past, Plessy v Ferguson and the contemporary acceptability of “separate but equal” being one 
example.25 Yet its use as an aid to contextualisation, rather than as retrospective doctrinal 
apologia can inform the present, and can be used to that extent.    
Thus we may see how history can provide more than just a picturesque backdrop 
to Indian Law but can actually be integral and determinative in modern litigation. Similarly, 
any academic study of the development of Indian Law would be impossible if not situated 
within a fully contextualised history. The evolution of Indian Law treated as an arid 
“history of law” in isolation would tell but half the story. 
 
Anthropology 
“Into each life, it is said, some rain must fall. Some people have bad horoscopes others 
take tips on the stock market. McNamara created .....the Edsel. Churches possess the 
real world. But Indians have been cursed above all other people in history. Indians have 
anthropologists.”(Vine Deloria)26 
 
Anthropologists have been a mixed blessing for the Indians. In some respects the 
preservation of cultural data is invaluable, but if this comes at the cost of an alien intrusion 
and ultimate control of sacred knowledge by the outsider, then some argue it would be 
better lost forever.27 There is moreover an attempt often to fossilize the Indian, particularly 
in regard to religion, which is an attitude that can be shared by the dominant society at 
large. The U.S. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, although laudable in intent, discussed 
the preservation of their “traditional religions,”28 thus perhaps marginalising the syncretic 
tradition of the Native American Church, a mixture of traditional use of sacramental 
Peyote and Christianity.29  
                                                          
24 Myers, H., Smith, C.et al. (2004). American Indian Law Deskbook. Boulder, Colo., University Press of 
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25 Balkin, J. (2005). "Wrong the Day It Was Decided: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism." Boston 
University Law Review 85: 677-725. 
 
26 Deloria, V. (1969) op.cit., p78. 
 
27 Bucko, R “Religion” in Biolsi, T. (ed) (2004) op.cit., p172 
 
28 42 U.S.C. s1996  
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This is what Martin would describe as the “discourse of the disappearing 
Indians.”30 In particular, an over-reverence and uncritical reliance on texts that deal solely 
with the purified and traditional forms of Indian spirituality and that holds simply that 
“savages dance out their religion.”31 This is typified by the “canonical status”32 afforded the 
Black Elk Speaks memoir, which neglected the fact that Black Elk had been a practising 
Catholic for 20 years. Indeed, Black Elk is reputed to have been baptised into three 
denominations.33 Yet his “conversion” to Christianity was not a replacement of his 
traditional spirituality but more of a co-existence, and his ecumenism was not of someone 
who practised two separate traditions, but rather attempted their integration.34 This study, 
as far as it described Indian spirituality, focused on religious practices of aboriginal people, 
not solely on practices that have existed ab origine.  
There is also the danger that, just as chronological primitivism proposes a nostalgic 
view of human life as necessarily better in the past, so does cultural primitivism consider 
indigenous culture as some lost idyll.35 This attempt to preserve an Indian culture in aspic is 
typified by the occasionally retouched photographs of the famous photographer Curtis, 
one example being the removal of an alarm clock between two Piegan Indians.36 Geertz has 
suggested that such primitivism is perhaps an attempt to assuage Christian guilt and 
reconcile the “age-old myth of man’s fall from Paradise.”37 Indian communities were 
regarded as “Edenic communities of untainted purity but primitive backwardness.”38 The 
Christian longs for his “lost purity and looks for it in a far-distant time or place.”39 This  
                                                          
30 Martin, J. W. (1991). "Before and beyond the Sioux Ghost Dance: Native American Prophetic Movements 
and the Study of Religion." Journal of the American Academy of Religion 59(4): 677-701, 678 
 
31 Aitken, B. (1930). "Temperament in Native American Religion." The Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
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32 Martin, J.W (1991) op.cit., p678  
 
33 Holler, C. (1984). "Black Elk's Relationship to Christianity." American Indian Quarterly 8(1): 37-49, 39 
 
34  ibid p41 
 
35 Geertz, A. (2003). "Ethnohermeneutics and Worldview Analysis in the Study of Hopi Indian Religion." 
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36 Martin, C. (1987). The American Indian and the problem of history. New York, Oxford University 
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modern phenomenon contrasts with Nineteenth Century European self-confidence and 
arrogance which was responsible for much of the Christianization process. Of course, 
Indians would simply prefer to be left alone, neither converted nor romanticised, so both 
extremes must be avoided.  
This is not to completely deny the relevance of anthropology. Like the historian, 
the anthropologist is often integral to the litigation process thus importing a considerable 
responsibility which may be unfamiliar and discomforting. Innocent and theoretical 
musings on cultural practices may be crystallised into legal doctrine and precedent. As 
McNeil remarks, anthropological evidence of the indigenous use of land in Canada at first 
contact has been used to determine not just the existence of such a right but also its extent.40 
Similarly, in the United States anthropological evidence is often decisive when tribes are 
claiming federal recognition as it must be demonstrated that the tribal entity “comprises a 
distinct community and has existed as a community from historical times to the present.”41 
 
Comparative 
“If the Great Spirit had desired me to be a white man he would have made me so in the 
first place. He put in your heart certain wishes and plans, in my heart he put other and 
different desires. Each man is good in his sight. It is not necessary for eagles to be crows.” 
(Sitting Bull)42 
 
One aim of this thesis was to provide something of practical use for indigenous 
communities in North America. To this end, a comparative approach can emphasise 
different trajectories and undermine the “taken for granted” development of jurisprudence 
in one country.43 This can have practical benefits in terms of cross-fertilisation between 
jurisdictions of successful legal strategies and in the search for common ground solutions.  
On the other hand, a comparative approach adds to the complexity and range of 
the inquiry which will inevitably involve a lack of some detail and may involve the 
sacrificing of analysis for description. Furthermore, a comparative treatment may be seen 
as an artificial posture of originality which may conceal other weaknesses of the thesis with 
                                                          
40 McNeil, K “The Meaning of Aboriginal Title” from Asch, M. (ed) (1997). Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in 
Canada : Essays on Law, Equity, and Respect for Difference. Vancouver, UBC Press. pp153-154 
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42 Deloria, V. (1973) op.cit., p205 
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the various elements being treated alongside, rather than as an integral whole.44 There 
seems to be no satisfactory refutation of these concerns except to suggest that, on balance, 
the benefits of a cross-border dialogue and potential importation of strategies prevail over 
these difficulties.  
In addition to the overall comparative treatment between Canada and the United 
States, this study had several other comparisons: there were treatments of the different 
worldviews of the Indian and Western peoples, together with their differing religious 
traditions, and a general comparison between liberalism and tribalism. The different 
relationships of spirituality and legality were assessed within each culture and also how 
Indian religious traditions fared within majoritarian jurisprudence, both in comparison to 
other minority religions, and mainstream Judaeo-Christian traditions. Although there have 
been at least two quantitative studies on the comparison of the success of minority 
religions in North American litigation this study was mainly qualitative.45  
 
B) Genocide  
The Residential Schools as Death Camps 
Although the question of whether there was actual physical genocide was not the main 
enquiry of this thesis, the number of children that perished in the schools must be 
mentioned. The death rate for Indian children in US schools has not been comprehensively 
documented and in practice children were often sent home to die, thus forming part of 
reservation statistics.46 Data for individual schools may be extrapolated: In the first year of 
the Carlisle school, 21 out of 136 died; between the years 1881 and 1894 only twenty-six 
out of 73 Shoshone and Arapaho pupils at Carlisle, the Genoa Industrial School and the 
Santee Indian boarding schools survived.47 Indeed, William McConnell a BIA inspector 
commented in 1899 that, “The word ‘murder’ is a terrible word, but we are little less than 
murderers if we follow the course we are now following after the attention of those in 
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charge has been called to its fatal results.”48The main killer was Tuberculosis, with a 
Smithsonian Institution Study of 1908 concluding that only one out of every five children 
was entirely free of the disease. The causes were poor diet, sanitation, overcrowded 
accommodation, and lodging the sick with the healthy.49Later in 1924 an American Red 
Cross report was so damning in its findings as to the health of the pupils that it was 
conveniently buried by the Commissioner Charles Burke.50 
Reverend Annett describes the equivalent Canadian schooling system as a 
systemized extermination camp.51 Approximately fifty per cent of students passing through 
the system died for a total of approximately fifty thousand dead.52 Many of the bodies have 
never been recovered. Forcible sterilization of adolescents, widespread sexual abuse, rape, 
medical experimentation, deliberate infection with tuberculosis, torture, mental cruelty and 
general degradation were some of the techniques used.53 Legislation passed as late as 1933 
in British Columbia and 1928 in Alberta permitted the sterilization of any residential school 
inmate.54 In 1920 British Columbia made it compulsory for native children to attend 
residential schools; this was despite the territorial government’s acknowledgment that the 
death rate was higher than non-native schools.55 The per capita basis of funding encouraged 
the admission of unhealthy children: “the existence of the school is made to depend on the 
Government Grant, and if the healthy children cannot be secured then the unhealthy are 
taken, to the destruction of all.”56Dr Josef Mengele is reputed to have honed his skills on 
residential school native children in collaboration with the notorious Montreal psychiatrist 
Ewen Cameron at the Upjohn and Bayer laboratories in Ontario.57  
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The last government residential school closed in 1983.58 The Canadian 
Government of Jean Chretien issued an apology on January 7 1998 and set aside a “healing 
fund” of $350 million for victims of the schools.59 This was primarily intended to 
compensate for the sexual and physical violence, rather than the cultural destruction and 
provided a Common Experience Payment. 
 
International Law on Genocide 
The problem with the list of seemingly protective International Law documents in 
Chapter 11 is that they are either soft law and unenforceable, such as UN declarations, or 
that the United States and Canada are not parties to the relevant conventions.60 Similarly, 
indigenous peoples often lack legal personality to pursue their interests in international 
fora. Thus International Law on Indigenous Peoples sets at best a framework for 
determining more substantive rights, at worst it is a mere vacuous exhortation. 
Yet International Law is not completely redundant, should there indeed be a 
relevant ratified and implemented treaty or alternatively where the issue is so grave as to 
constitute jus cogens Customary International Law. The Genocide Convention is one example of 
implemented law as well as its undoubted jus cogens status. 
Nazi attempts to extinguish large sections of non-Aryan Europeans during the 
Second World War provided the stimulus for the adoption of the United Nations Genocide 
Convention (1948).  Article II, lists the five activities that constitute genocide: “killing 
members of [a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such]” (IIa) “Causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group” (IIb) ; “Deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part” (IIc) ; “Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group” (IId) ; and 
“Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” (IIe)  
In the context of native residential schools, described in Chapter 5, arguably all 
five elements of article II were committed by the United States and Canada. For our 
purposes article IIe, the forcible transfer of children to residential schools was definitely 
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pursued and any, not all, of the activities constitute genocide.61 As Curcio remarks, the 
school attendees could also have claims, under II(a), II (b) and II (c), that there  was 
deliberate killing, the infliction of serious bodily injury or mental harm, as well as general 
conditions of their confinement which deliberately inflicted conditions of life “calculated 
to bring about physical destruction in whole or in part.”62 Evidence for an organized 
killing programme is perhaps controversial. The infliction of mental harm is more easily 
demonstrable by the suppression of languages, religion and identity together with a 
systematic denigration of their culture. As for inflicting “conditions of life calculated to 
bring about physical destruction” the lodging of the sick with the well was a policy that 
was pursued in order to maximise revenue due to the per capita system, even though it was 
well understood that this spread diseases such as tuberculosis.  
Forced sterilisation, in violation of II (d), was also carried out on adolescents. 
Indeed, in the United States a systematic campaign of forced sterilization of adult Indian 
women began in the 1930s and continued until much later: it has been estimated that 
between the early 70s and early 80s more than 42% of women of childbearing age were 
involuntarily sterilized.63   
Of course the Convention cannot be applied retrospectively to actions before 1948, 
although it is possible that the prohibition against genocide was Customary International 
Law before then, as evidenced by the Nuremberg Principles. In any case, the North 
American Governments continued such activities long after 1948. 
Lemkin, who coined the term genocide, originally included “cultural genocide” or 
“ethnocide” in the definition: “a coordinated plan of different action aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of the political and social institutions, of culture, 
language, national feelings, religion.”64 Canada and the United States lobbied successfully 
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against this inclusion hoping to restrict the definition to mass killing, which would give 
them an excuse to disavow the Convention on the grounds that such action was already 
punishable by domestic law.65  
Canada’s parliament voted in 1952 to bring its laws into line with the Convention yet 
only two of the prohibited acts found their way into Canadian law. The sections of the 
Canadian Criminal Code that implemented the Convention do not include:”Causing serious 
bodily or mental harm”, “Imposing measures intended to prevent births”, and “Forcibly 
transferring children.”66 The Customary Law nature of the Convention arguably circumvents 
these omissions. 
The United States ratified and implemented the Convention by the Genocide 
Convention Implementing Act of 1988 (Proxmire Act),67 with two reservations requiring firstly, 
U.S. consent to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and secondly, making 
the Convention subject to the U.S. Constitution.  
The U.S. reservations have been criticised as being at odds with the purpose of the 
treaty and thus legally unacceptable. However, due to the potentially jus cogens nature of the 
law against genocide, the Proxmire Act is arguably irrelevant.68 Furthermore, obligations are 
erga omnes. 69 As a matter of International Law the United States is bound internationally by 
its signing and ratification of the Convention so although a domestic prosecution may be 
impractical any competent tribunal would suffice. Yet finding a tribunal to which the 
United States has accepted jurisdiction and in which Indians would have locus standi is not 
straightforward. It would be a brave country indeed that sought a prosecution of a 
government official or church member who happened to be in transit in its country on the 
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basis of the Universal Jurisdiction that attaches to genocide.70 Canada has however 
accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC.71 
As for any defence of limitation periods the Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity has not been ratified by the 
United States or Canada but it is arguably jus cogens Customary International Law.72 
Additionally, Indians could argue that any limitation period has not begun, or that the 
harm is ongoing due to intergenerational effects, or that the failure to redress the harm is 
actually a harm in itself.73  
In summary, both countries’ unforgiveable treatment of Indian boarding school 
children arguably amounts to at least one, if not all five, definitions of genocide. Should the 
governments’ conduct not be regarded as secular genocide, the history of the treatment of 
Indian religion both sides of the border has undoubtedly amounted to spiritual genocide.   
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